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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liabilitycompany,
OPENING BRIEF
OF
CROSS-PETITIONER
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ON WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

Cross-Petitioner
vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
body politic and political
subdivision of the State
of Utah,

[ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED]
Case No. 20040365-SC

Cross-Petitioner

DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. is a Utah
limited

liability

company.

Its

principal

is

Scott M

McCleary, a natural person. The entity name is derived from
the first letters of the first names of Mr McCleary's three
adult children: Ben, Ashley and Matt.
Cross-Petitioner

SALT LAKE COUNTY is a Utah body

politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company,
OPENING BRIEF
OF
CROSS-PETITIONER
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT
ON WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

Cross-Petitioner
vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
body politic and political
subdivision of the State
of Utah,
Cross-Petitioner

[ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED]
Case No. 20040365-SC

CITATION TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Court of Appeals decision for which certiorari
review has been granted is B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. vs
Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, 87 P. 3d 710 (Utah App
2004),

decided

20

February

2004,

Appellate

Case No.

20010840-CA [hereinafter "the Decision"] . A photocopy of the
Decision is included herein at APPENDIX #1 of this BRIEF.
STATEMENT OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over the "appeal" originally was exercised
pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2-2(3) (j) , Utah
Code [Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction for
appeals of civil cases from the District Court]. The Utah
Supreme Court

"poured over" the case to the Court of

Appeals, which issued its opinion on 20 February 2004, 2004
UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah App 2004). The Utah Supreme

Court granted the parties' cross-petitions for writ of
certiorari in August 2004.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an "inverse condemnation" case to obtain "just
compensation" for "physical takings" of private property,
"taken" as development exactions by a government entity as
a condition of subdivision development approval. The three
issues specified for certiorari review by the Utah Supreme
Court of the Court of Appeals Decision are contained with
the Utah Supreme Court's August 2 0 04 order, thus:
Issue #1: Whether the Nollan/Dolan
"rough
proportionality" test applies where an alleged
taking results from a uniform land-use scheme
rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative
decision. [Hereinafter "Issue #1"]
Issue #2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding the district court's review was limited to
the administrative record. [Hereinafter "Issue
#2"]
Issue #3: Whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah
Code permits review regardless of the state of the
administrative record. [Hereinafter "Issue #3"]
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the Decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals

not of the trial court

for

correctness; the conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals
are afforded no deference. Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company vs Wall, 978 P.2d 460 at 461 (Utah Supreme Court
1999) .
Cross-Petitioner

B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT

strenuously

disputes the COUNTY'S intentional mischaracterization [p. 2

of its OPENING BRIEF: under the heading
REVIEW"] of the case

"STANDARD OF

as being a "facial challenge" to the

Ordinance.1 This case is an "inverse condemnation" case to
obtain

"just compensation"

(e.g. monetary payment) for

unconstitutionally excessive exactions (land dedication and
required improvements). In response to the COUNTY'S claim
that the "standard of review" for the "facial challenge"
which this case primarily isn' t

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT asserts

the

of

intentional

avoidance

the

constitutional

proscriptions of the Just Compensation Clause is never a
"legitimate state interest".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1997 B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, as owner of a 15-acre
parcel located immediately adjacent to 3500 South Street
actually a "state highway" subject to the jurisdiction of
the Utah Department of Transportation [UDOT]

applied to

SALT LAKE COUNTY for development approval of the "Westridge
Meadows" subdivision development. The proposed subdivision
presented no unique or difficult geologic, topographic or
similar engineering or other considerations. The proposed
lot configuration and other improvements readily conformed
to existing zoning requirements. What should have been a
x

The COUNTY'S evaluation of the case from page 3 of its
OPENING BRIEF, namely, "This case involves claims [that] .
. . the County violated BAM's constitutional guarantees of
just compensation for "takings" of private property . . ."
is much more accurately and fairly stated.
3

relatively simple administrative procedure requiring three
or four months actually took two years (until August 1999)
to complete.
In August

1998

the COUNTY Board

of

Commissioners

summarily refused to hear B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT'S appeal of
County Planning and Zoning Commission's requirements
per the COUNTY'S "highway-abutting" Ordinance
DEVELOPMENT,

as

a

condition

of

development

as

that B.A.M.
approval,

dedicate and improve a 53-foot "half-width" of the 3500
South state highway. This litigation was filed in August
1998. In August 1999
filed

one year AFTER the litigation was

the COUNTY finally granted development approval and

required the dedication and installation of the roadway and
other improvements to the 3500 South state highway, which
previously had a "half-width" of asphalt for eastbound
traffic of approximately

17 feet, with a then-current

"traffic load" of slightly less than 13,000 vehicles per day
(both

directions).

improvements

In

(interior

addition
streets,

to

the

sidewalks,

"internal"
etc.)

as

regularly required for the building lots directly served by
those public improvements, B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT installed the
"excessive" improvements mandated by the COUNTY for the 3 500
South state roadway.
The litigation was tried in the Third District Court in
April 2001 before Judge Timothy R Hansen, who ruled in favor

4

of the COUNTY: to the effect that there was a "rational
basis"

for

the

requirements. The

COUNTY'S

dedication

judgment

of

and

improvement

the District

Court was

appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which "poured over" the
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. In October 2002 the
Court of Appeals heard oral arguments and took the case
"under advisement". In February 2004 the Court of Appeals
issued its Decision, joined by a 2-member majority and with
one Judge dissenting. The three judges, however, were
unanimous in concluding that the so-called Nollan-Dolan
standard was the correct analytical standard to be applied,
thus overruling the District Court on that legal issue.
However, the Court of Appeals majority
having been raised or briefed

without the issue

sua sponte raised the

"administrative remand" issue. B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT sought for
a "petition for rehearing" on the "administrative remand"
issue, but after full consideration of the "petition for
rehearing" request, the "rehearing" was denied.
Thereafter, both parties filed cross-petitions for writ
of certiorari. The cross-petitions were granted and the
cases consolidated, with the Supreme Court specifying the
three issues reserved for review.
SUMMARY OF B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENTS
Herein

B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT

arguments, summarized thus:

5

asserts

the

following

1.

The Nollan-Dolan standards of "essential nexus",

"reasonable relationship", "individualized determination"
and "rough proportionality" are, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, directly and dispositively applicable to
the excessive dedications and improvements identified in
this litigation.
2.

The excessive dedication and installed improvements

for the 3500 South state roadway also violate the Utah
"constitutional standard of reasonableness", as previously
developed

by

Development

the Utah
(1981)

Supreme

Court

decision

in

the

interpreting

Banberry
the

Utah

Constitution.
3.

The

excessive

improvements

required

by

dedications
the

COUNTY

and

installed

pursuant

to

the

"highway-abutting" Ordinance also violate national and state
constitutional law principles of "equal protection" and
"uniform operation of laws".
4.

The

"administrative

remand"

provisions

and

disposition of the Utah Court of Appeals, raised sua sponte
and without the benefit of any briefing, is improvident and
misguided, and must be affirmatively addressed, overruled
and clarified by the Supreme Court.
5.

The provisions of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code,

expressly directing that no "administrative hearing" is
needed

as

a

pre-condition

fi

to

bringing

an

"inverse

condemnation" claim for a "physical taking" or an "exaction
by a political subdivision" is applicable and controlling:
to override the "administrative remand" portions of the
Court of Appeals Decision.
ARGUMENT
I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE DECISIONS
OF THE UNITED STATE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF
NOLLAN VS CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION (1987) AND OF
DOLAN VS CITY OF TIGARD (1994) AND THE DECISIONS
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF
CALL VS CITY OF WEST JORDAN (1980) AND OF
BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT VS SOUTH JORDAN CITY (1981) ARE
APPLICABLE TO THE GEOGRAPHY-BASED "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING"
ORDINANCE AND ENTITLE THE ADVERSELY AFFECTED
DEVELOPER TO AN AWARD OF JUST COMPENSATION
FOR SUCH EXCESSIVE DEDICATIONS AND EXACTIONS
TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE IN CONTRADICTION OF THOSE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
This is a case of "inverse condemnation" brought by a
propertyowner
government

[B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT]

against

a

local

[SALT LAKE COUNTY] for excessive development

"exactions": excessive real estate dedications AND required
improvement of that real estate, beyond that "reasonably"
required (created) by the development. The "taking" claims
arise from the admitted, straight-up physical occupation of
real estate AND from the required expenditure of private
monies for the development of roadway-related improvements
thereof. The "takings" claims of B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT are
brought under the national Constitution and under the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
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A
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARDS OF
"ESSENTIAL NEXUS", "REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP"
"INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATION" AND
"ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" ARE DIRECTLY
AND EXPRESSLY APPLICABLE TO THE
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING" CLAIMS RAISED IN
THIS "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" ACTION
TO RECOVER JUST COMPENSATION
FOR THE EXCESSIVE IN-KIND EXACTIONS
("PHYSICAL TAKINGS") EFFECTED PURSUANT TO
THE COUNTY'S "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
cases of Nollan vs California Coastal Commission 483 US 825,
97 LEd2d 677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987) [hereinafter "Nollan" and
attached hereto at APPENDIX #2] , and of Dolan vs City of
Tigard

(1994), 512 US 374, 129 Led2d 304, 114 Set 2309

(1994) , [hereinafter "Dolan" and attached hereto as APPENDIX
#3], speak for themselves. The applicability of Nollan and
Dolan

and the constitutional principles those decisions

identify and require

will be readily apparent to the Court

upon its reading thereof. The B.A.M. Development "Westridge
Meadows" situation
Dolan thereto

and the applicability of Nollan and of

is predicated upon a relatively-finite,

small set of core facts, encapsulated in but two sentences,
thus:
1.

As a condition of development approval for a

routine

44-lot

residential

pursuant

to

provisions

the

abutting" Ordinance

subdivision
of

the

and

"highway-

[hereinafter the "highwaya

abutting" Ordinance]2, Defendant COUNTY required
the

Developer

dedicate

Plaintiff

(fee

simple

B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT

conveyance

permanent and irrevocable

effect)

to

for

"public use" and to

improve (as a "half-width" of a 7-lane highway)
approximately 38,000 square feet of previously
held "private property" to become public roadway
within

the

undertake,

3500
at

"improvements"
adjacent

South
its

Street

own

(pavement,

barrier

fencing,

area

and

to

private

expense,

curbing,

sidewalk,

storm-drain

line

upsizing, and power pole relocation).

2

The "highway abutting" Ordinance
as codified within
the County's ordinances and as included in the COUNTY'S
OPENING BRIEF [Appendix "2"]
provides:
15.28. 010

Dedication and improvement required.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.020,
no building or structure shall be erected,
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged,
and no building permit shall be issued therefor,
on any lot or parcel which abuts a major or
secondary highway, as shown on the map entitled
"The County Transportation Improvement Plan," on
file with the planning and development services
division and made part of this chapter by
reference, unless the portion of such lot or
parcel within the right-of-way of the highway to
be widened or additional required street width has
been dedicated to the county and improved. This
dedication and improvements shall meet the
standards for such highway or street improvement
as provided in Section 15.28.060.
Emphasis added.
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2.

The

"highway-abutting"

dedication

and

improvement requirements of the COUNTY'S Ordinance
are enforced against ONLY those parcels which are
"highway-abutting"; other developments, creating
equal or even greater demands (i.e. "impact") for
roadway improvement are exempt from the dedication
and

improvement

requirements

if they

are not

"highway-abutting".
The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework is relevant and
applicable in adjudicating the case-at-hand, for at least
the following reasons:
1.

The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework presents

a factual and legal setting which is, legally and
constitutionally, essentially "on-all-fours" with
the

instant

factual

situation:

the

"ocean-

abutting" easement at issue in Nollan and the
"creek-abutting" easement at issue in Dolan are
not

materially

distinguishable,

in

a

constitutional sense, from the "highway-abutting"
situation presented in the instant case.
2.

The Nollan-Dolan

analytical

framework

and

result are applicable to the case-at-hand, because
the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality"
standards are essentially the same constitutional
standards as have been previously developed and

in

adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the earlier
cases of Call vs City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217
(Utah 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1980)

[holding

the

dedication

must

bear

a

"reasonable relationship to the needs created by
the

development"]

and

Banberry

Development

Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 8 99
(Utah

1981)

standard

[establishing

of

the

"constitutional

reasonableness"

criteria

for

development exactions]. The decisions of the Utah
Supreme

Court

Development

in

Call

II

and

are binding precedent

in

Banberry

and clearly

establish the "state constitutional" basis and
minimum threshold to which the COUNTY government
must adhere.
3.

There is nothing in the Nollan or the Dolan

decisions which would support the COUNTY'S selfserving claim that the Nollan-Dolan

framework

should

abutting"

not

apply

to

the

"highway

Ordinance, and the exactions thereunder, whether
or not legislatively or administratively imposed:
the result upon the propertyowner is still the
same. In fact, the "highway-abutting" Ordinance
with its result that the unfortunate few "highwayabutting" parcels are "singled out" and forced to
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bear

the

entire

burden,

created

by

all

developments, which burden should be borne by the
public

at

developers
burden)

large

(or

at

contributing

least

by

those

their

share

other

to

that

carries with it the Nollan-identified

"heightened risk" that the "building prohibition"
imposed only against "highway-abutting" parcels is
merely an "out-and-out plan of extortion" [107 SCt
at

3149]

to

obtain

the

sought-for

"easement"

without making the "just compensation" payment.
That

the

"highway-abutting"

Ordinance

is

so

written and applied, so as to obtain real estate
and

improvements

in contravention

of

the

Just

Compensation Clause, should be readily apparent to
the Court.
B
THE EXACTIONS REQUIRED UNDER THE COUNTY'S
"HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE FAIL TO SATISFY
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
OF THE NOLLAN-DOLAN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
AND THE PROPERTYOWNER IS ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION
The Just Compensation Clause

sometimes referred to as

"the Takings Clause" or "the Property Clause"

of the Fifth

Amendment to the national Constitution provides:
. . . private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation; . . .
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong vs
United States, 364 US 40, 4 LEd2d 1554, 80 SCt 1563 (1960),
12

observed:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne by
the public as a whole•
364 US at 49, 80 SCt at 1569. Emphasis added.
In 1980

the United

States Supreme

Court, in its

decision of in the case of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Incorporated vs Beckwith, 449 US 155, 66 LEd2d 358, 101 SCt
446 (1980), had written:
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may
not transform private property into public
property without compensation, even for the
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary
use of governmental power.
449 US at 164, 101 SCt at 452. Emphasis added.
In 1922 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, writing the
majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Company vs Mahon, 26 0
US 393, 67 LEd 322, 43 SCt 158 (1922), warned and observed:
When th[e] seemingly absolute protection [of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] is found to be
qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private
property
disappears.
But
that
cannot
be
accomplished in this way under the Constitution of
the United States.
. . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change.
13

260 US at 415-416. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added
for clarity.
In 1992 the United States Supreme Court in Lucas vs
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 120 L.Ed 3d
798, 112 SCt 2886 (1992), wrote:
" [A] t least with regard to permanent invasions, no
matter how minute the intrusions, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have
required compensation."
505 US at 1015, 112 SCt at 2893. Emphasis added.
In 2001 the United States Supreme Court again had
opportunity to revisit the "Just Compensation Clause" in the
case of Palazzolo vs Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 150 LEd2d
592, 121 SCt 2448 (2001), wherein the Court wrote:
The clearest sort of taking occurs when the
government encroaches upon or occupies private
land for its own proposed use. Our cases establish
that even a minimal "permanent physical occupation
of real property" requires compensation under the
Clause.
533 US at 617, 121 SCt at 2457. Emphasis added. Citation to
cases omitted.
Although the federal "takings" jurisprudence has had a
seemingly-convoluted history, in the spring of 1987 the
United States Supreme Court issued two truly "landmark"
decisions

which

had

an

explosive

impact

upon

governments nationwide. The first of these decisions

local
First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vs Los
Angeles County, 482 US 304, 107 SCt 2378 (1987), decided 9

14

June 1987

held that a county may be liable for a "taking"

effected pursuant to temporary building moratorium imposed
for public safety purpose]. The second "landmark" decision
from 1987 was Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 483
US 825, 97 LEd2d 677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987)

[hereinafter

referred to as "Nollan"] , decided two weeks later. The
majority opinion in Nollan is relatively short and to-thepoint; the decision "speaks for itself". The Court will be
familiar with its analytical method and conclusion.
In Nollan the governmental entity
Coastal

Commission]

had

required,

as

[the California
a

condition

of

development (demolition of an existing residential structure
and replacement thereof with a larger residential structure)
approval,

that

the

easement"

across

propertyowner
privately-held

dedicate
beachfront

a

"public
property

immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. The United States
Supreme Court analyzed that the required "easement" would be
a "permanent physical occupation", 107 SCt at 3146, entitled
to compensation, and wrote:
Given,
then,
that
requiring
uncompensated
conveyance of the easement outright would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, the question becomes
whether requiring it to be a conveyance as a
condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the
outcome.
107 SCt at 3147. Emphasis added. The Court further observed:
But the right to build on one's own property
even though its exercise can be subjected to
legitimate
permitting
requirements
cannot
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remotely be described as a "governmental benefit."
And thus the announcement that the application for
(or granting of) the permit will entail the
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded
as establishing a voluntary "exchange" . . .
107 SCt at 3147. Footnote 2. Emphasis added. Citations to
cases omitted.
The Supreme Court observed a factual setting which is
exactly-on-point

in

the

3500

South

Street

dedication

situation. The Supreme Court wrote:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the
burden of California's attempt to remedy these
problems, although they had not contributed to it
more than other coastal landowners, the State's
actions, even if otherwise valid, might violate
either the incorporated Takings Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal
purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole•"
107 SCt at 3148. Footnote 4. Emphasis added. Citation to
cases omitted.
After reviewing the previous history of the issue, the
Supreme Court focused on the "imposition of the condition"
(i.e. the mandated

dedication of the easement

to the

government) in the context of the "development prohibition"
(i.e. the exercise of the government's 'police power' to
prohibit the development outright). The Court observed such
a required

"dedication" would be constitutional

if it

"serves the same end" as the prohibition. 107 SCt at 3148.
The Nollan Court, however, went on to say:
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The evident constitutional propriety disappears,
however, if the condition substituted for the
prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition.
When that essential nexus is eliminated, the
situation . . . [lengthy discussion about
prohibition against shouting fire in a theater,
but authorized were a monetary fee paid to the
State] . . . would not pass constitutional muster.
107 SCt at 3148-3149. Emphasis added. [Bracketed material
added for clarity: please refer to original text.] The Court
then continued:
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something
other than what it was. The purpose then becomes,
quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to
serve some valid governmental purpose, but without
payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer
limits of "legitimate state interests" in the
takings and land-use context, this is not one of
them. In short, unless the permit condition serves
the same governmental purpose as the development
ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but "an out-and-out plan of
extortion."
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. Citation to cases omitted.
The COUNTY argues [Page 19 of COUNTY'S brief] that the
"highway-abutting" Ordinance is needed to further "sensible
long-range
justification

transportation
(i.e.

planning".

"long-range

.

.

That

claimed

. planning")

is

FUTURISTIC and ipso facto confirms the violation of the
Nollan-Dolan standard, which requires a PRESENT impact and
an "individualized determination" of that PRESENT impact.
Thus, that sub-part of the "nexus" test fails. The COUNTY,
on the basis of "long-range . . . planning" cannot justify
17

the PRESENT installation of the improvements for 3500 South.
The

"Achilles'

overlooks

heel"

which

the

COUNTY

self-servingly

is the simple fact that there simply is NO

"building restriction" which is uniformly imposed against
ALL development which may be causing the traffic congestion.
[See APPENDIX
immediately

#7

showing

adjoining

the

area

developments:

location

and

"Elusive

the

Estates",

"Chaparral" and "Centennial" subdivisions. Against those
adjacent developments, which (on a "per lot" basis) arguably
put an equal amount of traffic (vehicles per day) onto 3500
South Street, NO "exactions" (dedication or improvements)
were required.] The "building restriction" selectivelyimposed against ONLY the "highway-abutting" parcels, is
for these constitutional purposes

not a valid "permit

condition"; the restriction is simply a pretext to avoid the
Just Compensation Clause and for that reason there can be no
"nexus" established. The COUNTY'S "purpose" (of the "permit
condition": dedication required) has been "converted" into
"something other than what it was." Id. at 3149. Concerning
the

"purpose"

(of

the

"permit

condition":

dedication

required) the Supreme Court in Nollan continued:
The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the
obtaining of an easement to serve some valid
governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation.
Id. at 3149. Emphasis added. The Ordinance fails the Nollan
standard. The result of the Ordinance, with its "building
i ft

restriction"

imposed,

however,

against

ONLY

"highway-

abutting" parcels is readily observable to even the most
casual observer. The Supreme Court in Nollan continued:
We therefore find that the Commission's imposition
of the permit condition cannot be treated as an
exercise of its land-use power for any of these
purposes. Our conclusion on this point is
consistent with the approach taken by every other
court that has considered the question, with the
exception of the California state courts.
107 SCt at 3149-3150. Citations to numerous cases omitted.
In that listing the Supreme Court cited to the decision of
Call vs West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) ["Call II"] .
The United States Supreme Court continued:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to
be more than a pleading requirement, and
compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier,
our cases describe the condition for abridgement
of property rights through the police power as a
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the objective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is a heightened risk that the
purpose
is avoidance
of
the
compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. In the instant setting,
the "heightened risk" that the TRUE "purpose" behind the
COUNTY'S arbitrarily-applied "highway- abutting" dedication
requirement (but non-existent "building ban") IS readily and
unavoidably apparent and transparent: the "avoidance of the
compensation requirement", as the foregoing text identifies.

19

The COUNTY'S claim that the stated police power objective
(of "long-range
right-of-way)

transportation planning"
is

disingenuous,

as

and acquiring

well

as

being

unconstitutionally applied. This is exactly the setting
which is/creates "a heightened risk" that the development
exaction (i.e. the roadway dedication and improvements) is
for the "avoidance of the compensation requirement". Such is
transparently clear from even the most casual reading of the
COUNTY'S "highway-abutting Ordinance". As the Supreme Court
warned against, the COUNTY has
mandate

engaged

in

the

in disregard of the Court's

"exercise

of

cleverness

and

imagination"; that "cleverness and imagination" nevertheless
does not satisfy the demands of the Constitution.
In examining the Coastal Commission's "comprehensive
program"

which is, arguably, the functional equivalent to

the COUNTY'S assertedly "uniform and comprehensive plan" of
requiring

"highway-abutting"

dedication and improvements

parcels

to

effect

the

the Nollan opinion concluded:

. . . The Commission may well be right that it is
a good idea, but that does not establish that the
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be
compelled do contribute to its realization.
Rather, California is free to advance its
"comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using
its power of eminent domain for this "public
purpose" see U.S. Const. Amdt. 5; but if it wants
an easement across Nollan's property, it must pay
for it.
107 SCt

at

3151. Emphasis

added.

That

constitutional

principle and conclusion is self-evidently applicable to the
20

"highway-abutting" exaction requirements at issue here.
The Nollan decision would not have been materially
different in its result had the California Legislature, by
statute,

declared

that

all owners

of

"ocean-abutting"

parcels needing building permits are required to dedicate a
"public easement" across their parcels at water's edge.
Nollan was decided

and constitutes "the law of the land"--

-on the basis of substantive, "constitutional" principles,
not on some procedural technicality (i.e. how the "taking"
decision was made and/or by whom).
In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 129 LEd2d 304,
114 SCt 2309 (1994), the United States Supreme Court had
occasion to revisit and further explain the constitutional
principles discussed in Nollan seven years earlier. In Dolan
the

propertyowner

enlargement
directly

sought

development

approval

of an existing retail store upon property

abutting

development

had

"Fanno

approval

the

Creek".

As

a

municipality

condition
required

of
the

dedication of a "public easement" along the creek together
with installation of a walkway and bicycle path within the
dedicated easement. In Dolan the United States Supreme Court
introduced the "takings" issue thus:
We granted certiorari to resolve a question left
open by our decision in Nollan
v.
California
Coastal Comm'n, of what is the required degree of
connection between the exactions imposed by the
city and the projected impacts of the proposed
development.
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Id. at 377, 114 SCt at 2312. Emphasis added. Citation
omitted.
The Dolan majority

then proceeded

to discuss the

relevant "constitutional" issues, including a review of the
pertinent

case law

"standards"

(and phrasing of those

"standards"), as developed by the state courts. The Supreme
Court again cited to this Court's 1979 decision in the case
of Call vs West Jordan,
"authority" for the

606 P.2d 217

(Utah 1979), as

"reasonable relationship" test, as

adopted by the majority of state courts which had adopted
judicial

tests

for

exactions. The

described two other tests

Supreme

Court

also

a very "lax" standard followed

by a couple states (Montana and New York) and the "specific
and uniquely attributable" standard followed by Illinois.
The Supreme Court observed that the great majority of state
courts which had ruled on the issue followed the "reasonable
relationship" standard. In holding against the municipality,
the United States Supreme Court in Dolan wrote:
One of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness, should be borne by the public as a
whole."
Under
the
well-settled
doctrine
of
"unconstitutional conditions", the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional
right
here
the
right
to
receive
just
compensation when property is taken for public
use
in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the property has

little or no relationship to the benefit.
114 SCt at 2316-2317. Emphasis added.
In attempting to define the "degree of the exactions
demanded by the city's permit conditions bears to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development" [114
SCt at 2318], the Court, initially quoting a Nebraska
Supreme Court decision, wrote:
"The distinction, therefore, which must
be made between an appropriate exercise
of the police power and an improper
exercise of eminent domain is whether the
requirement
has
some
reasonable
relationship or nexus to the use to which
the property is being made or is merely
being used as an excuse for taking
property
simply
because
at
that
particular moment the landowner is asking
the city for some license or permit."
Thus, the court held a city may not require a
property owner to dedicate property for some
future public use as a condition for obtaining a
building permit when such future use is not
"occasioned by the construction sought to be
permitted."
Some form of the reasonable relationship test
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions.
[Citations to cases omitted.] Despite any semantic
differences, general agreement exists among the
courts "that the dedication should have some
reasonable relationship to the needs created by
the [development]."
We think the "reasonable relationship" test
adopted by a majority of the states courts is
closer to the federal constitutional norm than
either of those previously discussed. But we do
not adopt it as such, partly because the term
"reasonable
relationship"
seems
confusingly
similar to the term "rational basis" which
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
We
think
a
term
such
as
"rough
23

proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but
the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and
other authorities

cited in original Supreme Court text

have been omitted.]
In response
COUNTY

to

provided

"pre-trial
the

discovery11

"individualized

calculations, made in January 2001

requests, the
determination"

almost THREE YEARS

AFTER the COUNTY first imposed the exactions. The singlepage, hand-written "individualized determination" document
[attached hereto as APPENDIX #8] states, in its entirety:
January 24 2001
EXHIBIT
11

Bam Development
822' frontage
1997 adt 3500 S

12910

1998

13385

"

"

2015 adt projected
2020 adt projected

)
) 4% increase
)

17000 vpd
23000 vpd

if current 4% keeps up

2020 = 29000 vpd

typically design for level of service C (LOS)
development traffic

487 vpd

current roadway = 3 lanes
LOS

D

LOS E = 15952 vpd (3 lanes)
LOS C = 29000 vpd (7 lanes)
on cusp of failing--requires widening to 7 lanes
by year 2020
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The abbreviations "vpd" and "adt" apparently refer to
"vehicles

per

day"

and

to

"average

daily

trips"

respectively. "LOS" refers to "level of service": a somewhat
subjective determination as to the carrying capacity of the
roadway, as characterized by waiting times. The FUTURISTIC
analysis contained within the "individualized determination"
underscores the COUNTY'S failure to identify the PRESENT
needs

allegedly

generated

by

the

Westridge

Meadows

development. If the existing 17-foot roadway was at "level
of service D" , B.A.M. shouldn't have been required to
construct the "half-width" to the "level of service C"
standard, thus "remedying pre-existing deficiencies".

If

the 487 vehicles per day is compared against the existing
(approximately) 13385 vehicles per day, on an "buy-in"
basis, then approximately l/25th of the existing "roadway"
(i.e. paved asphalt) is needed: against the 17 feet of preexisting asphalt, that's another seven or eight inches, but
that's all. If the 487 vehicles generated by Westridge
Meadows is compared against the 27,000 vehicles per day of
the 7-lane roadway after full installation (i.e. B.A.M.'s
"half-width"), as calculated to be needed in "year 2020",
for which B.A.M.

was PRESENTLY required

to build the

"eastbound half-width", the "Westridge" share is 487/27000,
or about l/55ths: 1.8 percent. B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT ought to
be paying 1.8% of the 3500 South improvement costs. Having
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paid 100% of the costs, B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT "overpaid" by
approximately 55 TIMES TOO MUCH; such is hardly "roughly
proportional". The COUNTY fails another element of Dolan.
The COUNTY asserts [p. 34 of its OPENING BRIEF] that
Nollan and Dolan are two "discrete", separate "analytical
models" which can be "readily separated". The COUNTY'S selfserving analysis and statement are obviously incorrect and
misguided. Nollan and Dolan are expressly and logically
intertwined: the two decisions represent the Supreme Court's
identification and application of constitutional principles
which are applicable in the case-at-hand. As can be seen,
the two decisions must obviously be read together. As is
readily apparent Dolan constitutes the Court's more-recent
pronouncement and continuing development of the long-line of
cases, for which Nollan was merely the culminating (i.e.
"landmark") decision most clearly and decidedly bringing the
constitutional principles into focus. As such, Nollan and
Dolan are essentially inseparable; the two decisions must,
as intended, be read together. In the same vein, the local
government

the

COUNTY

must

satisfy

the

stated

"constitutional" restrictions and prerequisites specified in
BOTH decisions. Satisfaction of one element
incorrectly

asserts

that

the Nollan

the COUNTY

"nexus" test was

satisfied and. thus Dolan doesn't even apply, with the result
that the COUNTY goes free

is not enough: the COUNTY must
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satisfy ALL the criteria of the 4-element

Nollan-Dolan

standard.
Correctly understood, the

legislatively-determined,

geography-based exaction imposed pursuant to the COUNTY
Ordinance

with seeming (i.e. claimed) no administrative

discretion allowed for site-specific issues or impacts
fails the Nollan-Dolan test:
1.

There is no "essential nexus" and certainly no

"legitimate" governmental purpose (in evading the
Just Compensation Clause).
2-

There

is

no

meaningful

or

relevant

"individualized determination" that the exactions
required of B.A.M. were related in "nature and
extent" between the conditions and the impact.
There

was

(and

continues

"highway-abutting"
COUNTY

claims

no

to

Ordinance,
discretion

be,
for
is

under
which
allowed)

the
the
no

"quantification" of findings.
3.

There is (was and has been) no demonstration

of "rough proportionality".3 This is particularly
3

The January 2001 calculations made the COUNTY on the
eve of trial and only in response to the Plaintiff's pretrial discovery request, fail to satisfy the "individualized
determination" requirement. First, such was not done at the
time (i.e. BEFORE) the dedication, as Dolan requires.
Secondly, because the actual calculations
which are
actually more estimates of the future roadway capacity for
decades into the future
are not "individualized" for the
Westridge Meadows subdivision (44 lots).
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critical, given the fact that Dolan imposes upon
the local government the "burden" of establishing
the

constitutionality

requirement,

in

of

context

the
of

dedication
the

"rough

proportionality" of the "taking"!
On that basis, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff's
assertion

but not necessarily Plaintiff's allegation

that the COUNTY'S

"dedication" requirement, if not the

Ordinance in particular

was "facially" unconstitutional

was and is directly on point.
If the "Elusive Estates" subdivision, a couple hundred
feet further to the south and which paid no "de facto impact
fee" because that development did not "abut" onto 3500 South
Street, is considered, B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT paid a "de facto
traffic

impact

fee"

INFINITELY

TIMES

MORE

than

the

similarly-situated "Elusive Estates" subdivision "didn't
pay" .
The applicability of the Nollan-Dolan framework was
correctly recognized and properly accepted by all three
judges of

the Court

of Appeals

in the Decision.

[In

contrast, hardly any of the argument and none of the
obviously-inapplicable case-law "authority" cited by the
COUNTY to the

contrary was accepted by

the Court of

Appeals.] In light of the foregoing analysis, the dedication
and

improvement

exactions

required under
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the COUNTY'S

"highway-abutting" Ordinance fail under the Nollan-Dolan
analytical framework. The propertyowner is entitled to just
compensation. The Court of Appeals Decision recognizing the
applicability of the Nollan-Dolan standard should be upheld.
C
THE "ESSENTIAL NEXUS" AND "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY"
STANDARDS OF NOLLAN-DOLAN FRAMEWORK ARE THE
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE UTAH
"CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS"
AS DEVELOPED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
In addition to approaching and deciding the case on
"national" constitutional grounds (ala Nollan-Dolan), the
Court is requested to examine the claims on independent
"state" constitutional grounds.4 Cross-Petitioner B.A.M.
DEVELOPMENT

asserts

that

these

4

"state"

standards

are

The Supreme Court is requested to examine and
concurrently decide this case on "independent state
constitutional grounds", aside from and outside of the
Nollan-Dolan framework. This jurisprudential approach,
sometimes called "primacy", was identified
if not
developed
by scholarly jurists, regionally including
Associate Justice Hans A Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court.
See Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights", 9 University of Baltimore Law Review 379,
(1980). See also Carson, "Last Things Last: A Methodological
Approach to Legal Arguments in State Courts", 19 Willamette
Law Review 641 (1983), as prepared by Associate Justice
Wallace P Carson Jr of the Oregon Supreme Court.
In years past individual members of this Court
in
judicial decisions and/or in public forums
have invited
and suggested practitioners assert "independent state
constitutional grounds" as a basis for judicial relief. The
instant case represents such an opportunity, in which
governmental
interests
clash with
constitutionallyguaranteed "individual" rights (ala to receive "just
compensation" for "private property taken for public use").

OQ

functionally equivalent to the "national" standard

[of

Nollan-Dolan] , although their application may perhaps result
in an differing result. [For example, even if Nollan-Dolan
were found to be inapplicable, the "state" standards might
still justify

an award

of

"just compensation"

to the

propertyowner. ] However, this Court may view the welldeveloped body of "Utah constitutional law" on this subject
to be different from the national standard. If so, then the
suggestion (by the COUNTY) that the Court examine only the
national standard should not be followed; on the contrary,
the Court is requested to adjudicate all claims
and state

national

each of which have been pleaded and litigated

from the very inception of this litigation.
The "Just Compensation Clause" of the Utah Constitution
is found in Article I, Section 22, which provides:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.
Emphasis added.
Utah case law decisions, interpreting and applying the
Just Compensation Clause of the Utah Constitution, are
equally explicit and consistent in awarding compensation.
See, for example, Three D Corporation vs Salt Lake City, 752
P. 2d 1321
compensation

(Utah App. 1988)
when

[propertyowner

municipality

installed

entitled to
curb

which

interfered with access and parking on parcel, even though no
property was actually "taken" by government] ; Hampton vs

State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968)
[compensable

taking

occurred

when

Road

Commission

substantially interfered with owners only means of ingress
and egress (private driveway), even though there was no
actual taking of propertyowners real property]5; and Utah
State Road Commission vs Miya, 526 P. 2d 926 (Utah 1974)
[compensable taking occurred when government constructed
viaduct obstructing owner's view, thus decreasing property
value, and which interfered with privacy].
In 1979 the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in
the case of Call vs City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 187 (Utah
1979) [hereinafter "Call l»], on rehearing 614 P.2d 1280
(Utah 1980) [hereinafter "Call II"] . In Call I the Utah
Supreme Court was faced with and resolved a situation which
was to become

perhaps not a "landmark" decision

but

certainly at the time one of but a literal "handful" of
cases which at that time had addressed the issues of
development exactions and impact fees, as quoted by the
United States Supreme Court in Nollan in 1987 and thereafter
in Dolan in 1994. In Call I the subdivision developer had
5

The COUNTY will undoubtedly assert that the
propertyowners of the lots across the northern end of
Westridge Meadows have "public street" access by the street
frontage to the south. Thus, the impassible fencing adjacent
to 3500 South Street does not raise Three D-type or Hamptontype issues. Arguably so, but the flip-side to that argument
is the fact then that the 3500 South fencing (and the other
roadway improvements) should not have been required at all.
The COUNTY loses.
O 1

challenged the in-kind exaction (i.e. dedication of real
estate) and the in-lieu-of "impact fee". The Call I Court
upholding the validity of the dedication ordinance

wrote:

. . . the ordinance should be applied fairly, and
without favoritism or discrimination
606 P. 2d 221. In Call I the unconstitutionality of the
municipal ordinance was not specifically alleged by the
challengers. Consequently, as a matter of "constitutional
law", Call I is essentially void of any "constitutional"
reference. On "petition for rehearing", the Court wrote:
the dedication should have some reasonable
relationship
to the need created by the
subdivision.
Call II. 614 P.2d at 1258. Emphasis added. Citations to
footnotes omitted.
Any jurisprudential narrowness in the Call I and the
Call II decisions from a "constitutional" sense was brushed
aside by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Banberry
Development Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899
(Utah 1981) [hereinafter "Banberry Development"] decided a
year later. [Banberry Development is contained herein as
APPENDIX #4 to this OPENING BRIEF.] In Banberry Development
the Utah Supreme Court, referring to an earlier Utah Supreme
Court decision and quoting a decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court, wrote:
. . . if the burden cast upon the subdivider is
reasonably attributable to his activity, then the
requirement [of dedication or fees in lieu

thereof! is permissible; if not, it is forbidden
and amounts to a confiscation of private property
in
contravention
of
the
constitutional
prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation
under the police power.
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. Bracketed material in
original text. In Banberry Development the Utah Supreme
Court identified and described "the constitutional standard
of reasonableness"

[531 P. 2d at 904.] applicable to the

situation (i.e. "the validity of subdivision charges"). The
Banberry Development opinion noted that the impact fee
should

"fall

situated"

equitably

upon

those

who

are

similarly

[631 P. 2d at 905. Emphasis added.] and that

between various developers

contributing

to development

needs, the exactions must be imposed in an "equality of
treatment" manner [631 P.2d 904] . The Banberry Development
opinion also noted that "[t]he 'fair contribution' of the
connecting party should not exceed 'the expense thereof met
by others' [631 P.2d at 903] and that to comply with the
standard of "reasonableness" the fees and dedications must
" . . . not require newly developed properties to
bear more than their equitable share of the
capital costs in relation to benefits conferred".
631 P.2d at 903. Emphasis added. Accord, Home Builders
Association vs City of American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P.2d
425 (Utah Supreme Court 1999), Ul4. As previously noted,
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT was required to pay 55 TIMES more than
its "share of the capital costs"; such is hardly "equitable"
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or "reasonable". In Banberry the Supreme Court also noted:
Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to
a higher standard of rationality than the
requirement that its actions not be arbitrary or
capricious.
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. Citations to cases omitted.
The COUNTY'S geography-based dedication requirement
imposed against Westridge Meadows but not imposed at all
against the nearby Elusive Estates, Chaparral and Centennial
subdivisions

or any of

the other

"similarly-situated"

residential subdivisions which were not "highway-abutting" --hardly qualifies under the "constitutional standard of
reasonableness"

or

under

the

mandatory

"equality

of

treatment" standard, which the Court said "must be done".
631 P. 2d at 904. It is readily apparent that the provisions
and application of the COUNTY'S "highway-abutting" Ordinance
fail the Banberry Development "constitutional standard of
reasonableness" test.
D
THE COUNTY'S DEDICATION AND IMPROVEMENT REQUIREMENTS
EFFECTED PURSUANT TO THE "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE
ARE NOT A "UNIFORM" LAND-USE SCHEME,
BUT VIOLATE "EQUAL PROTECTION" AND
"UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAW" PRINCIPLES
The COUNTY mischaracterizes
Ordinance as being

the

"highway-abutting"

"uniform" and the exactions derived

therefrom as not being "site-specific". Such could not be
further from the truth! The "highway-abutting" Ordinance is
far

from

"uniform"

in

its
1 A

sweep,

application

and

justification. Similarly, its dedication and improvement
requirements are extremely "site-specific": namely, those
parcels which are "highway-abutting" are "extorted" (Nollan
term)

into

dedicating

and

improving

the

roadway. The

"building restriction" contained within the Ordinance is not
applied in a "uniform" manner against all developers and
builders which ostensibly create the demand (impact) for
additional roadways; the "building restriction" is applied
against ONLY "highway-abutting" parcels, and only for the
most transparent of purposes: a pretext to evade the Just
Compensation Clause requirements. A "building restriction"
(or ban) might be justified if there were inadequate roadway
infrastructure

in the area and the

"restriction" were

applied "uniformly": that is, nobody gets to build unless
and until government improves the roadway situation, or
everyone does their fair share. That's not the case here.
The Section 1 of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Emphasis added.
Article
provides:

I,

Section

24, of

the Utah

Constitution

"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
Emphasis added.
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In Liedtke vs Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court stated that Article I, §24 is "generally
considered the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution." 649 P.2d at 81n.l.
Although their language is dissimilar, Article I, §24 and
the

Equal

Protection

Clause

embody

the

same

general

principle: persons similarly situated should be treated
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not
be treated as if their circumstances were the same.
In Leetham vs McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974), the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
A legislative classification is never arbitrary or
unreasonable
so
long
as
the
basis
for
differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the
purposes or objectives to be accomplished by the
act.
If some persons or transactions/ excluded
from the operation of the law, were it to the
subject matter of the law in no differentiable
class from those included within its operation,
the law is discriminatory in the sense of being
arbitrary and unconstitutional.
524 P. 2d at 325. Emphasis added. Citation to footnotes
omitted.
In Malan vs Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court
1984),

the Utah

Supreme

"automobile guest statute"

Court

invalidating

the Utah

illuminated and articulated the

purposes and application of the "uniform operation of laws"
and the "equal protection" provisions of the constitutions.
The Court wrote:
Whether

a statute meets
^6

equal

protection

standards depends in the first instance upon the
objectives of the statute and whether the
classifications established provide a reasonable
basis for promoting those objectives.
Article 1, §24 protects against two types of
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to
all persons within a class.
Second, the
statutory classifications and the different
treatment given the classes must be based on
differences that have a reasonable tendency to
further the objectives of the statute. If the
relationship of the classification
to the
statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful,
the discrimination is unreasonable.
Equal
protection of the law, both state and federal,
"requires
more
of
a
state
law
than
nondiscriminatory application within the class it
establishes . " The classification must rest upon
some difference which "'bears a reasonable and
just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed, and can never be made
arbitrarily and without any such basis . . . .
[A]rbitrary selection can never be justified by
calling it classification."
"The Courts must
reach and determine the question whether the
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable
in light of its purpose. The law under Article I,
§24 is not different.
693 P.2d at 670-72. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and
footnotes omitted.
In Malan the Utah Supreme Court continued:
For a law to be constitutional under Article I,
section 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on
its face. What is critical is that the operation
of the law be uniform. A law does not operate
uniformly if "persons similarly situated are not
"treated similarly" or if "persons in different
circumstances"
are
"treated
as
if
their
circumstances were the same."
693 P.2d at 669 (Utah 1984). Emphasis added.
In

the

instant

situation,

the

"highway-abutting"

Ordinance is not "uniform" in its operation: the developer
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of the Elusive Meadows subdivision, creating the "exact same
impact"

(sic) as

the

B.A.M.

development

of

Westridge

Meadows, is required to dedicate or improve nothing! The law
simply is not uniform in its operation, although "facially"
it may appear to be so. The "highway-abutting" criteria is
itself its fatal "Achilles' heel".
In Malan the Supreme Court stated that Article I,
Section 24 requires that a law must apply equally to all
persons within a class and that statutory classifications
must have a "reasonable tendency to further the objectives
of the statute." 693 P. 2d at 670. In the instant situation,
the only "objective" which can be identified and advanced in
furtherance of the COUNTY'S policy of requiring the coerced
"dedication" and improvement to the 53-foot "half-width" is
to avoid the payment of the "just compensation" required by
the constitutions. [If the "highway-abutting Ordinance" had
as its "objective" the enhanced traffic flow, and so forth,
on the roadways, then the "building restriction" would be
enforced against ALL developers. That's not the situation
here.] The required dedication/improvement, required from
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT when the similarly-situated, "side-byside" developer of "Elusive Meadows" immediately to the
south PAYS NOTHING, is not the "uniform operation" the
Constitution requires! The "abutting-highway" criterion for
the "classification" is a blatant, straight-forward attempt

to avoid the constitutional requirement of paying for the
"taking"I
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, 576
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Equal
protection
protects
against
discrimination within a class. The legislature has
considerable discretion in the designation of
classifications but the court must determine
whether such classifications operate equally on
all persons similarly situated.
Thus, whether a classification operates
uniformly
on
all persons
situated
within
constitutional parameters is an issue that must
ultimately be decided by the judiciary.
576 P.2d at 1298. Emphasis added.
The "highway-abutting" Ordinance is no more "uniform"
in its operation than a statute which, hypothetically,
singled out for income tax payment ONLY those citizens
having naturally-occurring "red hair": those citizens with
"red hair" had to pay income taxes and those not having "red
hair" did not. Such a legislative scheme could not be
successfully defended against "uniform operation of law" or
"equal protection" attack by the government's assertion that
the classification is "legislatively adopted", that it
advances a legitimate governmental interest (i.e. government
needs the money), and/or that it is "uniformly applied"
(i.e. within and against all taxpayers having "red hair").
The same result occurs in the "highway-abutting" Ordinance
which "singles out" a small class of developers and forces
them to make dedications and incur improvement expenses for
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costs which should be borne by the public at large.
The COUNTY

asserts

[p. 29 of

its OPENING BRIEF,

Footnote #18] that
"BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair
County subdivision development conditions (if any
remedy is appropriate) is a legislative remedy/
not a judicial one."
Emphasis added. Such is an incredible statement. To think
that B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT has any political or legislative
influence with the COUNTY'S governing body

which adopted

the "highway-abutting" Ordinance in the first instance and
which

financially

"gains" each

time

the

Ordinance

is

enforced against a propertyowner unlucky enough to want to
develop "highway-abutting" property

is unreasonable and

unrealistic: so much so as to border on the absurd. It is
against that type of self-serving governmental arrogance and
constitutional insensitivity that B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT has
filed for "judicial" remedy: the Court should expressly
address

this

judicial

sub-issue.

not

See

legislative

Tax

Commission

determination

[it

whether

is a
the

classification operates "uniformly"] and Malan [courts must
determine if the classification operates uniformly].
The COUNTY previously argued at trial that B.A.M.
DEVELOPMENT, having acquired the real estate for development
ostensibly

knowing

about

the

"highway-abutting"

requirements, should be deemed to have waived all claims
against enforcement of the Ordinance. To this type of
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argument the Supreme Court in Nollan responded:
Nor are the Nollans' rights altered because they
acquired the land well after the Commission had
begun to implement its policy. So long as the
Commission could not have deprived the prior
owners of the easement without compensating them,
the prior owners must be understood to have
transferred their full property right in conveying
the lot.
483 US at 833, 107 SCt at 3147. Footnote 2. Emphasis added.
This same issue was also expressly revisited and similarly
decided, even more expressly so, in Palazzolo vs Rhode
Island, 533 US 606, 150 LEd2d 592, 121 SCt 2448 (2001).
The COUNTY characterizes the "dissenting" opinion of
Judge ORME as being "lengthy and vociferous" [COUNTY Opening
Brief, page 34]. Judge ORME's well-reasoned and scholarly
opinion

even

remand" issue

if

in

"dissent" on the

"administrative

is anything but "vociferous". Those portions

of the dissenting opinion of Judge ORME dealing with the
applicability of the Nollan-Dolan framework represent and
constitute an extraordinary judicial and scholarly effort
(successfully
analytical

so

in

framework

result)
for

to

the

"administrative remand" issue

identify

case.

the

[Except

correct
for

the

which the COUNTY concedes

NOW was incorrectly approached and decided by the other two
judges of the Court of Appeals panel, the Court of Appeals
unanimously found Nollan-Dolan to be THE analytical standard
for disposition of this case.] One cannot wonder that given
the time the Court of Appeals took
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namely, sixteen months

following "oral argument" (October 2002) to issuance of its
opinion in February 2004

and the extraordinary research

and scholarliness exhibited by Judge ORME

citing to cases

and other authorities not even briefed by the parties

that

the Judge ORME opinion was intended to be the "lead opinion"
and it was through some quirk of fate that the other two
judges fixated
concedes

on

improperly so, as the COUNTY implicitly now
the

unraised,

unbriefed

and

unpresented

"administrative remand" issue, identified and raised sua
sponte

by

the

two-judge

majority

notwithstanding

the

COUNTY'S position that the correct "appeal" procedures had
been followed. See ORME, dissenting, Kl9 o f the Decision.]
Judge ORME of the Court of Appeals
to the 2-judge majority

albeit in dissent

"nailed it"! The Utah Supreme

Court would be prudent to follow Judge ORME's well-reasoned
"dissenting" opinion.
II
SECTION 63-903-4, EXPRESSLY APPLICABLE TO
JUDICIAL CASES INVOLVING "PHYSICAL TAKINGS"
OR "EXACTIONS BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION",
CREATES AND CONSTITUTES AN EXCEPTION TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING/ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD ISSUE
In discussing Issue #3 [applicability of Section 6390a-4, Utah Code], the COUNTY essentially and expressly
concedes that Section 63-90a-4 creates an exception to the
"administrative hearing" requirements, as a pre-condition to
filing an action for "physical takings" (statutory term)
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cases. That's exactly correct; see analysis and discussion
herein at Point III, below.
The COUNTY, however, does not go so far as conceding
which logically it should

that the obvious statutory and

legal effect of the provisions of Section 63-90a-4 is to
emasculate the "administrative remand" provisions [Issue #2]
of

the

Court

of Appeals' Decision, which

the

COUNTY

inexplicably seems to continue to champion.
If

Section

63-90a-4

creates

and

constitutes

the

"exception" so noted by the COUNTY, then there can be no
"administrative record" (for the District Court to review),
because there was no "administrative appeal hearing" held.
Thus, the Court of Appeals Decision

in concluding that

Section 17-27-1001 required the "administrative remand"
was improvident and uninformed. The Supreme Court should
affirmatively and authoritatively decide and declare this
issue

at least within the narrow exception for "physical

takings"
(statutory

or

"exactions

terms)

practitioners,

cases

by

a

political

such as this

subordinate

courts

and

subdivision"

lest citizens,
others

observe

(incorrectly) that the Court of Appeals' Decision concerning
the "administrative remand" was correct

which it wasn't.

In related context, governmental authorities may not
burden property by the imposition of repetitive or unfair
land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision. See
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City of Monterey vs Del Monte Dunes at Monterey/ Ltd., 52 6
US 687, 143 LEd2d 882, 119 SCt 1624 (1999) [upholding jury
verdict against government]. See also Palazollo, supra.
Ill
SECTION 63-90a-4, UTAH CODE, IS APPLICABLE
TO EXEMPT CREATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
TO BE REVIEWED BY THE DISTRICT COURT
IN A "PHYSICAL TAKING" OR "EXACTIONS" CASE
Notwithstanding the COUNTY'S earlier (and inconsistent
with its present) assertions6, the COUNTY now concedes the
applicability of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, to the present
situation. The COUNTY acknowledges that Section 63-90a-4
creates

an

"exception"

to

the

6

"administrative

remand"

See,
for example, COUNTY'S RESPONSE
BRIEF TO
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, pp. 7-8 thereof, in
which the COUNTY stated:
Second, even if considered on the merits, Sec. 6390a-4 is wholly inapplicable in the context of
this case, . . . While Sec. 63-90a-4 allows a
citizen to seek judicial relief while bypassing
the municipal takings relief review provided as
an option by the statute, this does not place the
statute in conflict, or
as BAM suggests
in a
"controlling" position relative to Sec. 17-27-1001
as interpreted by the Court of Appeals.
Consequently, there is actually no "conflict" at
all between Sec. 63-90a-4, and the interpretation
of Sec. 17-27-1001 given by the Court of Appeals.
Emphasis added.
NOW
after the Supreme Court has "certified" the issue
for review
the COUNTY has flip-flopped and "changed its
tune":
the
COUNTY
concedes
the
applicability
and
"controlling" effect of Section 63-90a-4. The COUNTY'S
present language is:
However, if considered on the merits, it appears
that Sec. 63-90a-4 is applicable in the context of
this case.
OPENING BRIEF, page 39. Emphasis added.
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provisions (ostensibly required under the Court of Appeals'
Decision) for those "physical takings" or "exactions by a
political subdivision" (i.e. inverse condemnation) claims.
[The COUNTY'S conceding of this Issue #3 should, logically
by extension, simultaneously concede
doesn't
[Issue

expressly
#2]

say so

discussed

the

above.

although the COUNTY

"administrative
The

COUNTY'S

remand"

continuing

arguments with respect to Issue #2 make no logical or
judicial sense: if Section 63-90a-4 is controlling and
dispositive, then the "administrative remand" provisions of
the Decision are moot. It does no good and makes no sense to
continue to belabor those provisions.]
The "administrative remand" (Issue #2) is directly and
definitively controlled by the provisions of Section 63-90a4, Utah Code, which provides:
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose
interest is subject to a physical taking or
exaction by a political subdivision may appeal the
political subdivision's decision within 30 days
after the decision is made.
(b) The private property owner need not file the
appeal authorized by this section before bringing
an action in any court to adjudicate claims that
are eligible for appeal,
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the
action of a political subdivision does not
constitute. and may not be interpreted as
constituting, a failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing
legal action.
Emphasis added. The complete text of Section 63-90a-1 et
seq, Utah Code, is included as APPENDIX #6 to this OPENING
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BRIEF.
The Court of Appeals Decision

disposing of the appeal

on the basis of the "lack of administrative record" issue,
which issue was not raised by the pleadings, was not tried
in the District Court, and was neither briefed nor argued on
appeal

overlooked the provisions of Section 63-90a-4 . Even

when the obvious applicability of Section 63-90a-4 was
brought to the Court of Appeals' attention (in the context
of the "petition for rehearing"), the Court of Appeals
ultimately declined to consider the same. Section 63-90a-4
has

controlling

and

dispositive

significance

not

necessarily in a procedural setting, but as a matter of
substantive law

to the issues-at-hand.

The COUNTY'S

statements

that Section

63-90a-4 was

raised for the first time on appeal, is exactly correct;
however, the COUNTY'S citation of DeBry vs Noble, 889 P. 2d
428 at 444

(Utah 1995) to the apparent result that the

statute (issue) did NOT arise by reason of the Court of
Appeals

Decision

is

disingenuous

and

intentionally

misleading to the Supreme Court. The quoted text from DeBry,
although

correctly

quoted,

impliedly

asserts

that the

applicability of Section 63-90a-4 was NOT the result of the
Court

of

Appeals

Decision.

That

is

misleading

and

inaccurate. The entire "administrative remand" issue was
never raised by the COUNTY, in its pleadings or at trial, or
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on appeal. The "administrative remand" issue only existed,
as a result of the Court of Appeals Decision, which sua
sponte identified and developed the "administrative remand"
issue. So, of course, the applicability of Section 63-90a-4--which the Court of Appeals did not consider
issue,

because

"controlling"

Section

63-90a-4

and renders

"fix"

that

apparently

the Decision

through 13 of the Decision
should

is

became an

at

so

least ^|6

incorrect. The Supreme Court

problem.

The

"specific"

statutory

provisions of Section 63-90a-4 being facially "directly on
point" with the "physical taking" and "exactions by a
political subdivision" claims-at-hand would seem to be
controlling over the more "general" statutory provisions of
Section

17-27-1001

the

Decision

has

construed

to be

dispositive. See Millett vs Clark Clinic Corporation, 609
P. 2d 934 (Utah Supreme Court 1980), wherein the Court wrote:
[W]here the operation of two statutory provisions
is in conflict/ that provision which is more
specific in its application will govern over that
which is more general.
609 P.2d at 936. Emphasis added. Obviously, Section 63-90a-4
is exactly on-point and is exactly descriptive of what is to
happen (or not happen: no request for hearing is required,
as a condition precedent to a judicial action involving a
"physical taking" or an "exaction"). The provisions of
Section 17-27-1001 are certainly more "general" in nature.
Thus, Section 63-90a-4 is controlling and dispositive.
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The provisions of Section 17-27-1001 were originally
adopted in 1991 but became first effective in 1992. Except
for a minor stylistic change made in 1996
concern to us here

which is of no

the provisions of Section 17-27-1001

have remained unchanged since 1992 (at least up to the time--1998

when this case began). The provisions of Section

63-90a-4 were originally adopted in 1994. In 1998 the
provisions of Subsections 63-90a-4(b) and 63-90a-4 (c)

the

very provisions of the statute which are material to this
issue and its dispositive applicability

were adopted: to

provide the very text (i.e. no hearing need be requested or
held) within the statute. It is a black-letter principle of
statutory

interpretation

that

where

there

is

an

irreconcilable conflict between new provisions and prior
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new
provision

is

deemed

controlling

as

it

is

the

later

expression of the Legislature. See Ellis vs Utah State
Retirement Board, 757 P. 2d 882 (Utah Court of Appeals 1988),
certiorari granted 765 P.2d 1277, affirmed 783 P.2d 540
(Utah Supreme Court 1988) . See also S.S. vs State, 972 P.2d
439. (Utah 1998) [recently enacted statute will supersede an
existing statute] and Murray City vs Hall, 663 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983) [same].
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CONCLUSION
The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework is directly and
authoritatively applicable to this "physical takings" case.
The "highway-abutting" Ordinance fails in the Nollan-Dolan
analysis,

in

all

elements

of

the

4-element

test.

Furthermore, the COUNTY likewise failed in its "burden of
proof" (under the federal standard of Dolan) to show that
the dedication and improvement of the 3 500 South roadway was
"roughly proportional" in "scope and nature" to the needs
created by the Westridge Meadows development of the 44
building lots. The Supreme Court should affirmatively and
authoritatively address and adjudicate the Nollan-Dolan
issue and the COUNTY'S failure thereunder.
The Court should ALSO separately adjudicate and rule
upon

B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT'S

claims

Constitution:

the

reasonableness"

(per Banberry),

constitutional

under

"constitutional

grounds",

as

the

UTAH

standard

of

"independent

regardless

of

the

state
Court's

adjudication of the Nollan-Dolan issues.
If appropriate, the Court should declare the "highwayabutting" Ordinance unconstitutional, facially and/or as
applied

(it doesn't really matter), for any or all the

foregoing reasons: violation of national Constitution (Just
Compensation Clause and/or Equal Protection Clause) and/or
violation of Utah Constitution (Just Compensation Clause,

4Q

"uniform operation of laws" clause).
The Court should overturn the Court of Appeals Decision
on the "administrative remand" issue, as being improvidently
arrived

at

particularly

in

face

of

the

obvious

applicability of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code.
The Court should remand the case to the District Court
for entry of judgment in favor of Cross-Petitioner B.A.M.
DEVELOPMENT and against the COUNTY on B.A.M.'s "physical
taking" and "exaction by a political subdivision" ("inverse
condemnation") claims

(national and state) and related

issues, as prayed and established at trial.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of December, 2004.
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5. Zoning and Planning <s=>641, 748
It was reversible error for trial court, on
review of land use decision of county board of
commissioners confirming denial of developer's application for license to develop subdivision, which decision was reached without
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Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and
THORNE, JJ.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
HI B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. (BAM),
appeals from a district court decision finding
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that no unconstitutional taking occurred
when Salt Lake County (the County) required BAM to dedicate additional land as a
condition of subdivision approval. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
112 In 1997, BAM sought to develop a
subdivision located at 7755 West 3500 South
in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Salt Lake
County Planning and Zoning Commission
(the Commission) granted preliminary approval for the proposed subdivision. In the
original subdivision plat, BAM agreed to dedicate a forty-foot strip of land in anticipation
of 3500 South being widened. In April 1998,
the County informed BAM that after consulting with the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), the County had determined
that BAM must dedicate an additional thirteen-foot strip of land abutting 3500 South in
anticipation of future road expansion. BAM
objected to the increase because it had already drafted and divided the subdivision
plots utilizing the forty-foot dedication.1
BAM argued that increasing the dedication
to fifty-three feet would alter several plots
dramatically and would require reconfiguration of the subdivision at great expense.
Without receiving any evidence, the Commission denied BAM's license to develop their
subdivision without the fifty-three-foot dedication.

suing findings, the Board upheld the Commission's decision.
11 4 BAM then filed suit in district court
claiming that the County's demand was unconstitutional because it was not roughly proportional, as required by Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309,
2319-20,129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). After trial,
the district court found in favor of the County, concluding that the rough proportionality
test did not apply. BAM objected to the
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a motion for a new
trial. The district court overruled BAM's
objections and denied its motion for a new
trial. BAM appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1 5 BAM argues that the County's dedication requirement of thirteen additional feet
constitutes a taking of its land without just
compensation, in violation of the United
States Constitution.2 However, we must
first determine whether the district court
acted properly when it received evidence and
then ruled on the constitutionality of the
land-dedication requirement. Resolution of
this issue requires statutory interpretation,
which we review for correctness. See Valley
Colour Inc. v. Beuchert Builders Inc., 944
P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997) (noting that " '|iln
matters of pure statutory interpretation, an
11 3 BAM appealed to the Salt Lake County appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling
Board of Commissioners (the Board), by fil- for correctness and gives no deference to its
ing a "Notice of Claim" with the Board. In legal conclusions' " (citations omitted)).
this Notice of Claim, BAM claimed that
"(t]he uncompensated dedication and imANALYSIS
provement of the additional roadway constitute[d] an unconstitutional 'taking/ not rea116 The County Land Use Development
sonably justified by the actual impact created and Management Act, see Utah Code Ann.
by the proposed development." Without § 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes counconducting a hearing, taking evidence, or is- ties "to enact all ordinances, resolutions, and
1. Below, BAM argued that "[t]he uncompensated
dedication and improvement of the additional
roadway constitutes an unconstitutional 'taking/
not reasonably justified by the actual impact created by the proposed development." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, BAM did not challenge the dedication of the first forty feet of land and has
waived review of that portion of the dedication.
2. BAM also argued that the County violated
Utah's constitutional protections of Equal Protec-

tion and Uniform Operation of Laws. However,
because we find that the district court misinterpreted Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001
(2001) and received evidence in this case when it
should have found the Board's treatment uf
BAM's takings claim to be arbitrary and capricious, and we remand on that basis, we need nut
address the takings question or the other issues
raised by BAM.
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rules that they consider necessary for the
use and development of land within the county . . . unless . . . expressly prohibited by
law." Id, § 17-27-102(1)? If a landowner
disagrees with a county land use decision,
that landowner can appeal the decision, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 1727-1001. Section 17-27-1001(3)(a) provides
that when a county's land use decision is
appealed to the district court, that court shall
"presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and . . . determine only
whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal." Id. (emphasis added).1 "A determination of illegality requires
3.

We cite to the most recent version of the statute
for convenience. However, all amendments relevant to this opinion will be noted.

4.

Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 provides, in relevant part:

a determination that the decision violates a
statute, ordinance, or existing law." Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3)(b).
[1] 11 7 While no Utah Court has specifically addressed the standard of review applicable to appeals brought pursuant to section
17-27-1001, we have addressed the standard
of review for appeals taken pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated section 17-27-708 (2001),
which contains language similar to that of
section 17-27-1001.5 Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 17-27-708, with id. § 17-27-1001.
In the absence of any case law interpreting
section 17-27-1001, we, by analogy, rely upon
case law interpreting section 17-27-708.B
and, if available, a true and correct transcript
of its proceedings.
(5)(a) . . .
(i) // there is a record, the district
conn's
review is limited to the record provided bx the
board of adjustment.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any
evidence outside the board of
adjustment's
record unless that evidence was offered to the
board of adjustment and the court determines
that it was improperly excluded by the board
of adjustment.
(b) If there is no record, the court max call
witnesses and take evidence.
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the
board of adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708, (I), (2)(a). (4)(a).
(5)(a), (5)(b), (6) (2001) (emphasis added).

(1) No person may challenge in district court a
county's land use decisions made under this
chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until that person
has exhausted all administrative remedies.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any
decision made in the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court
within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that land use decisions and
regulations are valid: and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal,
(b) A determination of illegality requires a
determination that the decision violates a
statute, ordinance, or existing law.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(1), (2)(a),-(3)(a)(b)
(200!)
5.

Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-708 provides, in relevant pail:
(I) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment may petition the
district court for a review of the decision.
(2)(a) The district court's review is limited to a
determination of whether the board of adjustment's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(b) A determination of illegality requires a
determination that the board of adjustment's
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law.
(4)(a) The board of adjustment shall transmit
to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders

6.

Wc acknowledge that the analog) to section
17-27-708 is not perfect. For example, section
17-27-708(5)(b) authorizes the district court to
call witnesses and receive evidence if no record
was made below, see id. § 17-27-708(5)(b). or if
on review the district court determines that the
Commission erroneously excluded evidence. See
id. § 17-27-708(5)(a)(ii). In contrast, section
17-27-1001 does not authorize the district court
to receive evidence or call witnesses. Howevei,
this distinction merely strengthens our positior
that the district court erred in receiving evidence. In the case of section 17-27-1001, tht
legislature did not authorize the district court tc
receive evidence even though it had done so ii
other situations. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27
708(5)(b). "|W]e ' "presume that the legislatiu
used each word advisedly and |we] give effect t
the term according to its ordinary and accepte
meaning.
Department of Natural Re*. \
Huntington-Cleveland
Irrigation Co., 2002 li
75,11 13, 52 P.3d 1257 (citations omitted) A«
cordingly, we conclude that section 17-27 IOC
does not authorize the district court to recei\
evidence. Instead, the district court can on
review the record made before the County.
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[2,3] 118 In Patterson v. Utah County
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah C t
App.1995), landowners sought a "special exception under a county zoning ordinance."
Id. at 603. The county conducted a hearing,
received evidence, and then granted the exception. See id. Pursuant to section 17-27708, another landowner appealed the decision
to the district court, where the county's actions were found to be "arbitrary, capricious,
and illegal." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603.
The matter was then appealed to this court.
See id. On appeal, the parties attempted to
introduce new evidence. See id. at 610-11.
We concluded, because the board of adjustments had conducted a hearing and received
evidence, that we were limited to the existing
record. See id. at 604. In reaching this
conclusion, we stated:
Since the district court's review of the
Board's decision was limited to a review of
the Board's record, we do not accord any
particular deference to the district court's
decision. Instead, we review the Board's
Next, the dissent incorrectly claims that Sandy
City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah
1992), prohibits our analogy to section 17—27—
708. In Sandy Citv, the Utah Supreme Court
cautioned against the use of statutes relating to
cities in county-land-use appeals. See id. at 220.
The court noted that " 'the respective statutes
dealing with cities and counties confer different
powers.' " Id. (citations omitted). The court
further noted, in a footnote, that in the earlier
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, we had
erroneously relied on a municipal statute, had
applied an incorrect standard of review, and had
limited our review to the administrative record.
See id. n. 4.
In Sandy City, no statute governed appeals
from county land-use decisions. See id. In contrast, here, section 17-27-1001 sets forth this
court's standard of review-whether the county's
action was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(5)(b). Furthermore, in Sandy City, this court erroneously applied a municipal standard of review to a county
land-use decision. See Sandy City, 827 P.2d at
220 n. 4. Here, contrary to the dissent's claim,
we do not substitute section 17-27-708 for section 17-27-1001. Instead, we simply look to
cases interpreting similar language to determine
how the legislature intended courts to review
county land use decisions.
Next, the dissent implies that we apply the
standard of review set forth in section 17-27708, while ignoiing section 17-27-1001. We do
not substitute the standard of review in section
17-27-708 for the one in section 17-27-1001.
Instead, because of an absence of clear guidance

decision as if the appeal had come directly
from the agency. Thus, the standard for
our review of the Board's decision is the
same standard established in the Utah
Code for the district court's review.
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's decision we
will consider all the evidence in the record,
both favorable and contrary to the Board's
decision. Nevertheless, our review, like
the district court's review, "is limited to
the record provided by the board of adjustm e n t . . . . The court may not accept or
consider any evidence outside the board['s]
record
"We must simply determine, in
light of the evidence before the Board,
whether a reasonable mind could reach the
same conclusion as the Board. It is not
our prerogative to weigh the evidence
anew.
Id. at 603-04 (citations and footnotes omitted.)7
by the legislature, we merely refer to section 1727-708 by analogy because both statutes limit the
district court's review to whether the county's
decision is "arbitrary, capricious, oi illegal "
Compare Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708(2)(a),
with id. § !7-27-IOOl(3)(a).
Finally, the dissent makes much of the "County's concession in its brief that 'BAM followed
the appeal procedure outlined in the Utah Statutes and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provisionfs].' " We agree. However, our
focus is not on whether BAM followed the correct procedure, but whether the district court
exceeded the scope of its authority pursuant to
section 17-27-1001 when it received evidence in
this case. Any "concession" made by BAM has
no bearing on the propriety of the district court's
actions.
7.

In Patterson v. Utah County Bd of Adjustment,
893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). we detei mined
that appellate courts were bound by the record
before the board of adjustments. See id. at 604
However, Patterson did not address the import of
section l7-27-708(5)(b), which allows the district court to receive evidence if no record was
made below. See Utah Code Ann. § 17—27—
708(5)0) (2001) Still, Patterson provides some
guidance regarding how we should review appeals pursuant to section 17-27-1001, because it
addresses a situation, like the one here, when the
appellate court cannot receive evidence and can
only determine, on the record belore it, whether
the administrative agency acted arbitrarily, capaciously, or illegally. See Patterson, 893 P.2d at
604.
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11 9 Here, neither the Commission, nor the
Board, received evidence on whether the
County's requirement of an additional thirteen feet was a "taking." Instead, both approved the County's action without a hearing.
Consequently, the district court had no record to review. The lack of a record apparently prompted the district court to receive
evidence and determine for itself whether the
County had unconstitutionally taken BAM's
property. However, the plain language of
section 17-27-1001 does not authorize the
district court to receive evidence. See Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-1002(3)(a).8 Thus, we
conclude that the district court is limited to
the record made before the County and can
determine only whether the County's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."
Id. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(ii); see also Wilcox v.
CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21,118, 70 P.3d 85 (noting that courts first look to the plain language of a statute and only look beyond the
plain language if there is an ambiguity).9
[4] <110 The absence of a record in this
case is highly problematic, because historically, takings determinations are mixed questions of law and fact. See Lucas v South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1071, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2922, 120 L.Ed.2d 798
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that
whether government action has deprived a
claimant of his property without just compensation is an "essentially [an] ad hoc, factual inquirfy]"). Moreover, Utah courts also
have acknowledged that evaluating the reasonableness of an exaction is a fact-intensive
inquiry.
1111 In Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P.2d 425, the
Utah Supreme Court stated that "[exactions,]
such [as] fees[,] are constitutionally permissible if the benefits derived from their exaction
are 'of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivision,' and if newly developed properties are
8

The dissent aigues that even if we weie to
apply section 17-27-708 to the instant appeal "it
would not change the lesult " We do not advocate the substitution of section 17-27-708 for
section 17-27-1001. Instead, we simply refer to
case law mterpieting section 17-27-708 to support our conclusion that the distnct court's role
in this case is limited to determining whether the
Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally
in summarily denying BAM's taking claim.

not required to bear more than their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to
the benefits conferred." Id. at 1114 (quoting
Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City,
631 P.2d 899, 905 (Utah 1981) (additional
citation omitted)). In assessing the reasonableness of an exaction, a fact finder may
consider, among other factors
(1) the cost of existing capital facilities; (2)
the manner of financing existing capital
facilities (such as user charges, special assessments, bonded indebtedness, general
taxes, or federal grants); (3) the relative
extent to which the newly developed properties and the other properties in the municipality have already contributed to the
cost of existing capital facilities (by such
means as user charges, special assessments, or payment from the proceeds of
general taxes); (4) the relative extent to
which the newly developed properties and
the other properties in the municipality
will contribute to the cost of existing capital facilities in the future; (5) the extent to
which the newly developed properties are
entitled to a credit because the municipality is requiring their developers or owners
(by contractual arrangement or otherwise)
to provide common facilities (inside or outside the proposed development) that have
been provided by the municipality and financed through general taxation or other
means (apart from user charges) in other
parts of the municipality; (6) extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly
developed properties; and (7) the timeprice differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at different times
Id. at H 5 (quoting Banberry, 631 P 2d at
903-04). This list, while not exhaustive, illustrates that the determination of whether an
exaction is reasonable is a fact-intensive inquiry.
9. The dissent spends considerable time discuss
ing the diffeiences between boaid ot adjustments
and county commissions We acknowledge the
distinction between these two bodies, but note
that review from both is limited to whether the
decision was arbitrary, capiicious, oi illegal
This similarity is the basis for our analogy to
section 17-27-708.
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[5] 1112 Here, the absence of a record at
the administrative level prevented the district court from evaluating the propriety of
the Board's action as directed by Utah Code
Annotated section 17-27-1001(3)(a). We
conclude that the district court erred when it
received evidence on BAM's taking claim.
The district court should have, instead, determined that the Board, in the absence of an
adequate factual record, acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in deciding BAM's takings claim.
1113 Thus, we reverse the district court's
decision and remand the case directing the
district court to enter a judgment that the
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it failed to conduct a hearing on BAM's
takings claim. The district court should then
remand the case to the proper county agency, directing that agency to conduct a proper
hearing on BAM's takings claim.10
1114 However, because we anticipate that a
county body will have to determine the constitutionality of the exaction, we provide
some guidance regarding the proper standard to apply. BAM argues that its property has been taken without just compensation.
The Takings Clause, which applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, declares: u[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V.
One of the Clause's primary purposes is
" 'to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.' "

[Development exactions may be defined as
contributions to a governmental entity imposed as a condition precedent to approving the developer's project. Usually, exactions are imposed prior to the issuance of a
building permit or zoning/subdivision approval. Development exactions may take
the form of: (1) mandatory dedications of
land for roads, schools or parks, as a condition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage
connection fees, and (4) impact fees.
Salt Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808
R2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (quotations and
citations omitted); see also No. 13 Richard
R. Powell, Powell on Real Property,
§ 79D.04[2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2003) (noting that "exactions" are generally sought through several methods (1)
land dedication requirements, (2) land dedication requirement with fee option, (3) impact fees, or (4) in-kind exactions) In Dolan
v City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct
2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) and Nollan v
California Coastal Comm% 483 U.S 825,
107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), the
United States Supreme Court developed a
two-part test for determining whether a particular developmental exaction violated the
takings clause of the United States Constitution.

Smith luu Co v Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245,
257 (Utah CtAppl998) (quoting Dolan v
City of Tujaid, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct.
2309, 2316, 129 L Ed.2d 304 (1994)). One
type of "taking" associated with subdivision
approval is a "development exaction."

H 15 In Dolan, the Court concluded that
for a development exaction to be constitutional, the government must show an " 'essential
nexus 7 ... between the 'legitimate state interest' " and the land dedication requirement.
512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 (citation
omitted). The Court further explained that
to succeed the government "mubt make borne
sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed
development." Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-

10. Effective in 2000, Salt Lake County substantially changed its governmental structure Prior
to the change, the County was governed by three
County Commissioneis We remand this case
directing the district court to order a hearing on
BAM's takings claim However, in light of the
change in county structure remand to the Board
of Commissioners is impossible Thus, the district court must also determine which Salt Lake
County governmental body should consider
BAM's takings claim

The dissent attacks this approach as repugnant to the important principles of judicial econ
omy " While we admit that in this case it might
be quicker to ignore the appropriate standard of
review and address the merits of this case, we
would do so in direct opposition to the mandate
of Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001
The more appropriate approach is to balance the
desire for judicial economy against the need for
judicial restraint In this case, ab in most ca^eb
judicial restraint should, and does, prevail
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20 The Court labeled this examination a
"rough proportionality" test. Id at 391, 114
S.Ct. at 2319.

ORME, Judge (dissenting):
11 19 With neither party having so aigued,
it is perplexing that the majority insists on
analyzing the propriety of the trial court's
actions under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708
(2001), while at the same time admitting that
this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-27-1001 (2001). I disagree with this
approach and the remedy of starting over
before an entity of county government yet to
be selected by the trial court. This result is
especially disturbing given the County's concession in its brief that "BAM followed the
appeal procedure outlined in the Utah statute and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provision^]."

1116 Here, BAM was required to dedicate
thirteen additional feet of land that abutted
3500 South before the County would approve
its subdivision plat. We conclude that this
constitutes a developmental exaction as described in Nollan and Dolan. Accordingly,
the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality"
test applies in this case Therefore, upon
remand, the reviewing body must determine:
(1) whether requiring the exaction serves a
legitimate government interest, and (2)
whether there is a " 'rough proportionality*"
between the exaction and the "impact of the
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20, see also No. 13
1120 Under both sections 17-27-708 and
Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property,
17-27-1001, judicial review "is limited to a
fc 79D 04L2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolfdetermination of whether the [challenged]
ed., 2003).ll
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal"
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708(2)(a)
See
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(n)
H 17 We conclude that the district court
However, section 17-27-708 restricts the triexceeded its authority when it conducted a
al court's authority to take evidence, while
hearing and received evidence on BAM's taksection 17-27-1001 does not. By its own
ings claim contrary to the limits established
terms, section 17-27-708 applies only to trial
in Utah Code Annotated section 17-27court review of "any decision of a board oi
1001(3)(a). The district court should have
adjustment." Id. § 17-27-708(1)
BAM's
concluded that the Board acted arbitrarily
appeal was not, of course, from a decision of
and capriciously in deciding BAM's taking
issue without conducting a hearing. Accord- a board of adjustment, but trom a decision of
ingly, we reverse the district court's decision, the Salt Lake County Board of Commissionand remand directing the district court to set ers. This distinction is significant, given the
aside the Board's determination. The dis- very limited purview of a board of adjusttrict court shall then identify the proper body ment's powers and duties, which, at the time
to conduct a full hearing on the merits and of BAM's appeal to the County Commission,
was to "hear and decide
appeaU from
remand the case to that body
zoning decisions applying the zoning ordi1! 18 1 CONCUR. RUbSELL W BENCH, nance[,] special exceptions to the terms ol
the zoning ordinance[, and] variances fiom
Judge.
11. in Dolan v City of ligard, 512 U S 374, 114
S C t 2309, 129 L E d 2 d 304 (1994), the United
States* Supieme Couit announced for the first
time a "rough piopoitionahty" test to apply
when evaluating the constitutionality of exac
tions Id at 391, 1 14 S Ct at 2319 In Dolan,
the Couit acknowledged that the majority of
states have adopted a 'leasonable relationship"
test Id The Couit concluded that the "reasonable lelationship" test was close[ ] to the fedeial
constitutional n o u n '
Id Howevei, the Couit
declined to adopt the phrase ' reasonable relationship" because of its similanty to the phrase
rational basis " Id In all other respects, it

appears that the Court adopted a "reasonable
relationship" test and simply renamed it the
"lough proportionality" test
Utah has also applied the "reasonable i elation
ship ' test when evaluating the constitutionality
of an exaction See, eg , Home Builder 4>> n v
City oj Am Foik, 1999 UT 7,11 14-16 973 P 2d
425 (applying the leasonable relationship test
to a real estate development fee) Danbarv Ik\
Corp v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899 905
(Utah 1981) (applying the
leasonable ltlation
ship' " test to a subdivision impact fee (citation
omitted))
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the terms of the zoning ordinance." Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a)-(c) (1995) (emphasis added).1 The Salt Lake County zoning ordinances, contained in Title 19 of the
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, are
not relevant to this appeal. Rather, this
appeal contests the County's power to require highway dedication from abutting property owners under Title 15 of the Salt Lake
County Code of Ordinances. Understanding
the difference in function between a board of
adjustment and a county commission goes a
long way in demonstrating that there is a
rational basis for the distinction between section 17-27-708, applicable only to judicial
review of board of adjustment decisions, and
section 17-27-1001, applicable to land use
decisions generally. Such an understanding
dispels any notion that the Legislature meant
to include section 17-27-708's restriction in
section 17-27-1001, but just forgot to say so,
or that, on some other basis, the restriction
should be grafted onto section 17-27-1001.

elude a court from taking evidence where a
county commission has made the decision
under attack because no equivalent record
will ordinarily have been made by the county
commission.2 Therefore, the general provision set forth in section 17-27-1001 controls,
not the provision limited, by its own terms, to
boards of adjustment.

H 22 The majority argues that the language
in section 17-27-708 "strengthens [its] position that the district court erred in receiving
evidence" because section 17-27-1001 is silent on the matter. Specifically, section 1727-708(5)(a)(ii)-(b) states: "The [trial] court
may not accept or consider any evidence
outside the board of adjustment's record unless that evidence was offered to the board of
adjustment and the court determines that it
was improperly excluded by the board of
adjustment [or] there is no record." Id.
(emphasis added). The logic of the majority's argument is flawed. Section 17-27-708
restricts the trial court's authority to take
H 21 Boards of adjustment are adjudicative
evidence unless one of the two enumerated
bodies—they take sworn testimony and comexceptions applies.
Section 17-27-1001,
pel the attendance of witnesses, see id. § 17however,
contains
no
such
restriction. With27-702(3); they keep records of their proout
the
restriction,
there
is
no hindrance to
ceedings, see id. § 17-27-702(4)(b)(ii); and
the
trial
court's
receiving
evidence.
See Bidthey may even choose to make their record
die
v.
Washington
Terrace
City,
1999
UT
with the same completeness as a district
court, i.e., by means of a court reporter or 110,1114, 993 P.2d 875 4("[0]missions in statutape recorder. See id. § 17-27-702(4)(c). In tory language should be taken note of and
sharp contrast, county commissions are not, given effect.'") (quoting Keunecutl Copper
first and foremost, adjudicative bodies and Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 l\2d
thus are not positioned to generate the kind 217, 219 (1973)). Indeed, if silence meant the
of record that a board of adjustment will. trial court cannot consider evidence in the
Thus, a restriction on judicial roving into the absence of express authorization, there would
evidentiary realm in the case of a board of simply be no reason for the restriction exadjustment decision makes sense: There pressed in section 17-27-708—it would alshould already be an adequate record. How- ready be the case that evidence could not
ever, in contrast, it makes no sense to pre- ordinarily be received by the reviewing court.
1. The powers and duties of the board of adjustment have since been expanded. See Utah Code
Ann. § 17-27-703(2001).
2. Prior ca^es have distinguished boards of adjustment from local legislative bodies, both at the
county level, see Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT
103,11 7, 57 P.3d 1079 (recognizing that section
17-27-707, for example, "grantls] boards of adjustment limited power to grant zoning variances"); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331,
333 (Utah 1980) (stating that "the County Com*
mission is charged with the responsibility for
approving subdivision plats—not the Board of

Adjustment") (emphasis in original), and at ihe
municipal level. See Bradley v. Pay sou O/v
Corp., 2003 UT 16,11 13, 70 P.3d 47 ("[A] board of
adjustment is a quasi-judicial body designed onl\
to correct specific zoning errors."), (lurmuu
City, Inc. v. Draper City. 2000 UT App 31.11 16
997 P.2d 321 (noting that "Ulhe diMinuion be
tween quasi-judicial decisions of a board of adjustment as opposed to legislative nnmiupal zoning decisions is significant: board* oi adjustment
have no legislative powers and ate not pa muted
to have those powers").
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1123 Significantly, this court has previously
relied on a statute applicable to a board of
adjustment decision in an appeal stemming
from a planning commission decision, only to
have our error corrected by the Utah Supreme Court In Sandy City v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah CtApp.1990)
(Sandy City I), rev'd, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah
1992) (Sandy City II), this court applied
former section 10-9-15,3 the municipal analogue to current section 17-27-708, to an
appeal stemming from an action of the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission. See
Sandy City I, 794 P.2d at 486. In so doing,
this court stated that its review was limited
to the administrative record. See id. • The
Utah Supreme Court called attention to our
error in Sandy City II, indicating that "the
court of appeals [mistakenly] confined its
review to the administrative record," because, "[f]irst, section 10-9-15 applies only to
municipalities, not to counties(, and s]econd,
section 10-9-15 applies only to relief sought
from the actions of the board of adjustment,
not from the actions of the planning commission or the board of county commissioners,"
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4. Interestingly,.the Court
also noted that, u[a]t the time [Sandy City I
was decided], no analogous statute regulated
legal grievances arising from the actions of
Salt Lake County or the planning commission; consequently, there was no basis for
the court of appeals to confine its review to
the administrative record." Sandy City II,
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4.
H 24 Contrary to the law in existence at the
time Sandy City I was decided, we do now
have a statute that controls appeals from
land use decisions of the Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners—section 17-273. That section provided, in relevant part, that
"any person aggrieved by any decision of the
board of adjustment may have and maintain a
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 109-15(1986).
4. It is curious, then, that the majority cites Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893
P.2d 602 (Utah Ct.App.1995), in support of its
proposition that the trial court erroneously received evidence in the instant case. As the majority recognizes, the board of adjustment in
Patterson conducted a hearing and received evidence. See id. at 603. Therefore, pursuant to
section 17-27-708, a reviewing court could not

1001. If it is improper to apply a statute
applicable to actions of a board of adjustment
even when there is no comparable statute
governing appeals from another governmental body, it seems axiomatic that it would be
improper to do so when there is such a
statute.
% 25 But even if it were somehow proper
to analyze the trial court's actions under
section 17-27-708, it would not change the
approach in the instant appeal. As the majority recognizes, a trial court may not "accept or consider any evidence outside the
board of adjustment's record" under section
17-27-708 unless: (1) there is no record, see
id. § 17-27-708(5)(b), or (2) "evidence was
offered to the board of adjustment and the
court determines that it was improperly excluded." Id. § 17-27-708(5)(a)(ii). Because
there was no record made in connection with
BAM's appeal to the Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners, the instant case fits
squarely within the exception enumerated in
section 17-27-708(b).4 Therefore, even if we
do look to section 17-27-708 in analyzing the
trial court's actions, as the majority urges,
the court properly called witnesses and took
evidence, which evidence is properly now
part of our record. See Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984)
(" The nature and extent of [judicial] review
depends on what happened below as reflected by a true record of the proceedings'
[before the board of adjustment. Thus], if
the hearing had proceeded in accordance
with due process requirements, the reviewing court could look only to the record, but
where it had not or where there ivas nothing
to review, the reviewing court must be alreceive additional evidence in that case unless it
determined that such evidence "was improperly
excluded by the board." Utah Code Ann. § 1727-708(5)(a)(ii). BAM's appeal, on the other
hand, was summarily denied by the Salt Lake
County Board of Commissioners, whose response consisted entirely of the following statement: "The Board of County Commissioneis, at
its meeting held this day, upheld the planning
commission approval and denied the request ul
B.A.M. Development, Inc., for an appeal on PL97-1063, Westridge Meadows 7755 West 3500
South." Patterson, then, is quite unlike the case
before us.
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lowed to get at the facts.") (emphasis added)
(decided under former section 10-9-15). Accord Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756
P.2d 704, 709-10 (Utah CtApp.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
U26 Accordingly, the appeal is ripe for
decision by this court and, in my vieWt it
should be resolved at this juncture.6 If I
were writing the opinion for the court, I
would write as follows:

II27 Plaintiff B.A.M. Development, L.L.C.
(BAM) appeals the trial court's decision holding that Defendant Salt Lake County (the
County), acting pursuant to its Transportation Master Plan, could constitutionally require BAM to dedicate a fifty-three-foot
right-of-way, without compensation, as a condition to approval of BAM's subdivision proposal. The trial court's decision should be
reversed and remanded.

sion development extended to the center line
of 3500 South Street at its northern boundary. Pursuant to Salt Lake County Ordinance 15.28.010, BAM's proposed plat indicated a forty-foot half-road-width dedication
at 3500 South Street, running along the
northern boundary of BAM's adjacent property. The dedication was to be used for the
eventual widening of 3500 South, a state
highway abutting the proposed subdivision.
3500 South is a thoroughfare used by the
traveling public, which will also be used by
future subdivision residents, although the
highway is not directly accessible from the
subdivision.

1130 On September 9, 1997, the County
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject
to compliance with County ordinances and
departmental requirements in these terms:
1. Construction of curb, gutter, sidewalk
and street improvements on proposed
and adjoining streets including 3500
South (sidewalk on 3500 South to be 6'
6
wide
and placed next to the fence).
BACKGROUND
2. Elimination, relocation, piping, or fencH28 Salt Lake County Ordinance
ing open ditches and/or canals within or
15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah
adjacent to the subdivision by subdivider
Code Ann. § 17-27-801 (2001), requires dedias agreeable to irrigation users or comcation and improvement of public street
pany.
right-of-way space by developers of abutting
3. Construction of a 6' high non-climbable
property in accordance with the County's
barrier fence along 3500 South as these
Transportation Master Plan. The Transporlots are non-vehicular access to 3500
tation Master Plan is based on traffic projecSouth. A gate is to be constructed on
tions and recommendations from the Waseach
lot for property owner access and
atch Front Regional Council and the Utah
this
note
to be on Mylar.
Department of Transportation (UDOT), in4. Dedication of 40' from the center line
cluding a long-range transportation study
of 3500 South to Salt Lake County for
projecting highway capacity needs in Salt
street right-of-way.
Lake County to the year 2020.
5.
Modification of design as worked out
1129 In July of 1997, BAM submitted a
by
County Departments and subdivider.
proposal to develop Westridge Meadows sub6. Final plat to be drawn on a subdivision
division on a fifteen-acre parcel at approximylar by a licensed surveyor.
mately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's fee simple
7. Street on west to be dedicated and
interest in the parcel proposed for subdiviconstructed with curb and gutter on
5. This sound approach, fully consistent with the
plain language of the statutory sections analyzed,
also advances the cause of avoiding inefficiency,
duplication, and delay. Considerable court resources have already been expended on this case,
resulting in a two-day bench trial which produced a voluminous record. It has been briefed
and argued to this court and, as will be obvious,
has been the object of much deliberation and

analysis. Remanding this case to the tnal couit
with instructions to send it back to the County to
repeat the fact-finding process, i> repugnant to
the important principle of judicial economy
6. This opinion borrows liberally from the trial
court's Findings of Fact
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west side and curb, gutter & sidewalk on ty on all counts, concluding that, inter alia,
"BAM failed to establish a cause of action on
east side.
its
'takings' claim." The trial court subse8. Comply with all conditions of the 2
quently
denied BAM's "Motion for Entry of
overpressure zone. This note to be on
New
Findings
and/or Additional Findings"
mylar.
and
its
"Motion
for a New Trial," and BAM
9. A minimum 15' wide landscaping area
appealed to this court.
to be installed along 3500 South. The
H 33 While the above litigation was in prolandscape strip to be maintained by the
adjacent property owner. Plan to be cess, the County approved BAM's amended
approved by Development Services subdivision plat, which had been modified,
under protest, to include the required tiftyStaff.
10. Install traffic calming devices as ap- three-foot highway dedication. In August of
1999, BAM's subdivision plat was recorded in
proved by Transportation Engineer.
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, and
1131 On September 15, 1997, UDOT re- BAM later began construction of Westridge
ceived BAM's subdivision proposal. UDOT Meadows.
responded that the current required highway
dedication for 3500 South at the location of
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
BAM's proposed subdivision was a fiftythree-foot half-road-width right-of-way,, not
H 34 BAM raises several issues on appeal,
forty feet, as indicated by the County's but its first argument is dispositive. BAM
Transportation Master Plan. In June of 1998, argues that requiring it to dedicate property
the County incorporated the revised right-of- for eventual use in widening a street, and
way requirement of fifty-three feet into its improve adjacent property, all without comTransportation Master Plan. That same pensation, as a condition to approval of its
month, the County granted preliminary ap- subdivision proposal, constitutes an unconstiproval of BAM's subdivision proposal subject tutional "taking" of its property in violation
to compliance with, among other things, the of both federal and state law. This question
fifty-three-foot right-of-way dedication.7
of law is reviewed under the "correction-of1132 On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a notice of error standard! ]," with no particular deferappeal with the Salt Lake County Board of ence accorded to the trial court. State v,
Commissioners, challenging the constitution- Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
ality of the County's requirement of a fiftythree-foot dedication and the resulting "increased expenses" and requesting approval
of the subdivision proposal with a forty-foot
dedication. The Board of County Commissioners summarily denied BAM's appeal, and
BAM filed suit against the County in district
court, alleging, among other things, that the
County's development exactions were "unreasonable and excessive" and effected a taking
of BAM's property without just compensation. After a two-day bench trial, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of the Coun7. The June 1998 approval was contingent upon
additional requirements which, aside from the
fifty-three-foot dedication, substantially mirror
the September 1997 requirements listed above.
However, the June 1998 approval eliminated the
former requirement regarding "[a] minium 15'
wide landscaping area . . . along 3500 South"
and added a requirement »hm th* landowner

ANALYSIS
I. Introduction: Takings Jurisprudence
H 35 BAM argues that requiring it to dedicate a fifty-three foot strip of property and
undertake various improvements to property
outside the subdivision as a condition to approval of its subdivision proposal effects a
"taking" in violation of state and federal constitutional law. Before proceeding to the
merits of this claim, it is necessary to discern
the nature of BAM's takings challenge8 In
"[i]nstall an emergency service turnaround as
required by the Fire Department."
8. At oral argument, BAM correctly characterized
its claim as one for inverse condemnation, which
"is simply a generic description applicable to all
actions in which a property owner, in the absence of a formal condemnation [i.e., eminent
domain] proceeding, seeks to recover Irom a
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so doing, this opinion first summarizes rele- tags: physical takings and regulatory takvant United States Supreme Court jurispru- ings/'). ' Each of these more familiar types of
dence.9
takings, and a third category known as "deH36 The Takings Clause of the Fifth velopment exactions," are addressed below.
Amendment, applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago,
A. Physical Takings
Burlington. & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
H37 A physical taking requires govern166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 586, 41 L.Ed.
ment
activity in the form of an invasion,
979 (1897), provides that "private property
occupation,
or intrusion. See, e.g., Loretto,
[shall not] be taken for public use, without
l0
458
U.S.
at
426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171. "[Govjust compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V.
ernmental
action
[that] results in '[a] perThe Court has traditionally recognized two
categories of takings: "physical takings" and manent physical occupation' of the property,
so-called "regulatory takings." See, e.g., Yee by the government itself or by others," Nolv. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527, 112 Ian v. California Coastal Comm'v, 483 U.S.
S.Ct. 1522, 1528, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (dis- 825, 831, 107 S.Ct, 3141, 3146 (1987) (second
tinguishing the Court's "regulatory takings alteration in original) (citation omitted), concases" from its "physical takings" cases); stitutes a per se taking and "requires comLoretto v. Teleptvmpter Manhattan CATV pensation under the [Takings] Clause." PaCvrp.% 458 U.S. 419, 430, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3173, lazzolo v. Rhod* Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617,
73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (distinguishing a 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592
"physical occupation" from a "regulation that (2001). See also Lucas v. South Carolina
merely restricts the use of property"); Penn Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112
Cent Tramp. Co. u City of New York, 438 S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)
U.S. 104, 124-25, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 ("[A]t least with regard to permanent invaL.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (implicitly recognizing sions[ ], no matter how minute the intrudistinct categories of physical and regulatory sion, and no matter how weighty the public
takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parcho- purpose behind it, we have required commovsky, Gi-uings, 111 Yale L.J.' 547, 559 pensation."). Cf Yee, 503 U.S. at 539, 112
(2001) ("[I]t is indisputable that the case law S.Ct. at 1534 ("Because the ... ordinance
recognizes the existence of two types of tak- does not compel a landowner to suffer the
govcrnmenial entity for the appropriation of his
Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 558-60 (2001) (citation omitted). Another scholar noted that "[tjhe
property interest." 2A Nichols, Eminent Doincoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court's output
main § 6.14[l], at 6-227 (3d ed.2002). "[T]he
in this field has by now been demonstrated time
inverse condemnation action is available to any
and again by practitioners and academic comlandowner who suffers destruction or impairment of a protected private property right." Id. ., mentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the
ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the pa§ 6.14[l], at 6-230. Moreover, although BAM
per consumed in this frustrating and increasingly
correctly points out that inverse condemnation
pointless enterprise." Gideon Kanner, Hunting
claims brought under Article I, Section 22 of the
the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U S. Supieme
Utah Constitution are "self-executing," this
Court Been Competent in fts Effort to Formulate
means only that such claims may be brought
Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 The Uiban
even absent authorizing legislation and that such
Lawyer 307, 308 (Spring 1998). Nevertheless, a
claims are exempt from the limitations found in
summary of takings jurisprudence is important
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Colin the disposition of BAM's appeal, especially
umn v. Utah State land Bd.t 795 P.2d 622, 630considering the dearth of Utah case law on the
35 (Utah 1990). It does not follow, as BAM
subject.
contends, that inverse condemnation claims are
automatically exempt from requirements such as
10. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provider that
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
"(pjrivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
9. The lack of a "coherent test" and resulting "sea
Utah Const, art. I. § 22. The Utah provision
of uncertainty" in takings law inspired one pair
has been characterized as broader than its federof commentators to quip that "takings jurisprual counterpart because it ptotccts not only propdence is considered a leading candidate for the
erty that is "taken," but also property that is
'doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle
"damaged" for public use. See Bagford v. Ephraprize.' " Abraham Bell & Cideon Parchomovsky,
im City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995).
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physical occupation of his property, it does
not effect a per se taking under Loretto")
(emphasis in original).
B. Regulatory Takings

H 39 Despite the ad hoc nature of regulatory takings inquiries, at least one general rule
has emerged: "[T]he Fifth Amendment is
violated when land-use regulation 'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.'" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016,
112 S.Ct. at 2894 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260,
100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106
(1980)).11 Cf. Three D Carp. v. Salt Lake
City, 752 R2d 1321, 1325 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
('Where governmental action, not amounting
to a physical taking, effectively deprives a
property owner of reasonable access to property, the owner is entitled to compensation!.]") (footnote omitted). This general
rule incorporates the underlying principle
that while "[o]ur cases have not elaborated
on the standards for determining what constitutes a legitimate state interestf,]'
[t]hey have made clear ... that a broad
range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements." Nollan,
483 U.S. at 834-35, 107 S.Ct. at 3147. See
also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at
3179 ("We do not ... question the
substantial authority upholding a State's broad
power to impose appropriate restrictions
upon an owner's use of his property.") (emphasis in original).

H38 In contrast to a physical taking, a
regulatory takings claim challenges state or
local laws that impose "regulations" or "restrictions" on the "use" of property. Yee,
503 U.S. at 532, 539, 112 S.Ct. at 1531, 1534
(emphasis in original). See Loretto, 458 U.S.
at 430, 102 S.C1 at 3173 ("[RJecent cases
confirm the distinction between a permanent
physical occupation ... and a regulation that
merely restricts the use of property."). In
the famous words of Justice Holmes, 4<while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415,43 S.Ct 158,
160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). However, "[i]n 70odd years of succeeding regulatory takings
jurisprudence, [the Court has] generally eschewed any set formula for determining how
far is too far." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112
S.Ct. at 2893 (quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the Court has "examined the
taking question by engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors—such as the economic impact of
the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
C. Development Exactions
character of the governmental action—that
have particular significance." MacDonald,
H 40 Along with the traditional categories
Sommer.& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. of physical and regulatory takings, a third
340, 349,106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 category of takings has emerged in the case
(1986) (quotations and citations omitted).
law, namely "development exactions."12
11. The per se rule of Lucas is not absolute, but is
limited by "the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership." Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1028, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2900, 120 L.Ed.2d 798
(1992).
12. It is helpful to think of exactions as sort of a
hybrid between physical and regulatory takings.
The Court acknowledged as much in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission when it characterized "a classic right-of-way easement" as a
physical taking but nevertheless applied the regulatory takings test. 483 U.S. 825, 831 & n. 1,
107 S.Ct. 3141, 3146 & n. 1, 97 L.Ed.2d 677
(1987) ("We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred . . . where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to

and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself per ma
nently upon the premises."). The Court explained: "Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of the easement outi igiu would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the question
becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a
condition for issuing a land-use permit alter s the
outcome." Id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147. The
Court then applied the regulatory takings test of
whether the regulation " 'substantially advance^] legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land.'" Id. (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
Similarly, in Dolan v. City ofTigard, the Court
distinguished the garden-variety regulatory tak-
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" '[Development exactions may be defined as that development exactions—at least when
contributions to a governmental entity im- they take the form of forced dedications of
posed as a condition precedent to approving property—must satisfy to withstand scrutiny
the developer's project. Usually, exactions under the Takings Clause.13 In Nollan, the
are imposed prior to the issuance of a build- Court revisited the "long[-]recognized" rule
ing permit or zoning/subdivision approval/ " that a "land-use regulation does not effect a
Salt Lake County u Board of Educ, 808 taking if it Substantially advance[s] legitiP.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (citation omit- mate state interests' and does not *den[y] an
ted). Exactions will generally "serve more owner economically viable use of his land/ "
than a single development," 8A Nichols, Emi- Id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 (second and
nent Domain § 17.01, at 17-7 (2002), and third alterations in original) (citation omit" 'may take the form of: (1) mandatory dedi- ted). The Court acknowledged that it had
cations of land for roads, schools or parks, as "not elaborated on the standards for detera condition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of
mining what constitutes a 'legitimate state
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage
interest' or what type of connection between
connection fees and (4) impact fees/ " Salt
j. the regulation and the state interest satisfies
Lake County v. Board ofEduc, 808 P.2d at
^
1058 (citation omitted). Exactions "enable the requirement that the former 'substantiallocal government to acquire land for highway ly advance' the latter." Id. In addressing
expansion at no charge to the public. The these questions, the Court set forth the first
dedicated land is reserved in its present state prong of the Nollan/Dolan test: there must
between the
until the government is ready to widen the be an '"essential nexus*
'legitimate
state
interest'
and
the
permit conadjacent highway or construct a new roaddition
exacted
by
the
[governmental
entity]"
way."
8A Nichols, Eminent Domain
Dolan,
512
U.S.
at
386,
114
S.Ct.
at 2317
§ 17.02[3], at 17-17.
(quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837,107 S.Ct. at
H 41 In the famous Nollan and Dolan deci3148).
sions, see Dolan u City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
1142 In Dolan, the Court resolved the
374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994);
Nollan u California Coastal Comm'n, 483 question it left unanswered in Nollan: If an
U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct 3141, 97 L,Ed.2d 677 "essential nexus" exists, what is the required
(1987), the Court adopted a two-pronged test degree of connection between the exactions
ings cases from the case before it, which involved
tates, 71 S,W.3d 18, 30 (Tex.App.) ("In an exaction takings case, the landowner is not simply
a redevelopment permit conditioned upon a
forced dedication of land. See 512 U.S. 374, - denied or restricted in some clesired use of his
385, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 ' property. Rather, in an exaction takings case,
" some action—the exaction—is required of the
(1994). The Court stated:
landowner as a condition to obtaining governFirst, [those cases] involved essentially legislamental approval."), review granted, 2002 Tex.
tive determinations classifying entire areas of
LEXIS 209 (Tex.2002); Sparks v. Douglas Counthe city, whereas here the city made an adjudity, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742 (1995)
cative decision to condition petitioner's appli(recognizing that "[the physical taking*] luie
cation for a building permit on an individual
does not necessarily apply
where conveyance
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were
of a property nght is required as a condition loi
not simply a limitation on the use petitioner
issuance of a land permit"); 8 Nichols, Eminent
might make of her own parcel, but a requireDomain § 14E.04[4]4 at 14E-33 & 14E-34 (2002)
ment that she deed portions of the property to
("[T]he Dolan rule applies only to case-by-case
the city.
land exactions, and not to community wide zonId. (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that exacing and land use regulations."); Taking 'Takings
tions do not fit neatly into either the regulatory
Rights" Seriously: A Debate on Properly Right*
or physical takings jurisprudence. See Rogers
Legislation Before the J04th Congress, 9 Am U
Much, Inc. v Washington County, 181 Or.App.
Admin. L.J. 253, 277 (1995) (designating Dolan
369, 45 P.3d 966, 973 (characterizing exactions
as an example of a "special category of cases
as an ''amalgamation" between physical and regcalled dedication and exaction cases").
ulatory takings and noting that "[enactions do
not fit neatly within the more conventional Takings Clause analytical construct"), review denied, 13. As explained more fully below, it is unclear
334 Or. 492, 52 P.3d 1057 (Or.2002), cert, denied,
whether the Court's analysis applies to develop538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct. 1482, 155 L.Ed.2d 225
ment exactions other than forced dedications of
(2003); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Esproperty.
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and the projected impact of the proposed
development? 14 In response, the Court set
forth the "rough proportionality" prong of
the test, which requires the governmental
entity to "make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20.

P.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). More importantly, the facts of this case mirror the facts
of both Nollan, where the landowner was
forced to grant an easement to the public in
exchange for a building permit, and Dolan,
where the landowner was forced to dedicate
a portion of her property to the city of
Tigard in exchange for a development permit. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86, 114
H 43 To summarize the Nollan/Dolan two- S.Ct. at 2317.
1 45 Having concluded that BAM has statprong test, a development exaction in the
form of a forced dedication of real property ed a claim for an exaction in the form of a
will constitute a taking, necessitating just forced dedication of real property, it is necescompensation, unless the government demon- sary to determine what, if any, procedural
strates that (1) an " 'essential nexus* exists requirements BAM must comply with and
between the 'legitimate state interest' and whether it has done so in this case.
the permit condition exacted by the [governII. Preservation of Issues
mental entity]/' and (2) "the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to
H 46 The County argues, and the trial court
the impact of the proposed development." agreed, that "the only issue appealed by
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391, 114 S.Ct. at BAM to the County Commission, and thus
2317, 2319-20.
preserved by exhaustion of administrative
remedies,
was the County's requirement of a
1144 After considering the rules and ratio53-foot
highway
dedication, rather than a 40nales underlying physical, regulatory, and exactions takings cases, it appears that BAM's foot dedication." Thus, the County mainclaim most closely fits within the framework tains that "the only issue properly before this
of the development exactions cases. The Court" is whether the thirteen-foot increase
County conditioned approval of BAM's pro- in the County's dedication requirement efposed subdivision on dedication of property fected a taking of BAM's property. BAM,
to be used in the future for widening 3500 on the other hand, urges us to address the
South—at least if the County's Master constitutionality of the entire fifty-three-foot
Transportation Plan were to be eventually dedication as well as the County's additional
implemented. The forced dedication is a in-kind improvement requirements,
" 'contribution ] to a governmental entity
U 47 Although the County phrases its arguimposed as a condition precedent to approv- ment in jurisdictional terms, the County's
ing the developer's project,'" which is within objection, in reality, is one of issue-preservathe definition of an exaction as set forth in tion rather than exhaustion of administrative
Salt Lake County v. Board of Education, 808 remedies. 15 Tellingly, the County concedes
14. The Court did not addiess thib question in
Nollan because, while it "agreed that the Coastal
Commission's concern with piotecting visual ac. cess to the ocean constituted a legitimate public
interest," the Court deteuwined there was no
"essential nexus" between "visual access to the
ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral
public access along the Nollans' beachfront lot "
Dolan, 512 US at 386-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2317
Because the "essential nexus" piong was not
satisfied, the Court had no occasion to decide
"the required degree of connection between the
exactions and the piojected impact of the proposed development." Id. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at
2317.
15. In any event, it is far from clear that exhaustion t equipments would apply to BAM, at least

insofai as its challenge to the County s forced
dedication of real property is concerned Ii is
true that in reference to a garden-variety land
use regulation, "an essential prerequisite to its
assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity ot development
legally permitted on the subject pioperty A
court cannot determine whether a regulation has
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the legulation goes." MacDouald, Sommer & Fraies v
Yolo County, All U.S. 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561,
2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). Such logic does
not apply to a development exaction consisting of
a forced dedication of real property The County
did not attempt to regulate the "use" of BAM s
land, but conditioned its approval of BAM's subdivision proposal on a forced dedication of leal
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that "BAM followed the appeal procedure
outlined in the Utah statute and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provisions]." Thus, the County's real quarrel is
with the wording of BAM's appeal to the
Board of County Commissioners, which challenges the County's decision to deny development approval with the 40-foot dedication
and argues that the County's imposition of
"increased expenses and uncompensated dedication of private property for public use, is
arbitrary, capricious, . . . and contrary to
law."
1148 It is true that "a party seeking review
of agency action must raise an issue before
that agency to preserve the issue for further
review," Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Pursuant to the
"level of consciousness" test, "a plaintiff
[must] bring an issue to the fact finder's
attention so that there is at least the possibility that it could be considered." 16 Id.
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State Tax Comrn'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 n. 7
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (applying level of consciousness test to hearing before State Tax
Commission);
Ashcroft
v.
InduUrml
Comrn'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct.
App.) (holding that plaintiff waived issues not
presented to the administrative law judge
during formal hearing), cert, denied, 868 P.2d
95 (Utah 1993). In light of the fact that the
County Commission summarily denied
BAM's appeal without a hearing, foreclosing
the opportunity for BAM to develop and
explain its concerns, an unnecessarily
crabbed reading of BAM's notice of appeal is
not required by the "level of consciousness"
test, and that test does not foreclose consideration of the constitutionality of requiring
the entire fifty-three-foot dedication.

1151 A different conclusion is reached, however, on the question of whether BAM properly preserved its objection to the County's
requirement that certain in-kind improvements be made. On appeal, BAM chal% 49 It must be concluded that BAM's ap- lenges, to an unclear extent, a number of
peal properly encompassed its objection to improvements required by the County as a
the entire dedication of real property such condition to subdivision approval, including
that the Board of County Commissioners installation of curbs, gutters, stormdrain
was, or should have been, conscious of i t lines, sidewalks, and fencing. BAM argues
BAM's argument that the County should that such improvements are "unconstitutionhave approved its proposal with the 40-foot ally excessive and/or unreasonable." The
dedication does not foreclose its further ar- only possible evidence of preservation of this
gument that the County's requirement of argument in BAM's written appeal to the
"uncompensated dedication of private prop- Board of County Commissioners is in BAM's
erty," in whatever amount, is "unconstitu- objection to the County's "increased expenses." Even under the most liberal contional."
11 50 Furthermore, this case is in a some- struction of BAM's notice of appeal, it cannot
be said that this issue was sufficiently raised
what unusual posture because the "level of
such that the Board of County Commissionconsciousness" test is being applied not to a
ers should have been conscious of it.
hearing or other administrative proceeding,
1152 Furthermore, even if BAM had piopbut to BAM's written notice of appeal. Cf.
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (applying level of erly preserved this argument, BAM advances
consciousness test to informal hearing before no convincing argument that the County's
State Engineer); US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah improvement requirements should be invaliproperty. The only question is whether the
County's exaction of BAM's property constituted
a taking. See Nelson v. City of Lake Oswego, 126
Or.App. 416, 869 P.2d 350, 353 (1994) (en banc)
("LNo] case of which we are aware attaches an
exhaustion or ripeness prerequisite to the litigation of claims, like those here, that are based oh
a development condition that has resulted in the
actual acquisition of a private property interest
by the government.").

16, The "level of consciousness" test is a "less
exacting standard" than that applied in a uial
setting, where preservation requires that "(1) 'the
issue . . . be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) the
issue . . . be specifically raised;' and (3)[the] paity must introduce 'supporting evidence or i elevant legal authority.' " Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Han
v. Salt Lake County Comrn'n, 945 P2d 125. 130
(Utah Ct.App.), cert, dented. 953 P 2d 449 (Utah
1997)).
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dated, or for that matter even analyzed, under Nollan and Dolan.n The County cannot
force BAM to dedicate and improve 3500
South based solely on its own transportation
planning goals, rather than on the impacts of
BAM's subdivision, because this would force
BAM "alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Armstrong u United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct 1563,1569, 4
L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Nevertheless, there is
"an important distinction between ordinances
requiring installation of streets, sidewalks,
sewers and drainage facilities which are inextricably tied to the needs of the subdivision
development, and those ordinances which require dedication of land . . . where the nexus
between the use requirement and the subdivision development is less than evident." 2A
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6
218 (3d ed.2002). See also Art Piculell
Group v. Clackamas County, 142 OrApp.
327, 922 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1996) ("[Conditions
^hat in whole or in part serve the needs of
die development itself should be weighed •
differently than pure 'exactions' of the kind
rtiat serve only to mitigate an impact of the
development on the public or public facilities.").
1153 For example, the County's requirement that BAM install a fence and a sidewalk
along the portion of its property abutting
S500 South seems to be "inextricably tied to
17. This is not to say that improvement exactions
may never be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.
See McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App.
425, 28 P.3d 1222, 1227-28 (2001) (applying
Dolan to city ordinance requiring dedication of
property and installation of sidewalks, driveway
improvements, and street lighting), review denied,
334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d 435 (2002); Art Piculell
Group v. Clackamas County, 142 Or.App. 327,
922 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1996) (applying Dolan
to county requirement that landowner dedicate
and approve public street abutting his subdivision); Clark v. City of Albany, 137 Or.App. 293,
904 P.2d 185, 189 (1995) (applying Dolan to
improvement exactions because the court saw
"little difference between a requirement that a
developer convey title to the part of the property
that is to serve a public purpose, and a requirement that the developer himself make improvements on the affected and nearby property and
make it available for the same purpose"), review
denied, 322 Or. 644, 912 P.2d 375 (1996); Town
of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, 71 S.W.3d
18, 33 (Tex.Ct.App.) (applying Dolan to town
ordinance requiring road improvements because

the needs of [BAM's] subdivision," 2A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6-218,
because such improvements undoubtedly inure to the convenience and safety of the
subdivision residents. In any event, absent
proper preservation at the County Commission level and a well-developed argument on
appeal, BAM's objection to the County's inkind improvement requirements need be addressed no further.
III. Merits of BAM's Takings Challenge
K 54 Having resolved the threshold issue of
preservation, this opinion proceeds to the
merits of BAM's takings challenge. Although BAM has formulated its takings challenge to include separate claims for relief
under both state and federal law, the legal
principles underlying both claims are largely
the same and this opinion therefore treats
them concurrently. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 27
Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87,
100-101 (2002) (construing federal and state
takings clauses congruently); Sparks v.
Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d
738, 741 (1995) (same).
H55 As outlined above, it must now be
determined whether the two-pronged Nollan/Dolan test is satisfied here. The County, however, argues that the Nollan/Dolan
improvement exactions "involve conditional governmental land use approval and present the
same opportunities for governmental 'leveraging'
[as dedicatory exactions]"), review granted, 2002
Tex. LEXIS 209 (Tex.2002); Benchmark Land v
City of Battle Ground, 94 Wash.App 537, 972
P.2d 944, 950 (1999) (holding that "Nollan and
Dolan apply here where the City requires the
developer as a condition of approval to incur
substantial costs improving an adjoining street"),
affdon other grounds, 146 Wash.2d 685, 49 P.3d
860 (2002); Burton v. Clark County, 91 Wash
App. 505, 958 P.2d 343, 348, 357 (1998) (applying Nollan/Dolan to county requirement that per
mit applicants make "road dedications and lm
provements"), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1015
978 P.2d 1097 (1999). But see Parking Ass'n o
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 45(
S.E.2d 200, 201-02, 204 (1994) (refusing to ap
ply Dolan to city parking lot ordinance requinn
owners to install barrier curbs and landscapin
improvements even though three dissenting jut
tices argued that Nollan and Dolan were contro
ling), cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 115 S.Ct 2262
132 L.Ed.2d 273 (1995).
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exactions analysis does not apply to this case.
Specifically, the County argues, and the trial
court agreed, that the Nollan/Dolan analysis
applies only to "ad hoc discretionary assessment[s] imposed on an individualized basis"
and not to "a generally-applicable legislative
scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory
standard for road-width dedication by subdivision developments."18

1 56 In the instant case, it should not
matter whether the County ordinance at issue here is indeed a "generally applicable"
"uniformly imposed" legislative scheme because Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny iy
should apply to any forced dedication of real
property, regardless of whether the exactions
are imposed on an individualized basis or via
a comprehensive legislative scheme.20 This

18. It should be noted that unrebutted evidence
introduced at trial casts substantial doubt on this
characterization in any event. For example, testimony from William A. Marsh, a land-use planner employed by Salt Lake County for over twenty-eight years, elicited the following information:
Q. Okay. How does the county determine
how much that developer then dedicates;
in other words, what the half width actually is?
A. When the subdivision application is processed, the recommendation is sent out.
In the case of 3500 South, where it's a
state highway, it goes to the county transportation engineer and to UDOT.
Q. Okay. And who makes that determination
as to what the half width is?
A. It would be based on the recommendations that come back from those agencies.
Q. Okay. So at any given moment we can't,
say, look in the book and see what that
half width determination is?
A. We have the map that guides us, but until
we get the final written recommendation
we don't know for sure.
Such testimony belies the County's assurances
that there is no discretion involved in assessing
its road-width dedication requirements.

at issue, Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841, 107 S.Ct. at
3150-51, implies that such claims are subject to
increased scrutiny beyond that applied to garden-variety land-use regulations. As discussed in
Note 20, courts and commentators have disagreed about what type of cases invoke Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. Most, however, agree that Nollan
and Dolan do impose some sort of heightened
scrutiny. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City &
County of San Francisco, 27 Cal.4th 643, 117
Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87, 102 (2002) (" Thus
in Nollan, the rule that [physical occupations aie
per se takings] is transformed, in the context of a
development application, into a rule of heightened scrutiny to ensure that a required development dedication is not a mere pretext to obtain
or otherwise physically invade property without
just compensation.' ") (citation omitted). See
also Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains & Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa
L.Rev. 1, 4, 9-12 (2000) (arguing that "wholesale
application of Dolan to regulatory takings junsprudence would abruptly dismantle nearly seventy-five years of zoning law").

19. There has been some confusion about whether
Nollan and Dotan imposed a new form of heightened scrutiny. In Nollan, the Court stated that
"our verbal formulations in the takings field have
generally been quite different" from "those applied to due process or equal protection claims"
because "[w]e have required that the regulation
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State
"could rationally have decided " that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective.'"
483 U.S. at 834 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 n. 3
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Therefore, Nollan and Dolan could be interpreted as
merely clarifying the heightened scrutiny that
already applied to regulatory takings claims.
See, e.g., Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d
245, 258 n. 18 (Utah Ct.App.I998) C[T]he takings analysis . . . adds the word 'substantially'
before 'advance.' Thus, this standard appears to
be more stringent than the standard against
which we measured the substantive due process
validity of the ordinance."). However, the
Court's subsequent warning about being "particularly careful about the adjective" of "substantial" when an "actual conveyance of property" is

20. It must be acknowledged that the scope of the
Nollan/Dolan analysis is unsettled. In other
words, because both Nollan and Dolan were
decided in the context of forced dedications of
real property administered, according to the
Court, on an individualized, adjudicative basis, it
is unclear whether one or both of those conditions must exist for Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny to apply. $ee, e.g., Fennell, Hard Bargains, 86 Iowa L.Rev. at 10-11 (stating that two
uncertainties exist after Nollan and Dolan (I)
"whether Dolan's requirement of rough piopoitionality applies when land use 'conditions' ate
not selectively imposed on individual landowners, but are instead embedded in legislative enactments" and (2) whether Nollan and Dolan,
which "both involved actual concessions of land"
apply' to "other kinds of concessions (such as
cash payments or the provision of unrelated
amenities)"). See also Rogers MacJi. Inc. v
Washington County, 181 Or.App. 369, 45 P 3d
966, 976 (2002) ("In the eight years since Dolan
was decided, no consensus has emerged among
lower courts on [the above] questions and, so lar,
the Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari in cases that might have provided further
guidance."), review denied, 334 Or. 492, 52 P.3d
1057 (2002), cert, denied, 538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct
1482, 155 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003). See also, eg., San
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is so for at least two reasons. First, "[i]t is
not clear why the existence of a taking
should turn on the type of governmental
entity responsible for the taking." Parking
AWn of Georgia, Inc. u. City of Atlanta, 515
U.S. 1116, 115 S.Ct 2268, 2268-69, 132
L.Ed.2d 273 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For example, "[a] city council can
take property just as well as a planning
commission can."2I Id. at 1118, 115 S.Ct at
2269. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of
Schaumburg, 277 IU.App.3d 926, 214 Ill.Dec.
526, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself
from a takings challenge merely by utilizing
a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property "), ceit denied,
519 U.S 976, 117 S.Ct 413, 136 L.Ed.2d 325
(1996); McClure v City of Springfield, 175
Or.App. 425, 28 P 3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to
make particularized findings showing that
any resulting exactions were roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development"), review denied, 334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d
435 (2002)

H 57 Second, it is not always easy to tell
the difference between an individualized, adjudicative decision and a "uniformly imposed" legislative scheme. This ambiguity is
manifest in Dolan itself, where the majority
characterized'the city's action as an "adjudicative decision'' without further explanation,
while Justice Souter, in dissent, pointed out
that "the permit conditions were imposed
pursuant to [the city's] Community Development Code."22 Dolan v City of Tigcnd, 512
U.S. 374, 413 n. *, 114 SCt. 2309, 2331 n *
(1994) (Souter, J , dissenting) Distinguish
mg between adjudicative and legislative action is made even more difficult because "local governments are not structured under
strict separation of powers principles" and
"the nature of the land use decision-making
process relies on flexibility and discretion'
Inna Rezmk, The Distinction Betiveen Legis
lative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v
City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev 242, 257
(2000)P Notwithstanding these uncertainties, it must be concluded that all forced
dedications of property are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. This conclusion is
premised on the United States Supreme
Court's well-settled takings jurisprudence

Remo Hotel, 117 CalRptr2d 269, 41 P 3d at
Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc v Cit\ of Atlanta
102-05 (discussing scope of Nollan/Dolan analy515 US 1116, 115 SCt 2268 2268-69 132
sis), Krupp v Breckenndge Sanitation Dist, 19
L Ed 2d 273 (1995) (Thomas J joined b> O Con
P3d 687 695-98 (Colo 2001) (en banc) (same),
nor, J , dissenting from denial of cei tiorai i)
Town of Flower Mound, 71 S W 3d at 31-35
22. Specifically, the City of Tigard imposed the
(same) Inna Rezmk, The Distinction Between
floodplain exaction pursuant to us Mastei Diam
Legislative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v
age Plan, codified in its Community Development
Cuv o\ Tigard, 75 N Y U L Rev 242, 252 (2000)
Code and required by the State of Oregon which
(cataloguing the pervasive confusion among lowrequited land dedications from all permit apph
ei couits attempting to interpret and apply Docants seeking to develop land within dnd udj<i
lan )
cent to the 100-year floodplain
Dolan 512
US at 377-79, 1 \A S Ct at 2313-14 Of coin se
21. Noting the conflict among lower courts over
these facts are strikingly similar to the ones be
' whethei Dolan's test foi property regulation
fore us, where the County, acting pursuant to its
should be applied in cases where the alleged
Transportation Master Plan, requned dedication*
taking occurs thi ough an Act of the legislature,"
from alJ landowners seeking to develop property
Justice Thomas concluded:
abutting 3500 South Street It seems theielore
that the County cannot fairly characterize the
It is haidly surpusing that some courts have
scheme in Dolan as "ad hoc" and discretion
applied Dolan's rough proportionality test even
ary" without so chaiactenzing its own
when consideiing a legislative enactment
ITJhe geneial applicability of the ordinance
should not be relevant in a takings analysis If
23. Ms Rezmk astutely points out that somt exac
Atlanta had seized several hundred homes in
tions "are somewhere in the middle of adjudica
oidei to build a freeway, there would be no
tive and legislative because the legislative
doubt that Atlanta had taken property The
[may give] some guidelines [while] the admmis
distinction between sweeping legislative taktrative body retain[s] considerable disci etion as
ings and paiticulanzcd administrative takings
well" Rezmk, The Distinction Between Legisla
appeals to be a distinction without a constitutive & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v Cit\ oj
tional diffcience
Tigard, 75 N Y U L Rev at 266
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holding that physical invasions, occupations, Commission argued that the easement was
or mandated conveyances of real property necessary to advance legitimate state interare entitled to special treatment. As the ests such as "protecting the public's ability to
Court stated in Nollan v. California Coastal see the beach, assisting the public in overCommission,
coming the 'psychological barrier' to using
our cases describe the condition for the beach created by a developed shorefront,
abridgement of property rights through and preventing congestion on the public
the police power as a 'substantial ad- beaches." Id. at 835,107 S.Ct. at 3148. The
vancing]' of a legitimate state interest Court assumed, without deciding, that the
We are inclined to be particularly careful above interests were legitimate and agreed
about the adjective where the actual con- with the Commission that "a permit condition
veyance of property is made a condition to that serves the same legitimate police-power
the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in purpose as a refusal to issue the permit
that context there is heightened risk that should not be found to be a taking if the
the purpose is avoidance of the compensa- refusal to issue the permit would not constition requirement, rather than the stated tute a taking." Id. at 836, 107 S.Ct. at 3148.
Thus, if the "Commission could have exerpolice-power objective.
483 U.S. 825, 841, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3150-51, 97 cised its police power ... to forbid construcL.Ed.2d 677 (1987) (alteration and first em- tion of the house altogether," it may, in the
phasis in original). The Court has "re- alternative, impose permit conditions—for
peatedly held that, as to property reserved example, height or width restrictions—that
by its owner for private use, 'the right to would further the legitimate state interest of
exclude (others is] "one of the most essential * Protecting "the public's ability to see the
sticks in the bundle of rights that are com- beach." Id.
160 However, the Court went on to exmonly characterized as property."'" Id. at
831, 107 S.Ct at 3145 (alteration in original) plain that "[t]he evident constitutional propri(citations omitted). Anything less than Nol- ety disappears ... if the condition substitutlan/Dolan scrutiny, at least when an actual ed for the prohibition utterly fails to further
conveyance of property is at issue, falls short the end advanced as the justification for the
of adequately protecting these rights. Ac- prohibition." Id. at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3148.
cordingly, this opinion now addresses the Such was the case in Nollan. The Court
question of whether the County's uncompen- found it
quite impossible to understand how a resated dedication requirement passes muster
quirement that people already on the pubunder Nollan.
lic beaches be able to walk across the
A. Nollan and the "Essential Nexus"
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
11 58 Under Nollan, "[a court] must first
viewing the beach x created by the new
determine whether the 'essential nexus' exhouse[,] how it lowers any "psychological
ists between the 'legitimate state interest'
barrier" to using the public beaches, or
and the permit condition exacted by the [govhow it helps to remedy any additional conernmental entity]." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386,
gestion on them caused by construction of
114 S.Ct. at 2317 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S.
the Nollans' new house.
at 836-37, 107 S.Ct. at 3148). In doing so Id, at 838-39, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Thus, "the
here, it is appropriate to review the facts of lack of nexus between the condition and the
Nollan.
original purpose of the building restriction
11 59 The Nollans planned to replace their converts that purpose to something other
beachfront bungalow with a three-bedroom than what it was. The purpose then behouse. When they applied to the California comes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easeCoastal Commission for a development per- ment to serve some valid governmental purmit, the Nollans were told the permit would pose, but without payment of compensation."
be denied unless they agreed to a public Id. at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Such a restriceasement across their beachfront lot. The tion "is not a valid regulation of land use but
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'an out-and-out plan of extortion/ " Id (citation omitted).
1161 Having reviewed the holding and rationale underlying Nollan, this opinion now
turns to the facts of the instant case. The
County devotes the majority of its takings
analysis to arguing that Nollan and Dolan
are inapplicable to this case. In so doing,
the County fails to articulate, in the alternative, the legitimate state interests in support
of its dedication requirements, arguing only
in passing that "[s]uch a uniform scheme is
fundamental to ensuring that community development occurs in accordance with sensible
long-range transportation planning."24 Following the lead of the Nollan Court, it may
be assumed that the County's traffic goals
are a legitimate governmental interest.25
See Smith Inv. Co, v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d
245, 255 (Utah CtApp.1998) (" *[I]t is clear
that theflowof traffic is a legitimate concern
of a municipal legislative body in its enactment of zoning regulations,' ") (quoting Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of
Zoning § 3A.04 (4th ed.1996)). Nevertheless, the validity of the interest does not, by

itself, justify imposing the entire cost of realizing that goal upon BAM and other landowners whose property abuts 3500 South.
See 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 17.01, at
17-6, 17-7 (2002) (articulating the reasons "it
makes a great deal of sense for a governmental agency to attempt to acquire, or at least
reserve, land for major roads before an area
develops" but nevertheless noting that "the
need for reducing the cost of acquiring public
right-of-way . . . cannot override the constitutional guarantee that an individual's property rights be protected"). Rather, the
County must demonstrate an "essential nexus" between that interest and the roadway
dedication requirements it imposed upon
BAM. Although the County fails to undertake this demonstration in its brief, the record reveals unrebutted evidence, introduced
at trial, that construction of the Westridge
Meadows subdivision, consisting of forty-four
single-family units, would increase traffic
flow along 3500 South only "by approximately three to four percent."26
K 62 Clearly, there is an "essential nexus"
between the problem of increased traffic

24. The Commission advanced a similar argument in Nollan, pointing out that it had already
similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of
land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14
had been approved when the Commission did
not have administrative regulations in place
allowing imposition of the condition, and the
remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property.
483 U.S. at 829, 107 S.Ct. at 3144. The Commission argued that such a scheme was necessary as "part of a comprehensive program to
provide continuous public access along [the
beach] as the lots undergo development or redevelopment." /</. at 841, 107 S.Ct. at 3151. The
Court was unmoved, holding that such a justification was "unrelated to land-use regulation"
and was "simply an expression of the Commission's belief that the public interest will be served
by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach
along the coast." Id. The Court continued:
The Commission may well be right that it is a
good idea, but that does not establish that the
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can
be compelled to contribute to its realization.
Rather, California is free to advance its "comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using its
power of eminent domain for this "public purpose. . . . "
M a t 841-42, 107 S.Ct. at 3151.

quirements for new construction along major
traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and
other impact characteristics of each individual
parcel." This would only be true if BAM was
challenging the County's authority to require
road-width dedications as a condition of development. BAM's argument, however, is that while
the County surely has the authority to require
such dedications, it does not have the authority
to require them for free. Contrary to the County's contention, BAM's view would have no effect
on the uniformity of road width along 3500
South—it would just mean that the cost of such
uniformity would be borne by the public/not by
BAM alone.

25. To this end, the County argues that "under
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width re-

26. This conclusion is based on a study promulgated by the Institute of Transportation Engineers, which estimates that the typical residential
dwelling generates an average of ten car trips
per day. Thus, Westridge Meadows, consisting
of forty-four units, would generate approximately
440 additional trips per day on 3500 South, the
nearest major street to which Westridge Meadows residents would have vehicular access. Evidence at trial showed that, in 1997, about 13,000
cars traveled on 3500 South per day. Therefore,
the 440 additional trips generated by the Westridge Meadows subdivision would increase the
1997 estimate by, at most, three or four percent.
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along 3500 South, insofar as attributable to
the subdivision, and the solution of property
dedication so that 3500 South can eventually
be widened. The County, understandably,
must project and prepare for the inevitable
increase in traffic along state highways.
Should widening of 3500 South become necessary in the future, the County ideally
would be able to accomplish this without
having to buy, only to then demolish and
remove, existing structures. BAM's subdivision, as acknowledged by both sides at trial,
will necessarily contribute, albeit a relatively
small amount, to increased traffic along 3500
South and the eventual need for a wider
road. Thus, the County's roadway dedication requirements are connected to the goal
of insuring that the County will be able to
fulfill that need. Having determined that an
essential nexus exists between a legitimate
state interest and the required condition of
approval, this opinion now addresses whether
the required dedication is sufficiently related
in both nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.

114 S.Ct at 2313. The city responded that,
in exchange for the permit, the landowner
would be required to dedicate "the portion of
her property lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage
system . . . and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the
floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway "
Id. at 379-50, 114 S.Ct. at 2314. As justification for these exactions, the city argued, first,
that the floodplain dedication was necessary
to alleviate the "anticipated increased storm
water flow from the subject property to an
already strained creek and drainage basin."
Id. at 382, 114 S.Ct. at 2315. Second, the
city argued that "creation of a convenient,
safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an
alternative means of transportation 'could
offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby]
streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion' " caused, at least in part, by the
proposed development. Id. at 381-82, 114
S.Ct at 2314.

H 64 After determining that the above justifications satisfied the "essential nexus"
B. Dolan and Rough Proportionality
prong of Nollan, the Court was left with the
4
H 63 Dolan requires this court to deter- question of \vhether these findings are conmine whether the exactions demanded by the stitutionally sufficient to justify the condiCounty bear a "rough proportionality" to the tions imposed by the city on petitioner's
"projected impact of [BAM's] proposed de- building permit." Id. at 389, 114 S.Ct. at
velopment." 512 U.S. at 388-91, 114 S.Ct. at 2318. After reviewing "representative deci2318-19. In Dolan, the landowner applied sions" by State courts addressing this quesfor a building permit to expand her plumbing tion, the Court adopted the "rough proporand electrical supply store. See id at 379, tionality" test.27 Id. at 389-91, 114 S.Ct. at
27. As support for the adoption of this test, the - . After granting the landowner's petition for rehearing, however, the Utah Supreme Court held
United States Supreme Court cited Call v. City of
that "disposition of this issue as a matter of law
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (Call I),
[is] inappropriate," Call II, 614 P.2d at 1258,
modified on reh'g, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980)
"without plaintiffs being given the opportunity to
{Call II), the only Utah case of which I am
present evidence to show that the dedication
aware that addressed the constitutionality of exrequired of them had no reasonable relationship
actions in the form of forced dedications of propto the needs for flood control or parks and reci eerty. In Call 1, our Supreme Court addressed
ation facilities created by their subdivision, ll
the validity of a city ordinance that required
any." Id. at 1259. Like the United Suites Susubdividers to dedicate seven percent of their
preme Court, I think the "reasonable relationland, or pay the cash equivalent, as a condition
ship" test is virtually equivalent to the "rough
to development approval. The Court originally
proportionality" test, and thub piesents no ibbiie
upheld the ordinance against a takings challenge
of inconsistency between the precedents ol the
because the dedication, which was to be used for
United States and Utah Supreme Courts See
" 'Hood control and/or parks and recreation facilDolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319 ("[T]he
ities,' " bore a "reasonable relationship to the
'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majorneeds created by the subdivision." Id. at 220.
ity of the state courts is closet to the federal
This was so, the Court held, even though the
constitutional norm[,] . . [b]ut we do not adopt
dedication requirements would necessarily beneit as such partly because the term .. seems
fit the whole community along with the individuconfusingly similar to the term 'rational basis'
which describes the minimal level of scmtiny
al subdivision. See id.
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2318-19. In other words, "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development." Id. at 391,
114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. Under this test, the
Court determined that the city had failed to
demonstrate that its permit conditions bore a
"rough proportionality" to the "projected impact of [the landowner's] proposed development" Id at 388-95, 114 S.Ct. at 2318-22.
1165 Regarding the floodplam dedication,
the Coui t acknowledged that "[i]t is axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious
surface will increase the quantity and rate of
storm water flow from petitioner's property."
Id. at 392, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. "Therefore,
keeping the floodplam open and free from
development would likely confine the pressures . created by petitioner's development." Id at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. The
city, however, "demanded more—it not only
wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property
. for its greenway system." Id. The city
failed to explain 44why a public greenway, as
opposed to a private one, was required in the
interest offloodcontrol " Id
H 66 Further, u[w]ith respect to the pedestnan/bicycle pathway," the Court accepted
undei the Equal Pioiection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") Indeed, the Couit itself
used the two terms inteichangeably See id at
391,395, 114 SCt at 2319,232!
We aie, however, pi evented with a potential
conflict between state and federal law insofar as
Call II, decided before Nollan and Dolan, appears to place the bui den on the party challenging the dedication to show that it "had no rea
sonable relationship to the needs
created by
then subdivision' Call II 614 P 2d at 1259,
while Dolun places this burden on the entity of
local government See Dolan, 512 U S at 391 n
8 U4 SCt at 2320 n 8 (While "m evaluating
most generally applicable zoning regulations, the
burden pioperly rests on the party challenging
the legulation," the buiden is on the government
to 'justify the required dedication" when it
makes an adjudicative decision to condition
[anj application foi a building pei mit on an
individual paicel ' ) It must be noted, however,
that the landownei in Call II, at the request of
the city, paid a (te instead of actually conveying
his pioperty to the city, Cull I, 606 P 2d at 218,
so the casts aie distinguishable on that basis
Additionally, in Call v City of West Jordan, 727
P2d 180 (1986) (Call III), the Court upheld a

the city's finding that "the larger retail sales
facility proposed by petitioner [would] increase traffic" in the downtown area by an
estimated u435 additional trips per clay " Id
at 395, 114 S.Ct at 2321 The Court also
acknowledged that "[dedications lor streets,
sidewalks, and other public ways are genei ally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive
congestion from a proposed pioperty u^e "
Id
1167 Nevertheless, the Couit held that the
city's conclusory statement that "the cieation
of the pathway 'could offset some ot the
traffic demand"' tell far short of "demon
stratmg that the additional number of vehicle
and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's
development reasonably relate to the city's
requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement" Id at 395,
114 S.Ct. at 2321-22 (emphasis added) The
Court concluded that while
[t]he city's goals of reducing flooding haz
ards and traffic congestion, and providing
for public greenways, are laudable
there are outer limits to how this may be
done. "A strong public desire to improve
the public condition [will not] wan ant
achieving the desire by a shoitei cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the
change "
taal court order which placed the buidcn ot
producing evidence' regarding the reasonable
ness of the impact fee ' on the city Id at 182
In so doing, the Court indicated that Call II
should be interpreted in light of the Court's sub
sequent decision in Banberry Development Corp
v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899 (Utah 1981)
which states:
Since the information that must be used to
assuie that subdivision fees are within ttic
standard of reasonableness is most accessi) e
to the municipality thai body should dispose
the basis of its calculations to whoever chal
lenges the reasonableness of as subdivision ot
hookup fees Once that is done the buidcn ot
showing failure to comply with the consutu
tional standard of reasonableness in this mat
tei is on the challenges
Id at 904 See aUo Call III 727 P 2d at 131
However, where the burdtn ot proof ultimately
falls should not affect the outcome heie because
even if the burden properly lests on BAM it has
presented sufficient evidence that the Count) b
dedication requnement does not have the lequi
site relationship—whether couched in terms of
reasonableness or rough piopoitionahty—to the
impact of BAM's subdivision

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY

Utah 733

Cite as 87 P.3U 710 (UtahApp. 2004)

Id. at 396, 114 S.Ct. at 2322 (quoting Pmnsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
416, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922))
(second alteration in original).
H 68 The justifications advanced in favor of
the County's highway dedication requirements in this case suffer from the same
shortcomings as those identified in Dolan.
As acknowledged earlier in this opinion, the
County's goal of "ensuring that community
development occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning" qualifies as a legitimate public purpose. However, the County has not demonstrated why, in
the interest of transportation planning, BAM
must convey the right-of-way to the County
outright, instead of, for example, implementing a set-back requirement that would prohibit BAM and similarly situated property
owners from erecting structures that could
complicate the future widening of 3500
South.
M 69 Similarly, the anticipated three to four
percent increase in traffic congestion caused
by the subdivision does not, by itself, justify
the County's dedication requirement, which
in essence requires BAM to pay for 100
percent of the cost of the County's longrange transportation goal of widening 3500
South, at least as to the portion of 3500
South that abuts BAM's property. Any argument the County makes to the contrary is
fatally hobbled by its repeated assertions
that "the County highway-dedication requirement operates independently of any unique
characteristics or proposed uses of specific
parcels to which it applies." While it is clear
that the County employed such reasoning to
convince the court that Nollan and Dolan do
not apply to this case, it still leaves the
County a ufar cry" from the "individualized
determination" required by Dolan. Id. at
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319. See 1 Nichols, Emi28. Although Dolan doeb not require "precipe
mathematical calculation," it doeb not pieclude a
mathematical mquuy, and the Court in fact con
bideted such evidence in Dolan 512 US. at
391. 395, 114 SCt at 2319, 232t In any event,
mathematical calculations, while not required,
aie at least one way to show an exaction is not
roughly pioportional to the impact of the proposed development. See Art Piculell Croup v.
Clackamas County, 142 Or.App. 327, 922 P.2d
1227, 1235 (1996) ("[Dolan] in fact requires

nent Domain § 1.42(2], at 1-239 (3d ed
2002) ("[W]here the need for a road is substantially generated by public traffic demands, rather than by the proposed development, eminent domain must be used tathei
than the police power.").28 CJ Sparks v
Dvuglas Ccrunty, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P2d
738, 741, 746 (1995) (upholding county dedication requirements where proposed development "would approximately double traffic"
along adjacent streets).
H 70 Under Dolan, the County "must make
some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. There appears to
be no such evidence in the record before us
While it is agreed that community development and transportation planning are worthy
goals, the County should not be permitted to
implement these goals in an unconstitutional
fashion by avoiding the compensation re
quirement.29 "Rather, [the County] is hee to
advance its comprehensive program, if it
wishes, by using its power of eminent domain
for this public purpose, but if it wants [a
right-of-way] across [BAM's] propeity, it
must pay for it." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842-43,
107 S.Ct. at 3151 (citations and quotations
omitted).
CONCLUSION
H 71 The County's exaction requiring dedication of a fifty-three-foot right-of-way along
3500 South Street constitutes a taking of
BAM's property under both the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitu
tion and Article I, Section 22, of the Utah
Constitution. BAM is entitled to ju&t compensation for its property, and this couit
should reverse and remand for determination
some quantification [and thus] such inloimaiion
although not necebbauly determinative mas be
consulted ' ) (emphasis* in oiigmal)
29. It is acknowledged that the County may valid
ly administer thei>e goals via its dedication oidi
nance. Nevertheless, the County should not be
permitted to short circuit the just compensation
requirement by reading as ordinance to lequire
landowners to dedicate their propeity foi free
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of an appropriate award.30 Such award
should reflect unrebutted evidence that the
County's dedication requirement caused
BAM to lose two lots that it could have
otherwise developed. See, e,g.t City of Middle v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56,119, 28 P.3d 697
(" '[Landowners must be put in as good a
position money wise as they would have occupied had their property not been taken/ ")
(quoting State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 43, 305
P.2d 495, 497 (1957)).

Barry KELLY, individually and in the
right of Wapiti Heights, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company, Plaintiff and
Appellant,

motion for summary judgment, and denied
member's motion to amend his complaint.
Member appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Norman
H. Jackson, J., held that:
(1) member did not have standing to bring
quiet title action against lender on 12
of company's properties that were
transferred at foreclosure sale;
(2) misnomer of grantee in warranty deed
transferring seven of company's properties did not invalidate the transfer;
and
(3) trial court abused its discretion in denying member's motion to amend his
complaint to add interference with contractual relations and breach of fiduciary duty claims against lender.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded
in part.

v.

Russell W. Bench, J., concurred in the result.
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HARD MONEY FUNDING, INC., a Utah
corporation; each assignee of a beneficial interest of a certain trust deed;
Gary A. Weston, as trustee under a certain trust deed; M.V.I.; JJ Associates;
and V.C.I., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20020854-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 4, 2004.
Background: Member of limited liability
company brought quiet title and declaratory judgment action, on behalf of company
and in his individual capacity, against lender who held security interest in properties
once owned by the company. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department,
William B. Bohling, J., granted lender's
30. To the extent BAM has successfully persuaded
me of the fundamental soundness of its position,
that success should not be attributed, in any
degree, to its counsel's unrestrained and unnecessary use of the bold, underline, and "all caps"
functions of word processing or his repeated use
of exclamation marks to emphasize points in his
briefs. Nor are the briefs he filed in this case
unique. Rather, BAM's counsel has regularly
employed these devices in prior appeals to this

1. Appeal and Error <S=>761
Declaratory Judgment <S^392.1
Argument by member of limited liability
company in appeal of quiet title and declaratory judgment action against lender who had
security interest in properties once owned by
company, that purported involvement by
lender in scheme of other members of company to defraud company should act as
grounds to subordinate lender's interest in
the properties to member's own claims
against other members, would not be addressed on appeal, though member alluded to
argument in his various discussions of the
alleged involvement of lender in the various
machinations of other members, where mem
ber had not specifically argued subordinatioi
issue in his appellate brief, and did not pro
court. While I appreciate a zealous advocate a
much as anyone, such techniques, which real!
amount to a written form of shouting, are simp)
inappropriate in an appellate brief. It is cour
terproductive for counsel to litter his brief wit
burdensome material such as "WRON(
WRONG ANALYSIS!
WRONG RESUl/
WRONG! WRONG! WRONG!" It is also \
odds with Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appt
late Procedure.

APPENDIX #2
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission
107 SCt 3141 (United States Supreme Court 1987)
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usual and raises special concern.5 At
js^least, where a State permits the execution of a minor, great care must be taken
to ensure that the minor truly deserves to
be treated as an adult. A specific inquiry
including "age, actual maturity, family environment, education, emotional and mental
stability, and . . . prior record" is particularly relevant when a minor's criminal culpability is at issue. See Fare v. Mic]wel
C, 442 U.S. 707, 734, n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 2560,
2576, n. 4, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (POWELL,
J., dissenting). No such inquiry occurred
in this case. In every realistic sense Burger not only was a minor according to law,
but clearly his mental capacity was subnormal to the point where a jury reasonably
could have believed that death was not an
appropriate punishment. Because there is
a reasonable probability that the evidence
not presented to the sentencing jury in this
case would have affected its outcome,
Burger has demonstrated prejudice due to
counsel's deficient performance.

Ill
As I conclude that counsel's performance
in this case was deficient, and the deficiencharges of ineffective assistance of counsel is
likely to have a significant "chilling effect" on
the willingness of experienced lawyers to undertake the defense of capital cases. See ante, at
3118, n. 2. In this case, however, I conclude
that the facts and circumstances that no one
now disputes clearly show that counsel made a
serious mistake of judgment in failing fully to
develop and introduce mitigating evidence that
the Court concedes was "relevant" and that the
jury would have been compelled "to consider."
See ante, at 3123, n. 7.
5. We noted in Eddings v. Oklahoma that
"[e]very State in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders." 455 U.S.,
at 116, n. 12, 102 S.Ct. 877, n. 12 (citing In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18
L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). Of the 37 States that have
enacted capital-punishment statutes since this
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), 11
prohibit the execution of persons under 18 at
the time of the offense. Three States impose a
prohibition at age 17, and Nevada sets its limit
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cy may well have influenced the sentence
that Burger received, I would vacate Burger's death sentence and remand for resentencing.

483 U.S. 825, 97 L.Ed.2d 677
|825James Patrick NOLLAN, et
ux., Appellant
v.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL
COMMISSION.
No. 86-133.
Argued March 30, 1987.
Decided June 26, 1987.
Property owners brought action
against California Coastal Commission
seeking writ of mandate. The Commission
had imposed as a condition to approval of
at age 16. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and
Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 Cleveland
State L.Rev. 363, 368-369, and nn. 33-36 (1986).
Of the States permitting imposition of the death
penalty on juveniles, over half of them explicitly
denominate youth as a mitigating factor. The
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code capital-punishment statute states an exclusion for
defendants "under 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime." § 210.6(l)(d)
(1980). The Institute reasons "that civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of execution of children, and this opinion is confirmed
by the American experience in 'punishing youthful offenders." Id, Comment, p. 133. In 1983,
the American Bar Association adopted a resolution stating that the organization "oppo[ses], in
principle, the imposition of capital punishment
on any person for an offense committed while
that person was under the age of 18." See ABA
Opposes Capital Punishment for Persons under
18, 69 A.B.A.J. 1925 (1983).
International opinion on the issue is reflected
in Article 6 of the International Covenant on
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rebuilding permit requirement that owners
provide lateral access to public to pass and
repass across property. The Superior
Court, Ventura County, William L. Peck, J.,
granted peremptory writ of mandate, and
the Commission appealed. The California
Court of Appeal, Abbe, J., 177 Cal.App.3d
719, 223 Cal.Rptr. 28, reversed and remanded with directions. Appeal was taken.
The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, helc^
that Commission could not, without paying
compensation, condition grant of permission to rebuild house on property owners'
transfer to public of easement across
beachfront property.
Reversed.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Marshall joined.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined.

1. Eminent Domain <3=*2(1.2)
Although outright taking of uncompensated, permanent, public-access easement violates Fifth Amendment taking
clause, conditioning property owners' rebuilding permit on granting of easement
can be allowed for land use regulation if
condition substantially furthers governmental purposes that justify denial of permit. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
2. Eminent Domain <s=>2(10)
California Coastal Commission could
not, without paying compensation, condiCivil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. See United Nations,
Human Rights, A Compilation of International
Instruments 9 (1983). See also Weissbrodt,
United States Ratification of the Human Rights
Covenants, 63 Minn.L.Rev. 35, 40 (1978). Both
prohibit the execution of individuals under the
age of 18 at the time of their crime. The United
States is not a party to either of these treaties,
but at least 73 other nations have signed or
ratified the International Covenant. See Weissbrodt, supra. All European countries forbid

483 U.S. 825

tion grant of permission to rebuild house
on property owners' transfer to public of
easement across beachfront property. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 5.

Syllabus *
The California Coastal Commission
granted a permit to appellants to replace a
small bungalow on their beachfront lot
with a larger house upon the condition that
they allow the public an easement to pass
across their beach, which was located between two public beaches. The County
Superior Court granted appellants a writ of
administrative mandamus and directed that
the permit condition be struck. However,
the State Court of Appeal reversed, ruling
that imposition of the condition did not
violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as incorporated against the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held:
1. Although the outright taking of an
uncompensated, permanent, public-access
easement would violate the Takings
Clause, conditioning appellants' rebuilding
permit on their granting such an easement
would be lawful land-use regulation if it
substantially furthered governmental purposes that would justify denial of the permit. The government's power to forbid
particular land uses in order to advance
some legitimate police-power purpose includes the power to condition such use
upon some concession by the owner, even a
concession of property rights, so long as
the condition furthers the same governimposition of the death penalty on those under
18 at the time of their offense. Streib, supra, at
389 (citing Amnesty International, The Death
Penalty (1979)).
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.
499.
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mental purpose advanced as justification
for prohibiting the use. Pp. 3145-3148.

^ J u s t i c e SCALIA delivered the
opinion of the Court.

2. Here the Commission's impositioni
of the access-easement condition cannot be3
treated as an exercise of land-use regula-tion power since the condition does nott
serve public purposes related to the permitt
requirement. Of those put forth to justifyj
it—protecting the public's ability to see the3
beach, assisting the public in overcoming ai
perceived "psychological" barrier to usingr
the beach, and preventing beach congestion—none is plausible. Moreover, the>
Commission's justification for the access5
requirement unrelated to land-use regula-.
tion—that it is part of a comprehensive
program to provide beach access arisingr
from prior coastal permit decisions—is simply an expression of the belief that the
public interest will be served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach. Although the State is free to advance its
"comprehensive program" by exercising its
eminent domain power and paying for access easements, it 1826cannot compel coastal
residents alone to contribute to the realization of that goal. Pp. 3148-3150.

James and Marilyn Nollan appeal from a
decision of the California Court of Appeal
ruling that the California Coastal Commission could condition its grant of permission
to rebuild their house on their transfer to
the public of an easement across their
beachfront property. 177 Cal.App.3d 719,
223 Cal.Rptr. 28 (1986). The California
court rejected their claim that imposition of
that condition violates the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated
against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ibid. We noted probable
jurisdiction. 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 312, 93
L.Ed.2d 286 (1986).

177 Cal.App.3d 719, 223 Cal.Rptr. 28
(1986), reversed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined,
post, p. 3151. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 3163. STEVENS,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 3163.

Robert K. Best, Sacramento, Cal., for
appellants.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Los Angeles,
Cal., for appellee.

I
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A quarter-mile
north of their property is Faria County
Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach and recreation area. Another
public beach area, known locally as "the
Cove/' lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A
concrete seawall approximately eight feet
high separates the beach portion of the
Nollans7 property from the rest of the lot
The historic mean high tide line determines
the lot's oceanside boundary.
The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy. The building
on the lot was a small bungalow, totaling
504 square feet, which for a time they
rented to summer vacationers.
After
years of rental use, however, the building
had fallen into disrepair, and could no longer be rented out.
1828The Nollans' option to purchase was
conditioned on their promise to demolish
the bungalow and replace it. In order to
do so, under Cal.Pub.Res. Code Ann.
§§ 30106, 30212, and 30600 (West 1986),
they were required to obtain a coastal de-
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velopment permit from the California
Coastal Commission. On February 25,
1982, they submitted a permit application
to the Commission in which they proposed
to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house in
keeping with the rest of the neighborhood.
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other area development, would cumulatively "burden the public's ability to traverse
to and along the shorefront." Id., at 6566. Therefore the Commission could properly require the Nollans to offset that burden by providing additional lateral access
to the public beaches in the form of an
easement across their property. The ComThe Nollans were informed that their
mission also noted that it had similarly
application had been placed on the adminisconditioned 43 out of 60 coastal developtrative calendar, and that the Commission^ment permits along the same tract of land,
staff had recommended that the permit be
granted subject to the condition that they ancl that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14
allow the public an easement to pass across had been approved when the Commission
a portion of their property bounded by the did not have administrative regulations in
mean high tide line on one side, and their place allowing imposition of the condition,
seawall on the other side. This would and the remaining 3 had not involved shoremake it easier for the public to get to Faria front property. Id., at 47-48.
County Park and the Cove. The Nollans
The Nollans filed a supplemental petition
protested imposition of the condition, but for a writ of administrative mandamus
the Commission overruled their objections
with the Superior Court, in which they arand granted the permit subject to their
gued that imposition of the access condition
recordation of a deed restriction granting
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth
the easement. App. 31, 34.
Amendment, as incorporated against the
On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
petition for writ of administrative manda- The Superior Court ruled in their favor on
mus asking the Ventura County Superior statutory grounds, finding, in part to avoid
Court to invalidate the access condition. "issues of constitutionality," that the CaliThey argued that the condition could not be fornia Coastal Act of 1976, Cal.Pub.Res.
imposed absent evidence that their pro- Code Ann. § 30000 et seq. (West 1986),
posed development would have a direct ad- authorized the Commission to impose pubverse impact on public access to the beach. lic access conditions on coastal developThe court agreed, and remanded the case ment permits for the replacement of an
to the Commission for a full evidentiary existing single-family home with a new one
only where the proposed development
hearing on that issue. Id., at 36.
would have an adverse impact on public
On remand, the Commission held a public access to the sea. App. 419. In the court's
hearing, after which it made further factu- view, the administrative record did not proal findings and reaffirmed its imposition of vide an adequate factual basis for concludthe condition. It found that the new house ing that replacement of the bungalow with
would increase blockage of the view of the the house would create a direct or cumulaocean, thus contributing to the develop- tive burden on public access to the sea.
ment of "a 'wall' of residential structures 7 ' Id., at 416-417. Accordingly, the Superior
that would prevent the public "psychologi- Court granted the writ of mandamus and
cally . . . from realizing a stretch of coast- directed that the permit condition be
line exists nearby that they have every struck.
r
ight 1829to visit." Id., at 58. The new
house would also increase private use of
The Commission appealed to the Califorthe shorefront. Id., at 59. These effects nia Court of Appeal. While that appeal
of construction of the house, along with was pending, the Nollans satisfied 183othe
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condition on their option to purchase by
tearing down the bungalow and building
the new house, and bought the property.
They did not notify the Commission that
they were taking that action.
The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. 177 Cal.App.3d 719, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 28 (1986). It disagreed with the Superior Court's interpretation of the Coastal
Act, finding that it required that a coastal
permit for the construction of a new house >
whose floor area, height or bulk was more
than 10% larger than that of the house it
was replacing be conditioned on a grant of
access. Id., at 723-724, 223 Cal.Rptr., at
31; see Cal.Pub.Res.Code Ann. § 30212. It
also ruled that the requirement did not
violate the Constitution under the reasoning of an earlier case of the Court of Appeal, Grupe v. California
Coastal
Comm'n, 166 Cal.App.3d 148, 212 Cal.Rptr.
578 (1985). In that case, the court had
found that so long as a project contributed
to the need for public access, even if the
project standing alone had not created the
need for access, and even if there was only
an indirect relationship between the access
exacted and the need to which the project
contributed, imposition of an access condition on a development permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by the
project to be constitutional. 177 Cal.
App.3d, at 723, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 30-31; see
Grupe, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d, at 165-168,
212 Cal.Rptr., at 587-590; see also Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n,
163 Cal.App.3d 623, 628, 209 Cal.Rptr. 628,
631, appeal dism'd, 474 U.S. 915, 106 S.Ct.
241, 88 L.Ed.2d 250 (1985). The Court of
Appeal ruled that the record established
that that was the situation with respect to
the Nollans' house. 177 Cal.App.3d, at
722-723, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 30-31. It ruled
that the Nollans' taking claim also failed
because, although the condition diminished
the value of the Nollans' lot, it did not
deprive them of all reasonable use of their
property. Id., at 723, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 30;
see Grupe, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d, at 175-
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176, 212 Cal.Rptr., at 595-596. Since, in
the Court of Appeal's view, there was no
statutory or constitutional obstacle to imposjtion83i of the access condition, the Superior Court erred in granting the writ of mandamus. The Nollans appealed to this
Court, raising only the constitutional question.

II
[1] Had California simply required the
Nollans to make an easement across their
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public
access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on
their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt
there would have been a taking. To say
that the appropriation of a public easement
across a landowner's premises does not
constitute the taking of a property interest
but rather (as Justice BRENNAN contends) "a mere restriction on its use," post,
at 3155, n. 3, is to use words in a manner
that deprives them of all their ordinary
meaning. Indeed, one of the principal uses
of the eminent domain power is to assure
that the government be able to require
conveyance of just such interests, so long
as it pays for them. J. Sackman, 1 Nichols
on Eminent Domain § 2.1[1] (Rev. 3d ed.
1985), 2 id., § 5.01[5]; see 1 id., § 1.42[9], 2
id., § 6.14. Perhaps because the point is so
obvious, we have never been confronted
with a controversy that required us to rule
upon it, but our cases' analysis of the effect of other governmental action leads to
the same conclusion. We have repeatedly
held that, as to property reserved by its
owner for private use, "the right to exclude
[others is] 'one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.'" Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3175, 73
L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100
S.Ct. 383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). In
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Loretto we observed that where govern- ter Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 185, 50 P. 277,
mental action results in "[a] permanent 286 (1897); Heist v. County of Colusa, 163
physical occupation" of the property, by Cal.App.3d 841, 851, 213 Cal.Rptr. 278, 285
the government itself or by others, see 458 (1984); Aptos Seascape Corp. v. Santa
U.S., at 432-433, n. 9, 102 S.Ct, at 3174- v Cruz, 138 Cal.App.3d 484, 505-506, 188
3175, n. 9, "our cases uniformly have found Cal.Rptr. 191, 204-205 (1982). (None of
a taking to the extent of the occupation, these cases specifically adplressed833 the arwithout regard to whether the action gument that Art. X, § 4 allowed the public
achieves an important public ^ b e n e f i t or to cross private property to get to navigahas only minimal economic impact on the ble water, but if that provision meant what
owner," id., at 434-435, 102 S.Ct, at 31*5- Justice BRENNAN believes, it is hard to
3176. We think a "permanent physical oc- ^see why it was not invoked.) See also 41
cupation" has occurred, for purposes of
Op.Cal.Atty.Gen. 39, 41 (1963) ("In spite of
that rule, where individuals are given a
the sweeping provisions of [Art. X, § 4],
permanent and continuous right to pass to
and the injunction therein to the Legislaand fro, so that the real property may
ture to give its provisions the most liberal
continuously be traversed, even though no
interpretation, the' few reported cases in
particular individual is permitted to station
California have adopted the general rule
himself permanently upon the premises.1
that one may not trespass on private land
to get to navigable tidewaters for the purJustice BRENNAN argues that while
pose of commerce, navigation or fishing").
this might ordinarily be the case, the CaliIn light of these uncertainties, and given
fornia Constitution's prohibition on any inthe fact that, as Justice BLACKMUN
dividual's "excluding] the right of way to
notes, the Court of Appeal did not rest its
[any navigable] water whenever it is required for any public purpose," Art. X, § 4, decision on Art. X, § 4, post, at 3163, we
produces a different result here. Post, at should assuredly not take it upon ourselves
3154; see also post, at 3158,3159. There are to resolve this question of California constia number of difficulties with that argument. tutional law in the first instance. See, e.g.,
Most obviously, the right of way sought here Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234, n.
is not naturally described as one to navigable 1, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127, n. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 86
water (from the street to the sea) but along (1980). That would be doubly inappropriit; it is at least highly questionable whether ate since the Commission did not advance
the text of the California Constitution has this argument in the Court of Appeal, and
any prima facie application to the situation the Nollans argued in the Superior Court
before us. Even if it does, however, several that any claim that there was a pre-existing
California cases suggest that Justice BREN- public right of access had to be asserted
NAN's interpretation of the effect of the through a quiet title action, see Points and
clause is erroneous, and that to obtain Authorities in Support of Motion for Writ
easements of access across private proper- of Administrative Mandamus, No. SP50805
ty the State must proceed through its emi- (Super.Ct.Cal.), p. 20, which the Commisnent domain power. See Bolsa Land Co, sion, possessing no claim to the easement
v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 260, 90 P. 532, itself, probably would not have had stand534-535 (1907); Oakland v. Oakland Wa- ing under California law to bring. See
1. The holding of Prune Yard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d
741 (1980), is not inconsistent with this analysis,
since there the owner had already opened his
property to the general public, and in addition
permanent access was not required. The analysis of Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,

100 S.Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979), is not
inconsistent because it was affected by traditional doctrines regarding navigational servitudes. Of course neither of those cases involved, as this one does, a classic right-of-way
easement.
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Cal.Code Civ.Proc.Ann. § 738 (West 1980).2

may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substan|834Given, then, that requiring uncompential government purpose"). Our cases
sated conveyance of the easement outright
have not elaborated on the standards for
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
determining what constitutes^ "legitimate
the question becomes whether requiring it
state interest" or what type of connection
to be conveyed as a condition for issuing a between the regulation and the state interland-use permit alters the outcome. We est satisfies the requirement that the forhave long recognized that land-use regula- mer "substantially advance" the latter.3
tion does not effect a taking if it "substan- They have made clear, however, that a
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests" 1835broad range of governmental purposes
and does not "den[y] an owner economical-N v and regulations satisfies these requirely viable use of his land," Agins v. Tibu- ments. See Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447
ron, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, U.S., at 260-262, 100 S.Ct., at 2141-2142
65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). See also Penn Cen- (scenic zoning); Penn Central Transportral Transportation
Co, v. New York tation Co. v. New York City, supra (landCity, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, mark preservation); Euclid v. Ambler Re57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) ("[A] use restriction alty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71
2. Justice BRENNAN also suggests that the Commission's public announcement of its intention
to condition the rebuilding of houses on the
transfer of easements of access caused the Nollans to have "no reasonable claim to any expectation of being able to exclude members of the
public" from walking across their beach. Post,
at 3159-3161. He cites our opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct.
2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984), as support for the
peculiar proposition that a unilateral claim of
entitlement by the government can alter property rights. In Monsanto, however, we found
merely that the Takings Clause was not violated
by giving effect to the Government's announcement that application for "the right to [the] valuable Government benefit" id., at 1007, 104 S.Ct.,
at 2875 (emphasis added), of obtaining registration of an insecticide would confer upon the
Government a license to use and disclose the
trade secrets contained in the application. Id.,
at 1007-1008, 104 S.Ct., at 2875-2876. See also
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605, 107 S.Ct.
3008, 3019, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987). But the right
to build on one's own property—even though its
exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements—cannot remotely be described as a "governmental benefit." And thus
the announcement that the application for (or
granting of) the permit will entail the yielding
of a property interest cannot be regarded as
establishing the voluntary "exchange," 467 U.S.,
at 1007, 104 S.Ct., at 2875, that we found to have
occurred in Monsanto. Nor are the Nollans'
rights altered because they acquired the land
well after the Commission had begun to implement its policy. So long as the Commission
could not have deprived the prior owners of the
easement without compensating them, the prior
owners must be understood to have transferred
their full property rights in conveying the lot.

3. Contrary to Justice BRENNAN's claim, post, at
3150, our opinions do not establish that these
standards are the same as those applied to due
process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings
field have generally been quite different. We
have required that the regulation "substantially
advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to
be achieved, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260,
100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980), not
that "the State 'could rationally have decided'
that the measure adopted might achieve the
State's objective." Post, at 3152, quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981).
Justice BRENNAN relies principally on an equal
protection case, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., supra, and two substantive due
process cases, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488, 75 S.Ct. 461,
464-465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), and Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 72
S.Ct. 405, 407, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952), in support of
the standards he would adopt. But there is no
reason to believe (and the language of our cases
gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as
the regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are
identical; any more than there is any reason to
believe that so long as the regulation of speech
is at issue the standards for due process challenges, equal protection challenges, and First
Amendment challenges are identical. Goldblatt
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct, 987, 8
L.Ed.2d 130 (1962), does appear to assume that
the inquiries are the same, but that assumption
is inconsistent with the formulations of our
later cases.
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L.Ed. 303 (1926) (residential zoning); Laitos
& Westfall, Government Interference with
Private Interests in Public Resources, 11
Harv.Envtl.L.Rev. 1, 66 (1987). The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are protecting the public's
ability to see the beach, assisting the public
in overcoming the "psychological barrier"
to using the beach created by a developed
shorefront, and preventing congestion on
the public beaches. We assume, withouV
deciding, that this is so—in which case the
Commission unquestionably would be able
to deny the Nollans their permit outright if
their new house (alone, or by reason of the
cumulative impact produced in conjunction
with other construction)4 would substantially impede these puiposes,836 unless the
denial would interfere so drastically with
the Nollans' use of their property as to
constitute a taking. See Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra.

stitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby
with whose sighting of the ocean their new
house would interfere. Although such a
requirement, constituting a permanent
grant of continuous access to the property,
would have to be considered a taking if it
were not attached to a development permit,
the Commission's assumed power to forbid
-construction of the house in order to protect- the public's view of the beach must
surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights,
that serves the same end. If a prohibition
designed to accomplish that purpose would
be a legitimate exercise of the police power
rather than a taking, it would be strange to
conclude that providing the |837owner an
alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not.

The Commission argues that a permit
condition that serves the same legitimate
police-power purpose as a refusal to issue
the permit should not be found to be a
taking if the refusal to issue the permit
would not constitute a taking. We agree.
Thus, if the Commission attached to the
permit some condition that would have protected the public's ability to see the beach
notwithstanding construction of the new
house—for example, a height limitation, a
width restriction, or a ban on fences—so
long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed
it could) to forbid construction of the house
altogether, imposition of the condition
would also be constitutional. Moreover
(and here we come closer to the facts of the
present case), the condition would be con-

The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to
further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater,
but granted dispensations to those willing
to contribute $100 to the state treasury.
While a ban on shouting fire can be a core
exercise of the State's police power to protect the public safety, and can thus meet
even our stringent standards for regulation
of speech, adding the unrelated condition
alters the purpose to one which, while it
may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain
the ban. Therefore, even though, in a
sense, requiring a $100 tax contribution in

4.

If the Nollans were being singled out to bear
the burden of California's attempt to remedy
these problems, although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners,
the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might
violate either the incorporated Takings Clause
or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the
principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to
bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-

ness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554
(1960); see also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656, 101 S.Ct. 1287,
1306, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting); Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 98 S.Ct. 2646,
2658, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). But that is not the
basis of the Nollans' challenge here.
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order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on
speech than an outright ban, it would not
pass constitutional muster. Similarly here,
the lack of nexus between the condition
and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining
of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation. Whatever may be^the outer
limits of "legitimate state interests" in^he
takings and land-use context, this is not
one of them. In short, unless the permit
condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of
land use but "an out-and-out plan of extortion." J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson,
121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15
(1981); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22, and n. 20. See also Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S., at 439, n. 17, 102 S.Ct, at 3178, n.
17.5
J838IH

The Commission claims that it concedes
as much, and that we may sustain the
condition at issue here by finding that it is
reasonably related to the public need or
burden that the Nollans' new house creates
or to which it,contributes. We can accept,
for purposes of discussion, the Commission's proposed test as to how close a "fit"
between the condition and the burden is
required, because we find that this case
does not meet even the most untailored
5. One would expect that a regime in which this
kind of leveraging of the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish
other purposes, leading to lesser realization of
the land-use goals purportedly sought to be
served than would result from more lenient (but
nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus,
the importance of the purpose underlying the
prohibition not only does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating the
prohibition, but positively militates against the
practice.
6. As Justice BRENNAN notes, the Commission
also argued that the construction of the new

standards. The Commission's principal
contention to the contrary essentially turns
on a play on the word "access." The Nollans' new house, the Commission found,
will interfere with "visual access" to the
beach. That in turn (along with other
shorefront development) will interfere with
the desire of people who drive past the
Nollans' house to use the beach, thus creating a "psychological barrier" to "access."
The Nollans' new house will also, by a
process not altogether clear from the Commission's opinion but presumably potent
enough to more than offset the effects of
the psychological barrier, increase the use
of the public beaches, thus creating the
need for more "access." These burdens on
"access" would be alleviated by a requirement that the Nollans provide "lateral access" to the beach.
[2] Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words makes clear that
there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible
to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to
walk across the Nollans' property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created
by the new house. It is also impossible to
understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or
how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them |839caused by construction
of the Nollans' new house. We therefore
find that the Commission's imposition of
the permit condition cannot be treated as
an exercise of its land-use power for any of
these purposes.6 Our conclusion on this
house would " 'increase private use immediately
adjacent to public tidelands,'" which in turn
might result in more disputes between the Nollans and the public as to the location of the
boundary. Post, at 3156, quoting App. 62. That
risk of boundary disputes, however, is inherent
in the right to exclude others from one's property, and the construction here can no more justify mandatory dedication of a sort of "buffer
zone" in order to avoid boundary disputes than
can the construction of an addition to a singlefamily house near a public street. Moreover, a
buffer zone has a boundary as well, and unless
that zone is a "no-man's land" that is off limits
for both neighbors (which is of course not the
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point is consistent with the approach taken
by every other court that has considered
the question, with the exception of the California state courts. See Parks v. Watson,
716 F.2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 1983); Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668, 671-674 (Colo.
1981); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v.
Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 117120, 273 A.2d 880, 885 (1970); Longboat
Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So.2d 574
(Fla.App.1983); Pioneer Trust & Savings
Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 I11.2d 375, 380,
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961); Lampton v.
Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 918-919 (Ky.App.
1980); Schwing v. Baton Rouge, 249 So.2d
304 (La.App.), application denied, 259 La.
770, 252 So.2d 667 (1971); Howard County
v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 280-282, 482
A.2d 908, 920-921 (1984); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976);
State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County,
478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.1972); juoBillings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,
144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P.2d 182, 187-188
(1964); Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb.
240, 292 N.W.2d 297 (1980); Briar West,
Inc. v. Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d
730 (1980); J.E.D. Associates v. Atkinson,
121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of
Princeton, 52 N J . 348, 350-351, 245 A.2d
336, 337-338 (1968); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218
N.E.2d 673 (1966); MacKall v. White, 85
App.Div.2d 696, 445 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1981),
appeal denied, 56 N.Y.2d 503, 450 N.Y.S.2d
1025, 435 N.E.2d 1100 (1982); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 68-69,
71, 264 A.2d 910, 913, 914 (1970); College
Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d
802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan,
614 P.2d 1257, 1258-1259 (Utah 1980);
Board of Supervisors of James City
County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 136-139, 216
case here) its creation achieves nothing except
to shift the location of the boundary dispute
further on to the private owner's land. It is true
that in the distinctive situation of the Nollans'
property the seawall could be established as a
clear demarcation of the public easement. But
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S.E.2d 199, 207-209 (1975); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 617-618,
137 N.W.2d 442, 447-449 (1965), appeal
dism'd, 385 U.S. 4, 87 S.Ct. 36, 17 L.Ed.2d 3
(1966). See also Littlefzeld v. Afton, 785
F.2d 596, 607 (CA8 1986); Brief for National Association of Home Builders et al. as
Amid Curiae 9-16.
Justice BRENNAN argues that imposition of the access requirement is not irrational. In his version of the Commission's
argument, the reason for the requirement
is that in its absence, a person looking
toward the beach from the road will see a
street of residential structures including
the Nollans' new home and conclude that
there is no public beach nearby. If, however, that person sees people passing and
repassing along the dry sand behind the
Nollans' home, he will realize that there is
a public beach somewhere in the vicinity.
Post, at 3155-3156. The Commission's action, however, was based on the opposite
factual finding that the wall of houses completely blocked the view of the beach and
that a person looking from the road would
not be able to see it at all. App. 57-59.
Even if the Commission had made the
finding that Justice BRENNAN proposes
however, it is not certain that it woulc
l84isuffice. We do not share Justice BRENNAN's confidence that the Commission
"should have little difficulty in the future
in utilizing its expertise to demonstrate a
specific connection between provisions for
access and burdens on access," post, at
3161, that will avoid the effect of today's
decision. We view the Fifth Amendment's
Property Clause to be more than a pleading
requirement, and compliance with it to be
more than an exercise in cleverness anc
imagination. As indicated earlier, oui
cases describe the condition for abridge
ment of property rights through the police
power as a "substantial advancing]" of s
since not all of the lands to which this land-us<
condition applies have such a convenient refer
ence point, the avoidance of boundary dispute
is, even more obviously than the others, a made
up purpose of the regulation.

483 U.S. 843

NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COM'N
Cite as 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987)

legitimate state interest. We are inclined
to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a
land-use restriction, since in that context x
there is heightened risk that the purpose is
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective.
We are left, then, with the Commission's
justification for the access requirement unx
related to land-use regulation:
"Finally, the Commission notes that
there are several existing provisions of
pass and repass lateral access benefits
already given by past Faria Beach Tract
applicants as a result of prior coastal
permit decisions. The access required as
a condition of this permit is part of a
comprehensive program to provide continuous public access along Faria Beach
as the lots undergo development or redevelopment." App. 68.
That is simply an expression of the Commission's belief that the public interest will
be served by a continuous strip of publicly
accessible beach along the coast. The
Commission may well be right that it is a
good idea, but that does not establish that
the Nollans (and other coastal residents)
alone can be compelled to contribute to its
realization. Rather, California is free to
advance its "comprehensive program," if it
wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this "public purpose,^" see U.S.
Const., Amdt. 5; but if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must
pay for it.
Reversed.
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice
MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
Appellants in this case sought to construct a new dwelling on their beach lot
that would both diminish visual access to
the beach and move private development
closer to the public tidelands. The Commission reasonably concluded that such
"buildout," both individually and cumulatively, threatens public access to the shore.
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It sought to offset this encroachment by
obtaining assurance that the public may
walk along the shoreline in order to gain
access to the ocean. The Court finds this
an illegitimate exercise of the police power,
because it maintains that there is no reasonable relationship between the effect of
the development and the condition imposed.
The first problem with this conclusion is
that the Court imposes a standard of precision for the exercise of a State's police
power that has been discredited for the
better part of this century. Furthermore,
even under the Court's cramped standard,
the permit condition imposed in this case
directly responds to the specific type of
burden on access created by appellants'
development. Finally, a review of those
factors deemed most significant in takings
analysis makes clear that the Commission's
action implicates none of the concerns underlying the Takings Clause. The Court
has thus struck down the Commission's
reasonable effort to respond to intensified
development along the California coast, on
behalf of landowners who can make no
claim that their reasonable expectations
have been disrupted. The Court has, in
short, given appellants a windfall at the
expense of the public.
I
The Court's conclusion that the permit
condition imposed on appellants is unreasonable cannot withstand analysis. First,
the Court demands a degree of exactitude
that is injconsistent843 with our standard for
reviewing the rationality of a State's exercise of its police power for the welfare of
its citizens. Second, even if the nature of
the public-access condition imposed must be
identical to the precise burden on access
created by appellants, this requirement is
plainly satisfied.

There can be no dispute that the police
power of the States encompasses the authority to impose conditions on private de-
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velopment. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, might achieve the State's objective.
447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
(1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (emphasis in original).1
2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Gorieb v. Fox, In t^iis case, California hasj£ employed its
44
274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228
police
power
in
order
to
condition
develop(1927). It is also by now commonplace that
this Court's review of the rationality of a ment upon preservation of public access to
State's exercise of its police power de- the ocean and tidelands. The Coastal Commands only that the State "could rational- mission, if it had so chosen, could have
ly have decided " that the measure adopted^ dejnieds45 the Nollans' request for a devel1. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488, 75 S.Ct. 461,
464-465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) ("[T]he law need
not be in every respect logically consistent with
its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that
it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it"); DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,
423, 72 S.Ct. 405, 407, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952) ("Our
recent decisions make it plain that we do not sit
as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation nor to decide whether the policy
which it expresses offends the public welfare
[Sjtate legislatures have constitutional
authority to experiment with new techniques;
they are entitled to their own standard of the
public welfare").
Notwithstanding the suggestion otherwise,
ante, at 3147, n. 3, our standard for reviewing
the threshold question whether an exercise of
the police power is legitimate is a uniform one.
As we stated over 25 years ago in addressing a
takings challenge to government regulation:
'The term 'police power' connotes the timetested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the
substitution of the familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' this Court has generally refrained.
from announcing any specific criteria. The
classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133, 137 [14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed.
385] (1894), is still valid today: . . . '[I]t must
appear, first, thai the interests of the public . . .
require [government] interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.' Even this rule is
not applied with strict precision, for this Court
has often said that 'debatable questions as to
reasonableness are not for the courts but for the
legislature
' E.g., Sproles v. Binford, 286
U.S. 374, 388 [52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed. 1167]
(1932)." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594-595, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990-991, 8 L.Ed.2d 130
(1962).
See also id., at 596, 82 S.Ct. at 991 (upholding
regulation from takings challenge with citation
to, inter alia, United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed.

1234 (1938), for proposition that exercise of
police power will be upheld "if any state of facts
either known or which could be reasonably
assumed affords support for it"). In Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S.
211, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986), for
instance, we reviewed a takings challenge to
statutory provisions that had been held to be a
legitimate exercise of the police power under
due process analysis in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,
104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984). Gray, in
turn, had relied on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d
752 (1976). In rejecting the takings argument
that the provisions were not within Congress'
regulatory power, the Court in Connolly stated:
"Although both Gray and Turner Elkhorn were
due process cases, it would be surprising indeed
to discover now that in both cases Congress
unconstitutionally had taken the assets of the
employers there involved." 475 U.S., at 223, 106
S.Ct., at 1025. Our phraseology may differ
slightly from case to case—e.g., regulation must
"substantially advance," Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d
106 (1980), or be "reasonably necessary to,"
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 57
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), the government's end.
These minor differences cannot, however, obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the
same.
Of course, government action may be a valid
exercise of the police power and still violate
specific provisions of the Constitution. Justice
SCALIA is certainly correct in observing that
challenges founded upon these provisions are
reviewed under different standards. Ante, at
3147, n. 3. Our consideration of factors such as
those identified in Penn Central, supra, for instance, provides an analytical framework for
protecting the values underlying the Takings
Clause, and other distinctive approaches are utilized to give effect to other constitutional provisions. This is far different, however, from the
use of different standards of review to address
the threshold issue of the rationality of government action.
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opment permit, since the property would
have remained economically viable without
the requested new development.2 Instead,
the State sought to accommodate the Nollans' desire for new development, on the
condition that the development not diminish
the overall amount of public access to the
coastline. Appellants' proposed development would reduce public access by restricting visual access to the beach, by contributing to an increased need for community facilities, and by moving private devek
opment closer to public beach property.
The Commission sought to offset this diminution in access, and thereby preserve the
overall balance of access, by requesting a
deed restriction that would ensure "lateral" access: the right of the public to pass
and repass along the dry sand parallel to
the shoreline in order to reach the tidelands
and the ocean. In the expert opinion of the
Coastal Commission, development conditioned on such a restriction would fairly
attend to both public and private interests.
The Court finds fault with this measure
because it regards the condition as insufficiently tailored to address the precise
Retype of reduction in access produced by
the new development. The Nollans' development blocks visual access, the Court tells
as, while the Commission seeks to preserve
ateral access along the coastline. Thus, it
concludes, the State acted irrationally.
>uch a narrow conception of rationality,
lowever, has long since been discredited as
i judicial arrogation of legislative authori,y. "To make scientific precision a criteri>n of constitutional power would be to subt. As this Court declared in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127,
106 S.Ct. 455, 459, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985):
"A requirement that a person obtain a permit
before engaging in a certain use of his or her
property does not itself 'take' the property in
any sense: after all, the very existence of a
permit system implies that permission may be
granted, leaving the landowner free to use the
property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses
available to the owner. Only when a permit is
denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent
'economically viable' use of the land in question
can it be said that a taking has occurred."
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ject the State to an intolerable supervision
hostile to the basic principles of our
Government." Sproles v. Binford, 286
U.S. 374, 388, 52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed.
1167 (1932). Cf. Keystone
Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
491, n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1245, n. 21, 94
L.Ed.2d 472 (1987) ("The Takings Clause
has never been read to require the States
or the courts to calculate whether a specific
individual has suffered burdens . . . in excess of the benefits received"). As this
Court long ago declared with regard to
various forms of restriction on the use of
property:
"Each interferes in the same way, if not
to the same extent, with the owner's
general right of dominion over his property. All rest for their justification upon
the same reasons which have arisen in
recent times as a result of the great
increase and concentration of population
in urban communities and the vast
changes in the extent and complexity of
the problems of modern city life. State
legislatures and city councils, who deal
with the situation from a practical standpoint, are better qualified than the courts
to determine the necessity, character,
and degree of regulation which these
new and perplexing conditions require;
and their conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable." Gorieb, 274
U.S., at 608, 47 S.Ct., at 677 (citations
omitted).
We also stated in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 179, 100 S.Ct. 383, 392, 62 L.Ed.2d
332 (1979), with respect to dredging to create a
private marina:
"We have not the slightest doubt that the
Government could have refused to allow such
dredging on the ground that it would have impaired navigation in the bay, or could have
conditioned its approval of the dredging on petitioners' agreement to comply with various measures that it deemed appropriate for the promotion of navigation."
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The Commission is charged by both the
State Constitution and legislature to preserve overall public access to the California
coastline. Furthermore, by virtue of its
participation m the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) program, the ^ S t a t e
must "exercise effectively [its] responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development and implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of the
land and water resources of the coastab
zone/' 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2), so as to provide
for, inter alia, "public access to the coas[t]
for recreation purposes/ 1 § 1452(2)(D).
The Commission has sought to discharge
its responsibilities in a flexible manner. It
has sought to balance private and public
interests and to accept tradeoffs: to permit
development that reduces access in some
ways as long as other means of access are
enhanced. In this case, it has determined
that the Nollans' burden on access would
be offset by a deed restriction that formalizes the public's right to pass along the
shore. In its informed judgment, such a
tradeoff would preserve the net amount of
public access to the coastline. The Court's
insistence on a precise fit between the
forms of burden and condition on each individual parcel along the California coast
would penalize the Commission for its flexibility, hampering the ability to fulfill its
public trust mandate.
The Court's demand for this precise fit is
based on the assumption that private landowners in this case possess a reasonable
expectation regarding the use of their land
that the public has attempted to disrupt.
In fact, the situation is precisely the reverse: it is private landowners who are the
interlopers. The public's expectation of access considerably antedates any private development on the coast. Article X, § 4, of
the California Constitution, adopted in
1879, declares:
"No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage
or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet,
estuary, or other navigable water in this
State, shall be permitted to exclude the
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right of way to such water whenever it is
required for any public purpose, nor to
destroy or obstruct the free navigation
of such water; and the Legislature shall
$nact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction to this provision, so
| 848 that access to the navigable waters of
this State shall always be attainable for
the people thereof."
It is therefore private landowners who
"threaten the disruption of settled public
expectations. Where a private landowner
has had a reasonable expectation that his
or her property will be used for exclusively
private purposes, the disruption of this expectation dictates that the government pay
if it wishes the property to be used for a
public purpose. In this case, however, the
State has sought to protect public expectations of access from disruption by private
land use. The State's exercise of its police
power for this purpose deserves no less
deference than any other measure designed
to further the welfare of state citizens.
Congress expressly stated in passing the
CZMA that "[i]n light of competing demands and the urgent need to protect and
to give high priority to natural systems in
the coastal zone, present state and local
institutional arrangements for planning
and regulating land and water uses in such
areas are inadequate."
16 U.S.C.
§ 1451(h). It is thus puzzling that the
Court characterizes as a "non-land-use justification," ante, at 3151, the exercise of
the police power to " 'provide continuous
public access along Faria Beach as the lots
undergo development or redevelopment.'"
Ibid, (quoting App. 68). The Commission's
determination that certain types of development jeopardize public access to the ocean,
and that such development should be conditioned on preservation of access, is the
essence of responsible land-use planning.
The Court's use of an unreasonably demanding standard for determining the rationality of state regulation in this area
thus could hamper innovative efforts to
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preserve an increasingly fragile national
resource.3

the public—is thus directly alleviated by
the provision for public access over the dry
sand.
The Court therefore has an
I849B
l85ounrealistically limited conception of
Even if we accept the Court's unusual, what measures could reasonably be chosen
demand for a precise match between the to mitigate the burden produced by a dimicondition imposed and the specific type of nution of visual access.
burden on access created by the appellants,
The second flaw in the Court's analysis
the State's action easily satisfies this reof
the fit between burden and exaction is
quirement. First, the lateral access condimore
fundamental. The Court assumes
tion serves to dissipate the impression^ tjiat
the beach that lies behind the wall ofx that the only burden with which the Coasthomes along the shore is for private use - al Commission was concerned was blockage
access to the beach. This is incoronly. It requires no exceptional imagina- of visual
4
rect.
The
Commission specifically stated
tive powers to find plausible the Commission's point that the average person pass- in its report in support of the permit condiing along the road in front of a phalanx of tion that "[t]he Commission finds that the
imposing permanent residences, including applicants' proposed development would
the appellants' new home, is likely to con- present an increase in view blockage, an
clude that this particular portion of the increase in private use of the shorefront,
shore is not open to the public. If, how- and that this impact would burden the pubever, that person can see that numerous lic's ability to traverse to and along the
people are passing and repassing along the shorefront." App. 65-66 (emphasis added).
dry sand, this conveys the message that It declared that the possibility that "the
the beach is in fact open for use by the public may get the impression that the
public. Furthermore, those persons who beachfront is no longer available for public
go down to the public beach a quarter-mile use" would be "due to the encroaching
away will be able to look down the coast- nature of private use immediately adjaline and see that persons have continuous cent to the public use, as well as the visual
access to the tidelands, and will observe 'block' of increased residential build-out imsigns that proclaim the public's right of pacting the visual' quality of the beachaccess over the dry sand. The burden pro- front." Id., at 59 (emphasis added).
duced by the diminution in visual access—
The record prepared by the Commission
the impression that the beach is not open to is replete with references to the threat to
3. The list of cases cited by the Court as support
for its approach, ante, at 3149-3150, includes no
instance in which the State sought to vindicate
pre-existing rights of access to navigable water,
and consists principally of cases involving a
requirement of the dedication of land as a condition of subdivision approval. Dedication, of
course, requires the surrender of ownership of
property rather than, as in this case, a mere
restriction on its use. The only case pertaining
to beach access among those cited by the Court
is MacKall v. White, 85 App.Div.2d 696, 445
N.Y.S.2d 486 (1981). In that case, the court
found that a subdivision application could not
be conditioned upon a declaration that the landowner would not hinder the public from using a
trail that had been used to gain access to a bay.
The trail had been used despite posted warnings
prohibiting passage, and despite the owner's resistance to such use. In that case, unlike this

one, neither the State Constitution, state statute,
administrative practice, nor the conduct of the
landowner operated to create any reasonable
expectation of a right of public access.
4. This may be because the State in its briefs and
at argument contended merely that the permit
condition would serve to preserve overall public
access, by offsetting the diminution in access
resulting from the project, such as, inter alia,
blocking the public's view of the beach. The
State's position no doubt reflected the reasonable assumption that the Court would evaluate
the rationality of its exercise of the police power
in accordance with the traditional standard of
review, and that the Court would not attempt to
substitute its judgment about the best way to
preserve overall public access to the ocean at
the Faria Family Beach Tract.
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public access along the coastline resulting
from the seaward encroachment of private
development along a beach whose mean
high-tide line is constantly shifting. As the
Commission observed in its report: "The
Faria Beach shoreline fluctuates during the
year depending on the seasons and accompanying storms, and the public is not always able to traverse the shoreline below
the mean|85ihigh tide line/' Id., at 67. As
a result, the boundary between publicly
owned tidelands and privately owned beach"
is not a stable one, and "[t]he existing
seawall is located very near to the mean
high water line." Id., at 61. When the
beach is at its largest, the seawall is about
10 feet from the mean high-tide mark;
"[djuring the period of the year when the
beach suffers erosion, the mean high water
line appears to be located either on or
beyond the existing seawall." Ibid. Expansion of private development on appellants' lot toward the seawall would thus
"increase private use immediately adjacent
to public tidelands, which has the potential
of causing adverse impacts on the public's
ability to traverse the shoreline." Id., at
62. As the Commission explained:
"The placement of more private use adjacent to public tidelands has the potential
of creating use conflicts between the applicants and the public. The results of
new private use encroachment into
boundary/buffer areas between private
and public property can create situations
in which landowners intimidate the public
and seek to prevent them from using
public tidelands because of disputes, be5. As the Commission's Public Access (Shoreline)
Interpretative Guidelines state:
"[T]he provision of lateral access recognizes the
potential for conflicts between public and private use and creates a type of access that allows
the public to move freely along all the tidelands
in an area that can be clearly delineated and
distinguished from private use areas
Thus
the 'need' determination set forth in P[ublic]
Resources] C[ode] 30212(a)(2) should be measured in terms of providing access that buffers
public access to the tidelands from the burdens
generated on access by private development."
App. 358-359.
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tween the two parties over where the
exact boundary between private and public ownership is located. If the applicants' project would result in further seaward encroachment of private use into
an area of clouded title, new private use
in the subject encroachment area could
result in use conflict between private and
public entities on the subject shorefront."
Id., at 61-62.
The deed restriction on which permit approval was conditioned would directly address this threat to the public's access to
the tidelands. It would provide a formal
declaration of the public's right of access,
thereby ensuring that the shifting character of the tidelands, and the presence of
private development immediately adjacent
to it, would not jeopjardize852 enjoyment of
that right.5 The imposition of the permit
condition was therefore directly related to
the fact that appellants development would
be "located along a unique stretch of coast
where lateral public access is inadequate
due to the construction of private residential structures and shoreline protective
devices along a fluctuating shoreline." Id.,
at 68. The deed restriction was crafted to
deal with the particular character of the
beach along which appellants sought to
build, and with the specific problems created by expansion of development toward
the public tidelands. In imposing the restriction, the State sought to ensure that
such development would not disrupt the
historical expectation of the public regarding access to the sea.6
6. The Court suggests that the risk of boundary
disputes "is inherent in the right to exclude
others from one's property," and thus cannot
serve as a purpose to support the permit condition. Ante, at 3149, n. 6. The Commission
sought the deed restriction, however, not to ad
dress a generalized problem inherent in any
system of property, but to address the particular
problem created by the shifting high-tide line
along Faria Beach. Unlike the typical area in
which a boundary is delineated reasonably
clearly, the very problem on Faria Beach is that
the boundary is not constant. The area open to
public use therefore is frequently in question,
and, as the discussion, supra, demonstrates, the
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l853The Court is therefore simply wrong
that there is no reasonable relationship between the permit condition and the specific
type of burden on public access created by
the appellants' proposed development.
Even were the Court desirous of assuming
the added responsibility of closely monitoring the regulation of development along
the California coast, this record reveals rational public action by any conceivable
standard.
II
The fact that the Commission's action is
a legitimate exercise of the police power
does not, of course, insulate it from a takings challenge, for when "regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322
(1922). Conventional takings analysis underscores the implausibility of the Court's
holding, for it demonstrates that this exercise of California's police power implicates
none of the concerns that underlie our takings jurisprudence.
In reviewing a Takings Clause claim, we
have regarded as particularly significant
the nature of the governmental action and
the economic impact of regulation, especially the extent to which regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations.
Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct, at
Commission clearly tailored its permit condition precisely to address this specific problem.
The Court acknowledges that the Nollans' seawall could provide "a clear demarcation of the
public easement," and thus avoid merely shifting "the location of the boundary dispute further on to the private owner's land." Ante, at
3150, n. 6. It nonetheless faults the Commission
because every property subject to regulation
may not have this feature. This case, however,
is a challenge to the permit condition as applied
to the Nollans'property, so the presence or absence of seawalls on other property is irrelevant.
7. See, e.g., Bellefontaine Neighbors v. /./. Kelley
Realty & Bldg. Co., 460 S.W.2d 298 (Mo.Ct.App.
1970); Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178
N.W. 27 (1920). See generally Shultz & Kelley,
Subdivision Improvement Requirements and
Guarantees: A Primer, 28 Wash.UJ.Urban and
Contemp.L. 3 (1985).
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2659. The character of the government
action in this case is the imposition of a
condition on permit approval, which allows
the public to continue to have access to the
^oast. The physical intrusion permitted by
the deed restriction is minimal. The public
is permitted the right to pass and repass
along the coast in an area from the seawall
to the mean high-tide mark. App. 46. This
area is at its widest 10 feet, id.} at 61,
which means that even without the permit
^condition, the public's right of access permits it to pass on average within a few feet
of the seawall. Passage closer to the 8foot-high rocky seawall will make the
J854appellants even less visible to the public
than passage along the high-tide area farther out on the beach. The intrusiveness
of such passage is even less than the intrusion resulting from the required dedication
of a sidewalk in front of private residences,
exactions which are commonplace conditions on approval of development.7 Furthermore, the high-tide line shifts throughout the year, moving up to and beyond the
seawall, so that public passage for a portion of the year would either be impossible
or would not occur on appellant's property.
Finally, although the Commission had the
authority to provide for either passive or
active recreational use of- the property, it
chose the least intrusive alternative: a
mere right to pass and repass. Id., at 370.8
8. The Commission acted in accordance with its
Guidelines both in determining the width of the
area of passage, and in prohibiting any recreational use of the property. The Guidelines state
that it may be necessary on occasion to provide
for less than the normal 25-foot-wide accessway
along the dry sand when this may be necessary
to "protect the privacy rights of adjacent property owners." App. 363. They also provide this
advice in selecting the type of public use that
may be permitted:
"Pass and Repass. Where topographic con
straints of the site make use of the beach dangerous, where habitat values of the shoreline
would be adversely impacted by public use of
the shoreline or where the accessway may encroach closer than 20 feet to a residential structure, the accessway may be limited to the right
of the public to pass and repass along the access
area. For the purposes of these guidelines, pass
and repass is defined as the right to walk and
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As this Court made isssdear in Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2042, 64 L.Ed.2d 741
(1980), physical access to private property
in itself creates no takings problem if it
does not "unreasonably impair the value or
use of [the] property." Appellants can
make no tenable claim that either their
enjoyment of their property or its value is
diminished by the public's ability merely to
pass and repass a few feet closer to the
seawall beyond which appellants' house is
located.

483 U.S. 854

Finally, the character of the regulation in
this case is not unilateral government action, but a condition on approval of a development request submitted by appellants.
The. State has not sought to interfere with
any pre-existing property interest, but has
responded to appellants' proposal to intensify development on the coast. Appellants
themselves chose to ^ s u b m i t a new development application, and could claim no
property interest in its approval. They
were aware that approval of such development would be conditioned on preservation
of adequate public access to the ocean.
The State has initiated no action against
appellants' property; had the Nollans' not
proposed more intensive development in
the coastal zone, they would never have
been subject to the provision that they challenge.

Prune Yard is also relevant in that we
acknowledged in that case that public access rested upon a "state constitutional . . .
provision that had been construed to create
rights to the use of private property by
strangers." Id., at 81, 100 S.Ct, at 2041.
In this case, of course, the State is also
acting to protect a state constitutional
right. See supra, at 3154 (quoting Art. X,
§ 4, of California Constitution). The constitutional provision guaranteeing public
access to the ocean states that "the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the
most liberal construction to this provision so that access to the navigable waters
of this State shall be always attainable for
the people thereof." Cal. Const., Art. X,
§ 4 (emphasis added). This provision is the
explicit basis for the statutory directive to
provide for public access along the coast in
new development projects, Cal.Pub.Res.
Code Ann. § 30212 (West 1986), and has
been construed by the state judiciary to
permit passage over private land where
necessary to gain access to the tidelands.
Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166
Cal.App.3d 148, 171-172, 212 Cal.Rptr. 578,
592-593 (1985). The physical access to the
perimeter of appellants' property at issue
in this case thus results directly from the
State's enforcement of the State Constitution.

Examination of the economic impact of
the Commission's action reinforces the conclusion that no taking has occurred. Allowing appellants to intensify development
along the coast in exchange for ensuring
public access to the ocean is a classic instance of government action that produces
a "reciprocity of advantage." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S., at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160.
Appellants have been allowed to replace a
one-story, 521-square-foot beach home
with a two-story, 1,674-square-foot residence and an attached two-car garage, resulting in development covering 2,464
square feet of the lot. Such development
obviously significantly increases the value
of appellants' property; appellants make
no contention that this increase is offset by
any diminution in value resulting from the
deed restriction, much less that the restriction made the property less valuable than it
would have been without the new construction. Furthermore, appellants gain an additional benefit from the Commission's per-

run along the shoreline. This would provide
for public access along the shoreline but would
not allow for any additional use of the accessway. Because this severely limits the public's
ability to enjoy the adjacent state owned tidelands by restricting the potential use of the

access areas, this form of access dedication
should be used only where necessary to protect
the habitat values of the site, where topographic
constraints warrant the restriction, or where it
is necessary to protect the privacy of the landowner." Id., at 370.
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mit condition program. They are able to
walk along the beach beyond the confines
of their own property only because the
Commission has required deed restrictions
as a condition of approving other new
beach developments.9 Thus, appellants
benefit both as private landowners and as
members of the public from the fact that
new development permit requests are conditioned on preservation of public access.

the State, are matters of local law"). In
this case, the State Constitution explicitly
states that no one possessing the "frontage" of any "navigable water in this State,
shall be permitted to exclude the right of
way to such water whenever it is required
for any public purpose." Cal. Const., Art.
X, § 4. The state Code expressly provides
that, save for exceptions not relevant here,
"[p]ublic access from the nearest public
x roadway to the shoreline and along the
jj^Ultimately, appellants' claim of economic injury is flawed because it rests on coast shall be provided in new development
the assumption of entitlement to the full projects." Cal.Pub.Res.Code Ann. § 30212
value of their new development. Appel- (West 1986). The Coastal Commission Inlants submitted a proposal for more inten- terpretative Guidelines make clear that fulsive development of the coast, which the fillment of the Commission's constitutional
Commission was under no obligation to ap- and statutory duty 1858requires that approvprove, and now argue that a regulation al of new coastline development be condidesigned to ameliorate the impact of that tioned upon provisions ensuring lateral
development deprives them of the full val- public access to the ocean. App. 362. At
ue of their improvements. Even if this the time of appellants' permit request, the
novel claim were somehow cognizable, it is Commission had conditioned all 43 of the
not significant. "[T]he interest in antici- proposals for coastal new development in
pated gains has traditionally been viewed the Faria Family Beach Tract on the provias less compelling than other property-re- sion of deed restrictions ensuring lateral
lated interests." Andrus v. Allard, 444 access along the shore. Id., at 48. Finally,
U.S. 51, 66, 100 S.Ct. 318, 327, 62 L.Ed.2d the Faria family had leased the beach property since the early part of this century,
210 (1979).
and "the Faria family and their lessees
With respect to appellants' investment[including the Nollans] had not interfered
backed expectations, appellants can make
with public use of the beachfront within
no reasonable claim to any expectation of
the Tract, so long as public use was limited
being able to exclude members of the pubto pass and re-pass lateral access along the
lic from crossing the edge of their property
shore." Ibid. California therefore has
to gain access to the ocean. It is axiomatclearly established that the power of excluic, of course, that state law is the source of
sion for which appellants seek compensathose strands that constitute a property
tion simply is not a strand in the bundle of
owner's bundle of property rights. "[A]s a
appellants' property rights, and appellants
general proposition^] the law of real prophave never acted as if it were. Given this
erty is, under our Constitution, left to the
state of affairs, appellants cannot claim
individual States to develop and administhat the deed restriction has deprived them
ter." Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S.
290, 295, 88 S.Ct. 438, 441, 19 L.Ed.2d 530 of a reasonable expectation to exclude from
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also their property persons desiring to gain acBorax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, cess to the sea.
296 U.S. 10, 22, 56 S.Ct. 23, 29, 80 L.Ed. 9
Even were we somehow to concede a
(1935) ("Rights and interests in the tide- pre-existing expectation of a right to exland, which is subject to the sovereignty of clude, appellants were clearly on notice
9. At the time of the Nollans' permit application,
43 of the permit requests for development along
the Faria Beach had been conditioned on deed

restrictions ensuring lateral public access along
the shoreline. App. 48.
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when requesting a new development permit
that a condition of approval would be a
provision ensuring public lateral access to
the shore. Thus, they surely could have
had no expectation that they could obtain
approval of their new development and exercise any right of exclusion afterward. In
this respect, this case is quite similar to
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984).
In Monsanto, the respondent had x submitted trade data to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for the purpose^
of obtaining registration of certain pesticides. The company claimed that the agency's disclosure of certain data in accordance with the relevant regulatory statute
constituted a taking. The Court conceded
that the data in question constituted property under state law. It also found, however, that certain of the data had been
submitted to the agency after Congress
had |859made clear that only limited confidentiality would be given data submitted
for registration purposes. The Court observed that the statute served to inform
Monsanto of the various conditions under
which data might be released, and stated:
"If, despite the data-consideration and
data-disclosure provisions in the statute,
Monsanto chose to submit the requisite
data in order to receive a registration, it
can hardly argue that its reasonable investment-backed expectations are disturbed when EPA acts to use or disclose
the data in a manner that was authorized
by law at the time of the submission."
Id., at 1006-1007, 104 S.Ct, at 28742875.
The Court rejected respondent's argument
that the requirement that it relinquish
some confidentiality imposed an unconstitutional condition on receipt of a Government
benefit:
"[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the
conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally

The similarity of this case to Monsanto
is obvious. Appellants were aware that
stringent regulation of development along
the California coast had been in place at
least since 1976. The specific deed restriction to which the Commission sought to
subject them had been imposed since 1979
on all 43 shoreline new development
projects in the Faria Family Beach Tract.
App. 48. Such regulation to ensure public
access to the ocean had been directly authorized by California citizens in 1972, and
reflected their judgment that restrictions
on coastal development represented " 'the
advantage of living and doing business in a
civilized community.' " Andrus v. Allard,
supra, 444 U.S., at 67, 100 S.Ct, at 328,
quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Makon,
260 U.S., at 422, 43 S.Ct, at 163 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). The deed restriction was
"authorized by law at the 186otime of [appellants' permit] submission," Monsanto, supra, 467 U.S., at 1007, 104 S.Ct, at 2875,
and, as earlier analysis demonstrates, supra, at 3155-3157, was reasonably related to
the objective of ensuring public access. Appellants thus were on notice that new developments would be approved only if provisions were made for lateral beach access. In
requesting a new development permit from
the Commission, they could have no reasonable expectation of, and had no entitlement
to, approval of their permit application
without any deed restriction ensuring public access to the ocean. As a result, analysis of appellants' investment-backed expectations reveals that "the force of this
factor is so overwhelming . . . that it disposes of the taking question." Monsanto,
supra, at 1005, 104 S.Ct, at 2874.10

10. The Court suggests that Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto is distinguishable, because government
regulation of property in that case was a condition on receipt of a "government benefit," while

here regulation takes the form of a restriction
on "the right to build on one's own property,"
which "cannot remotely be described as a
'government benefit.'" ante, at 3147, n. 2. This

related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an
applicant in exchange for the economic
advantages of a registration can hardly
be called a taking." Id., at 1007, 104
S.Ct, at 2875.
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Standard Takings Clause analysis thus from exercising its right to have access to
indicates that the Court employs its unduly the sea.
restrictive standard of police power rationFurthermore, consideration of the Comality to find a taking where neither the mission's action under traditional takings
character of governmental action nor the ^analysis underscores the absence of any
nature of the private interest affected raise viable takings claim. The deed restriction
any takings concern. The result is that the permits the public only to pass and repass
Court invalidates regulation that repre- along a narrow strip of beach, a few feet
sents a reasonable adpustmentsei of the closer to a seawall at the periphery of
burdens and benefits of development along appellants' property. Appellants almost
surely have enjoyed an increase in the valthe California coast.
"ue of their property even with the restriction, because they have been allowed to^
Ill
build a significantly larger new home with
The foregoing analysis makes clear that garage on their lot. Finally, appellants can
the State has taken no property from appel- claim the disruption of no expectation interlants. Imposition of the permit condition in est, both because they have no right to
this case represents the State's reasonable exclude the public under state law, and
exercise of its police power. The Coastal because, even if they did, they had full
Commission has drawn on its expertise to advance notice that new development along
preserve the balance between private devel- the coast is conditioned on provisions for
opment and public access, by requiring that continued public access to the ocean.
any project that intensifies development on
|862Fortunately, the Court's decision rethe increasingly crowded California coast garding this application of the Commismust be offset by gains in public access. sion's permit program will probably have
Under the normal standard for review of little ultimate impact either on this parcel
the police power, this provision is eminently in particular or the Commission program in
reasonable. Even accepting the Court's general. A preliminary study by a Senior
novel insistence on a precise quid pro quo Lands Agent in the State Attorney Generof burdens and benefits, there is a reason- al's Office indicates that the portion of the
able relationship between the public benefit beach at issue in this case likely belongs to
and the burden created by appellants' de- the public. App. 85.11 Since a full study
velopment. The movement of development had not been completed at the time of
closer to the ocean creates the prospect .of appellants' permit application, the deed reencroachment on public tidelands, because striction was requested "without regard to
of fluctuation in the mean high-tide line. the possibility that the applicant is proposThe deed restriction ensures that disputes ing development on public land." Id., at
about the boundary between private and 45. Furthermore, analysis by the same
public property will not deter the public Land Agent also indicated that the public
proffered distinction is not persuasive. Both
Monsanto and the Nollans hold property whose
use is subject to regulation; Monsanto may not
sell its property without obtaining government
approval and the Nollans may not build new
development on their property without government approval. Obtaining such approval is as
much a "government benefit" for the Nollans as
it is for Monsanto. If the Court is somehow
suggesting that "the right to build on one's own
property" has some privileged natural rights status, the argument is a curious one. By any
traditional labor theory of value justification for
property rights, for instance, see, e.g., J. Locke,

The Second Treatise of Civil Government 15-26
(E. Gough, ed. 1947), Monsanto would have a
superior claim, for the chemical formulae
which constitute its property only came into
being by virtue of Monsanto's efforts.
11. The Senior Land Agent's report to the Commission states that "based on my observations,
presently, most, if not all of Faria Beach waterward of the existing seawalls [lies] below the
Mean High Tide Level, and would fall in public
domain or sovereign category of ownership."
App. 85 (emphasis added).
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had obtained a prescriptive right to the use
of Faria Beach from the seawall to the
ocean. Id., at 86.12 The Superior Court
explicitly stated in its ruling against the
Commission on the permit condition issue
that "no part of this opinion is intended to
foreclose the public's opportunity to adjudicate the possibility that public rights in
[appellants'] beach have been acquired
through prescriptive use." Id., at 420..

that the record's documentation of the impact of coastal development indicates that
the Commission should have little problem
presenting its findings in a way that avoids
a takings problem.

12. The Senior Land Agent's report stated:
"Based on my past experience and my investigation to date of this property it is my opinion
that the area seaward of the revetment at 3822
Pacific Coast Highway, Faria Beach, as well as
all the area seaward of the revetments built to
protect the Faria Beach community, if not public owned, has been impliedly dedicated to the
public for passive recreational use." Id., at 86.

mission. In addition, pressure for development
along the coast is expected to increase since
approximately 85% of California's population
lives within 30 miles of the coast." Grupe v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal.App.3d 148,
167, n. 12, 212 Cal.Rptr. 578, 589, n. 12 (1985).
See also Coastal Zone Management Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1451(c) (increasing demands on coastal
zones "have resulted in the loss of living marine
resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and adverse changes to ecological systems,
decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion").

Nonetheless it is important to point out
that the Court's insistence on a precise
accounting system in this case is insensitive to the fact that increasing intensity of
development in many areas calls for farWith respect to the permit condition pro- x -sighted, comprehensive planning that takes
gram in general, the Commission should into account both the interdependence of
have little difficulty in the future in utiliz- land uses and the cumulative impact of
ing its expertise to demonstrate a specific development13 As one scholar has noted:
connection between provisions for access
"Property does not exist in isolation.
and burdens on access produced by new
Particular parcels are tied to one another
development. Neither the Commission in
in complex ways, and property isi864more
its report nor the State in its briefs and at
accurately described as being inextricaargument highlighted the particular threat
bly part of a network of relationships
to lateral access created by appellants'
that is neither limited to, nor usefully
^development project. In defending its
defined by, the property boundaries with
action, the State emphasized the general
which the legal system is accustomed to
point that overall access to the beach had
dealing. Frequently, use of any given
been preserved, since the diminution of acparcel of property is at the same time
cess created by the project had been offset
effectively a use of, or a demand upon,
by the gain in lateral access. This approperty
beyond the border of the user."
proach is understandable, given that the
Sax,
Takings,
Private Property, and PubState relied on the reasonable assumption
lic
Rights,
81
Yale L.J. 149, 152 (1971)
that its action was justified under the nor(footnote omitted).
mal standard of review for determining
As
Congress has declared: 'The key to
legitimate exercises of a State's police powmore
effective protection and use of the
er. In the future, alerted to the Court's
apparently more demanding requirement, it land and water resources of the coastal
need only make clear that a provision for zone [is for the states to] develo[p] land
public access directly responds to a particu- and water use programs for the coastal
lar type of burden on access created by a zone, including unified policies, criteria,
new development. Even if I did not believe standards, methods, and processes for dealthat the record in this case satisfies this ing with land and water use decisions of
requirement, I would have to acknowledge more than local significance." 16 U.S.C.

13. As the California Court of Appeals noted in
1985, "Since 1972, permission' has been granted
to construct more than 42,000 building units
within the land jurisdiction of the Coastal Corn-
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§ 1451(i). This is clearly a call for a focus
on the overall impact of development on
coastal areas. State agencies therefore require considerable flexibility in responding
to private desires for development in a way
that guarantees the preservation of public
access to the coast. They should be encouraged to regulate development in the
context of the overall balance of competing
uses of the shoreline. The Court today
does precisely the opposite, overruling air
eminently reasonable exercise of an expert
state agency's judgment, substituting its
own narrow view of how this balance
should be struck. Its reasoning is hardly
suited to the complex reality of natural
resource protection in the 20th century. I
can only hope that today's decision is an
aberration, and that a broader vision ultimately prevails.14
I dissent.
I sGsJustice BLACKMUN, dissenting.
I do not understand the Court's opinion
in this case to implicate in any way the
public-trust doctrine. The Court certainly
had no reason to address the issue, for the
Court of Appeal of California did not rest
its decision on Art. X, § 4, of the California
Constitution. Nor did the parties base
their arguments before this Court on the
doctrine.
I disagree with the Court's rigid interpretation of the necessary correlation between
a burden created by development and a
condition imposed pursuant to the State's
police power to mitigate that burden. The
land-use problems this country faces require creative solutions. These are not advanced by an "eye for an eye" mentality.
The close nexus between benefits and burdens that the Court now imposes on permit
14. I believe that States should be afforded considerable latitude in regulating private development, without fear that their regulatory efforts
will often be found to constitute a taking. "//
... regulation denies the private property owner the use and enjoyment of his land and is
found to effect a 'taking/" however, I believe
that compensation is the appropriate remedy
for this constitutional violation. San Diego Gas
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conditions creates an anomaly in the ordinary requirement that a State's exercise of
its police power need be no more than
rationally based. See, e.g., Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659
(1981). In my view, the easement exacted
from appellants and the problems their development created are adequately related
to the governmental interest in providing
.public access to the beach. Coastal development by its very nature makes public
access to the shore generally more difficult. Appellants' structure is part of that
general development and, in particular, it
diminishes the public's visual access to the
ocean and decreases the public's sense that
it may have physical access to the beach.
These losses in access can be counteracted,
at least in part, by the condition on appellants' construction permitting public passage that ensures access along the beach.
Traditional takings analysis compels the
conclusion that there is no taking here.
The governmental action is a valid exercise
of the police power, and, so far as the
record reveals, |g66has a nonexistent economic effect on the value of appellants'
property. No investment-backed expecta
tions were diminished. It is significan
that the Nollans had notice of the easemem
before they purchased the property anc
that public use of the beach had been per
mitted for decades.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice
BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.
The debate between the Court and Jus
tice BRENNAN illustrates an extremel;
important point concerning governmen
regulation of the use of privately owne
& Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 65(
101 S.Ct. 1287, 1306, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis added),
therefore see my dissent here as compietel
consistent with my position in First EngliSi
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Lo
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 9
L.Ed.2d 250 (1987).

ajLo<*
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real estate. Intelligent, well-informed pub- I am persuaded that he has the better of
lic officials may in good faith disagree the legal arguments here. Even if his posiabout the validity of specific types of land- tion prevailed in this case, however, it
use regulation. Even the wisest lawyers would be of little solace to land-use planwould have to acknowledge great uncer- ners who would still be left guessing about
tainty about the scope of this Court's tak- how the Court will react to the next case,
ings jurisprudence. Yet, because of the and the one after that. As this case demCourt's remarkable ruling in First English onstrates, the rule of liability created by
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen- the Court in First English is a shortsightdale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304^ ed one. Like Justice BRENNAN, I hope
107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), local 'th^t "a broader vision ultimately prevails."
governments and officials must pay the Ante,.dX 3161.
price for the necessarily vague standards
I respectfully dissent.
in this area of the law.
In his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 101
S.Ct. 1287, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981), Justice
BRENNAN proposed a brand new constitutional rule.* He argued that a mistake
such as the one that a majority of the
Court believes that the California Coastal
Commission made in this case should automatically give rise to pecuniary liability for
a "temporary taking." Id., at 653-661, 101
S.Ct, at 1304-1309. Notwithstanding the
unprecedented chilling effect that such a
rule will obviously have on public officials
charged with the responsibility for drafting
and implementing regulations designed to
protect the envjronment867 and the public
welfare, six Members of the Court recently
endorsed Justice BRENNAN's novel proposal. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, supra.
I write today to identify the severe tension between that dramatic development in
the law and the view expressed by Justice
BRENNAN's dissent in this case that the
public interest is served by encouraging
state agencies to exercise considerable flexibility in responding to private desires for
development in a way that threatens the
preservation of public resources. See
ante, at 3153-3154. I like the hat that
Justice BRENNAN has donned today better than the one he wore in San Diego, and
* "The constitutional rule I propose requires that,
once a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a 'taking/ the government entity must pay just compensation for the period
commencing on the date the regulation first
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jsesJoseph G. GRIFFIN, Petitioner,
v.
WISCONSIN.
No. 86-5324.
Argued April 20, 1987.
Decided June 26, 1987.
Probationer was convicted in the Circuit Court, Rock County, J. Richard Long,
J., of possession of firearm by a felon, and
he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 126
Wis.2d 183, 376 N.W.2d 62, affirmed, and
probationer appealed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 131 Wis.2d 41, 388 N.W.2d
535, affirmed, and certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, held
that search of probationer's home, pursuant to Wisconsin regulation replacing standard of probable cause by "reasonable
grounds/' satisfied Fourth Amendment.
Affirmed.
effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." 450 U.S., at 658,
101 S.Ct., at 1307.
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On May 9, 1983, at his first appearance
before the court, Reed, appearing without
counsel, informed the court that he would be
in a halfway house but for the detainer.
"App. 12. The court acknowledged that there
{
is a "world of difference" between a halfway
house and the Fulton County jail. Id., at 14.
The court later observed that Reed's incarceration rendered him incapable of preparing
his defense. Id, at 54.
At the June 27 pretrial conference, Reed
..asked the court if it would prefer future
motions orally or in writing. The court responded, "I want it in writing," and "I read
better ^ t h a n I listen." Id., at 39-40; see
also id., at 123 (noting preference for written
motions). Conforming to this request, Reed
filed a motion on July 25, requesting that
/'trial be held within the legal guidelines of
Jhe Agreement on Detainer Act." Id., at 56.
Clarifying his concerns, Reed complained
that the State of Indiana was "forcing [him]
to be tried beyond the limits as set forth in
the Agreement on Detainer Act," and specifically "requested that] no extension of time
be granted beyond those guidelines." Ibid.
./This pro se motion was filed 31 days before
ltthe 120-day period expired.
Three days later, Reed filed a motion statL
ing that there was "limited time left for trial
"within the laws." Id., at 88. This pro se
^motion was filed 28 days before the IAD
clock ran out. Finally, on August 11, he filed
c
a motion for subpoenas that sought prompt
relief because the "Detainer Act time limits"
were "approaching." Id., at 91. This pro se
motion was filed 15 days before the 120-day
IAD time limit expired.
Thus, after being instructed that the court
wanted all motions in writing, Reed filed
n
three timely written motions indicating his
~rdesire to be tried within the IAD time limits.
^The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded
"rthat Reed's July 26 motion constituted "a
9,11.

The Court, referring to the "clarity" of Reed's
August 29 motion seeking discharge of the indictment, suggests that he deliberately obscured his
-ibt request until after the clock had run. Ante, at
2295, 2297. The Court fails to mention, however, that Reed prepared his earlier motions both
without counsel and without adequate access to

general demand that trial be held within the
time limits of the IAD." 491 N.E.2d 182, 185
(1993). Under Mauro, this was enough to
put the court on notice of his demands.
Even as an original matter, when a trial
court instructs a pro se defendant to put his
motions in writing, and the defendant does
so, not once, but three times, it is wholly
unwarranted then to penalize him for failing
to object orally at what this Court later
singles out as the magic moment.11
|373This should be a simple matter. Reed
invoked, and the trial court denied, his right
to be tried within the IAD's 120-day time
limit. Section 2254 authorizes federal courts
to grant for such a violation whatever relief
law and justice require. The IAD requires
dismissal of the indictment. Nothing in the
IAD, in § 2254, or in our precedent requires
or even suggests that federal courts should
refrain from entertaining a state prisoner's
claims of a violation of the IAD. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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Landowner petitioned for judicial review
of decision of Oregon Land Use Board of
legal materials. It was only at the August 1
pretrial conference that the court ordered the
sheriff to provide Reed with access to legal materials. App. 85. On August 9, Reed was given
two lawbooks, including one on Indiana criminal
procedure, and thereafter his draftsmanship improved
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Appeals, affirming conditions placed by city
on development of commercial property.
The Court of Appeals, 113 OrApp. 162, 832
P.2d 853, affirmed, and landowner again appealed. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed,
317 Or. 110, 854 P.2d 437, and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that: (1) city's requirement
that landowner dedicate portion of her property lying within flood plain for improvement
of storm drainage system and property^adjacent to flood plain as bicycle/pedestrian pathway, as condition for building permit allowing
expansion of landowner's commercial property, had nexus with legitimate public purposes; (2) findings relied upon by city to
require landowner to dedicate portion of her
property in flood plain as public greenway,
did not show required reasonable relationship necessary to satisfy requirements of
Fifth Amendment; and (3) city failed to meet
its burden of demonstrating that additional
number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated
by proposed commercial development reasonably related to city's requirement of dedication of pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion
in which Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg
joined.
Justice Souter filed dissenting opinion.
1. Eminent Domain <&=>1
One of the principal purposes of the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment is to
bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by public as a whole. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 5,
14.
2. Eminent Domain <S>2(1.2)
Zoning and Planning <S=>40
Land use regulation does not effect a
taking if it substantially advances legitimate
state interest and does not deny owner economically viable use of his or her land.
U.S.CA ConstAmends. 5, 14.
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3. Eminent Domain <s=»2(l.l, 1.2)
Under doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," government may not require person
to give up constitutional right in exchange for
discretionary benefit conferred by government where property sought has little or no
relationship to the benefit. U.S.CA Const.
Amends. 5, 14.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. Eminent Domain <S>2(1.2)
In evaluating landowner's claim that
city's requirement that she dedicate a portion
of her property as condition of further development was unconstitutional taking, Supreme
Court was first required to determine whether "essential nexus" existed between legitimate state interest and permit condition exacted by city; if Court found that nexus
existed, it was then required to decide required degree of connection between exactions and projected impact of proposed development. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
5. Eminent Domain S>2(1.2)
Zoning and Planning <s>382.3
City's requirement that landowner dedicate portion of her property lying within
flood plain for improvement of storm drainage system and property adjacent to flood
plain as bicycle/pedestrian pathway, as condition for building permit allowing expansion of
landowner's commercial property, had nexus
with legitimate public purposes of preventing
flooding along creek and reducing traffic congestion in city's central business district, for
purposes of Fifth Amendment takings analysis. U.S.CA ConstAmends. 5, 14.
6. Eminent Domain <3»2(1.2)
Zoning and Planning <S=»382.3
"Rough proportionality" test applied in
determining whether degree of exactions required by city's building permit conditions
bore required relationship to projected impact on proposed development to satisfy takings clause of Fifth Amendment; no precise
mathematical calculation was required, but
city was required to make some sort of indi-
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vidualized determination that required dedication was related both in nature and extent
to impact of proposed development.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

7. Constitutional Law <s*82(6.1)
Simply denominating governmental interest as "business regulation" doesrit>timmunize it from constitutional challenge on
grounds that it violates provision of the Bill
of Rights. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1-10.
8. Eminent Domain <&=>56
Zoning and Planning @=>439
Findings relied upon by city to require
landowner to dedicate portion of her property infloodplain as public greenway, as condition for constructing new commercial building, did not show required, reasonable relationship between flood plain easement and
landowner's proposed new building necessary
to satisfy requirement of Fifth Amendment
"takings" clause; although city found that
paved parking lot that was included in proposed development would increase storm water flow from property, city never stated why
public greenway, as opposed to private one,
was required in interest of flood control.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
9. Zoning and Planning <S>382.3
City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that additional number of vehicle
and bicycle trips generated by proposed commercial development were reasonably related
;;to city's requirement of dedication of pedesttrian/bicycle pathway easement as condition
• of granting building permit; city simply
^found that creation of pathway could offset
^some of the traffic demand and lessen increase in traffic congestion, but did not find
l
that pathway was likely to offset traffic demand. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
k*The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

10. Zoning and Planning <s>382.3
Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and
other public ways are generally reasonable
exactions to avoid excessive congestion from
proposed property use. U.S.C.A. Const
Amends. 5, 14.
Syllabus *
The City Planning Commission of respondent city conditioned approval of petitioner Dolan's application to expand her
store and pave her parking lot upon her
compliance with dedication of land (1) for a
public greenway along Fanno Creek to minimize flooding that would be exacerbated by
the increases in impervious surfaces associated with her development and (2) for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to relieve
traffic congestion in the city's Central Business District. She appealed the commission's denial of her request for variances
from these standards to the Land Use Board
of Appeals (LUBA), alleging that the land
dedication requirements were not related to
the proposed development and therefore' constituted an uncompensated taking of her
property under the Fifth Amendment
LUBA found a reasonable relationship between (1) the development and the requirement to dedicate land for a greenway, since
the larger building and paved lot would~increase the impervious surfaces and thus the
runoff into the creek, and (2) alleviating the
impact of increased traffic from the development and facilitating the provision of a pathway as an alternative means of transportation. Both the Oregon Court of Appeals and
the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: The city's dedication requirements constitute an uncompensated taking of
property. Pp. 2316-2322.
(a) Under the well-settled doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government
where the property sought has little or no
See United States v Detroit Lumber Co , 200 U S
321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499
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relationship to the benefit. In evaluating
Dolan's claim, it must be determined whether
an "essential nexus" exists between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3148, 97
L.Ed.2d 677. If one does, then it must be
decided whether the degree of the exactions
demanded by the permit conditions bears the
required relationship to the projected impact
of the proposed development. Id, at "834,
107 S.Ct. at 3147. Pp. 2316-2317.
(b) Preventing flooding along Fanno
Creek and reducing traffic congestion in the
district are legitimate public purposes; and a
nexus exists between the first purpose and
limiting development within the creeps
Jj75floodplain and between the second purpose and providing for alternative means of
transportation. Pp. 2317-2318.
(c) In deciding the second question—
whether the city's findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed
on Dolan's permit—the necessary connection
required by the Fifth Amendment is "rough
proportionality." No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the proposed
development's impact. This is essentially the
"reasonable relationship" test adopted by the
majority of the state courts. Pp. 2318-2320.
(d) The findings upon which the city
relies do not show the required reasonable
relationship between the floodplain easement
and Dolan's proposed building. The Community Development Code already required that
Dolan leave 15% of her property as open
space, and the undeveloped floodplain would
have nearly satisfied that requirement.
However, the city has never said why a
public, as opposed to a private, greenway is
required in the interest offloodcontrol. The
difference to Dolan is the loss of her ability
to exclude others from her property, yet the
city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of
its request. The city has also not met its
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burden of demonstrating that the additional
number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated
by Dolan's development reasonably relates to
the city's requirement for a dedication of the
pathway easement. The city must quantify
its finding beyond a conclusory statement
that the dedication could offset some of the
traffic demand generated by the development. Pp. 2319-2322.
317 Ore. 110, 854 P.2d 437 (1993), reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR,
SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which BLACKMUN and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 2322.
SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post,
p. 2330.

David B. Smith, Tigard, OR, for petitioner.
Timothy V. Ramis, Portland, OR, for respondent.
l376Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, DC,
for U.S., as amicus curiae by special leave of
the Court.
For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:
1994 WL 249537 (Pet.Brief)
1994 WL 123754 (Resp.Brief)
1994 WL 82042 (Reply.Brief)
1994 WL 106731 (Resp.Supp.Brief)
| yrrChief Justice REHNQUIST delivered
the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner challenges the decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court which held that the
city of Tigard could condition the approval of
her building permit on the dedication of a
portion of her property for flood control and
traffic improvements. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P.2d
437 (1993). We granted certiorari to resolve
a question left open by our decision in Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), of
what is the required degree of connection
between the exactions imposed by the city^
and the projected impacts of the proposed
development.
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bate these flooding problems. To combat
The State of Oregon enacted a comprehen- these risks, the Drainage Plan suggested a
sive land use management program in 1973. series of improvements to the Fanno Creek
Basin, including channel excavation in the
Ore.Rev.Stat §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991).
area
next to petitioner's property. App. to
The program required all Oregon cities and x
Pet. for Cert. G-13, G-38. Other recommencounties to adopt new comprehensive land
dations included ensuring that the floodplain
use plans that were consistent with the stateremains free of structures and that it be
wide planning goals. §§ 197.175(1), 197.250.
preserved as greenways to minimize flood
The plans are implemented by land use regudamage to structures. Record, Doc. No. F,
lations which are part of an integrated^hierch. 5, pp. 5-16 to 5-21. The Drainage Plan
archy of legally binding goals, plans, ancT x concluded that the cost of these improveregulations. §§ 197.175, 197.175(2)(b). Pur- ments should be shared based on both direct
suant to the State's requirements, the city of and indirect benefits, with property owners
Tigard, a community of some 30,000 resi- along the waterways paying more due to the
dents on the southwest edge of Portland, direct benefit that they would receive. Id.,
developed a comprehensive plan and codified ch. 8, p. 8-H. CDC Chapters 18.84 and
it in its Community Development Code 18.86 | 9and CDC § 18.164.100 and the Ti37
(CDC). The CDC requires property owners gard Park Plan carry out these recommendain the area zoned Central Business District tions.
to comply with a 15% open space and landPetitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbscaping requirement, which limits total site
ing
and electric supply store located on Main
coverage, including all structures and paved
Street
in the Central Business District of the
parking, to 85% of the parcel. CDC, ch.
18.66, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-16 to G-17. city. The store covers approximately 9,700
After the completion of a transportation square feet on the eastern side of a 1.67-acre
study that identified ^congestion in the parcel, which includes a gravel parking lot.
Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern
. Central Business District as a particular
corner of the lot and along its western
problem, the city adopted a plan for a pedesboundary. The year-round flow of the creek
1
trian/bicycle pathway intended to encourage renders the area within the creek's 100-year
alternatives to automobile transportation for floodplain virtually unusable for commercial
short trips. The CDC requires that new development. The city's comprehensive plan
development facilitate this plan by dedicating includes the Fanno Creek floodplain as part
'land for pedestrian pathways where provided of the city's greenway system.
for in the pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan.1
Petitioner applied to the city for a permit
s
" The city also adopted a Master Drainage to redevelop the site. Her proposed'plans
*Plan (Drainage Plan). The Drainage Plan called for nearly doubling the size of the
-noted that flooding occurred in several areas store to 17,600 square feet and paving a 39~ along Fanno Creek, including areas near pe- space parking lot. The existing store, locattitioner's property. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. ed on the opposite side of the parcel, would
2, pp. 2-5 to 2-8; 4-2 to 4-6; Figure 4-1. be razed in sections as construction progress^The Drainage Plan also established that the ed on the new building. In the second phase
^increase in impervious surfaces associated of the project, petitioner proposed to build an
with continued urbanization would exacer- additional structure on the northeast side of
I

t.
'1. CDC § 18.86.040.A.i.b provides: "The develJ
«' opment shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circula° tion if the site is located on a street with desig'J1, nated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated
>r~ greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be
5
" addressed [include]: (i) Provision of efficient,
v convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation systems, linking develop-

ments by requiring dedication and construction
of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the
comprehensive plan. If direct connections cannot be made, require that funds in the amount of
the construction cost be deposited into an account for the purpose of constructing paths."
App. to Brief for Respondent B-33 to B-34.
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the site for complementary businesses and to
provide more parking. The proposed expansion and intensified use are consistent with
the city's zoning scheme in the Central Business District. CDC § 18.66.030, App. to
Brief for Petitioner C-l to C-3.
The City Planning Commission (Commission) granted petitioner's permit application
subject to conditions imposed by the city's
CDC. The CDC establishes the following
standard for site development review approval:
"Where landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year
floodplain, the City shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for
greenway adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a
suitable elevation for the construction of a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the
|38ofloodplain in accordance with the
adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan." CDC
§ 18.120.180.A.8, App. to Brief for Respondent B-45 to B-46.
Thus, the Commission required that petitioner dedicate the portion of her property lying
within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system along Fanno Creek and that she dedicate an additional
15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.2 The
dedication required by that condition encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or
roughly 10% of the property. In accordance
with city practice, petitioner could rely on the
2. The city's decision includes the following relevant conditions "1 The applicant shall dedicate
to the City as Greenway all portions of the site
that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain
[of Fanno Creek] (i e , all portions of the property
below elevation 150 0) and all property 15 feet
above (to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain
boundary The building shall be designed so as
not to intrude into the greenway area " App to
Pet for Cert G-43
3. CDC § 18 134 050 contains the following criteria whereby the decisionmaking authority can
approve, approve with modifications, or deny a
vanance request
"(1) The proposed variance will not be materially detrimental to the purposes of this tide, be in
conflict with the policies of the comprehensive
plan, to any other applicable policies and stan-
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dedicated property to meet the 15% open
space and landscaping requirement mandated by the city's zoning scheme. App. to Pet.
for Cert. &-28 to G-29. The city would bear
the cost of maintaining a landscaped buffer
between the dedicated area and the new
store. Id., at G-44 to G-45.
Petitioner requested vanances from the
CDC standards. Vanances are granted only
where it can be shown that, owing to special
circumstances related to a specific piece of
the land, the literal interpretation of the applicable zoning provisions would cause "an
undue or unnecessary hardship" unless the
variance is granted. CDC § 18.134.010, App.
to Brief for Respondent B-47.3 Rather than
posing alternative^! mitigating measures to
offset the expected impacts of her proposed
development, as allowed under the CDC, petitioner simply argued that her proposed development would not conflict with the policies
of the comprehensive plan. Id., at E-&. The
Commission denied the request.
The Commission made a senes of findings
concerning the relationship between the dedicated conditions and the projected impacts of
petitioner's project. First, the Commission
noted that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that
customers and employees of the future uses
of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway adjacent to this development for
their transportation and recreational needs."
dards, and to other properties in the same zoning
district or vicinity,
"(2) There are special circumstances that exist
which are peculiar to the lot size or shape topography or other circumstances over which the
applicant has no control, and which are not
applicable to other properties in the same zoning
district,
"(3) The use proposed will be the same as permitted under this title and City standards will be
maintained to the greatest extent possible, while
permitting some economic use of the land,
"(4) Existing physical and natural systems, such
as but not limited to traffic, drainage, dramatic
land forms, or parks will not be adversely affected any more than would occur if the development were located as specified in the title, and
"(5) The hardship is not self-imposed and the
variance requested is the minimum variance
which would alleviate the hardship " App to
Brief for Respondent B-49 to B-50
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City of Tigard Planning Commission Final
Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet for Cert.
G-24. The Commission noted that the site
plan has provided for bicycle parking in a
rack in front of the proposed building and
"[i]t is reasonable to expect that some of thev
users of the bicycle parking provided for by
the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to
Fanno Creek if it is constructed." Ibid, In
addition, the Commission found that creation
of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of traits-:
portation "could |382offset some of the traffic
demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the
increase in traffic congestion." Ibid,
The Commission went on to note that the
required floodplain dedication would be reasonably related to petitioner's request to intensify the use of the site given the increase
in the impervious surface. The Commission
stated that the "anticipated increased storm
water flow from the subject property to an
already strained creek and drainage' basin
can only add to the public need to manage
the stream channel and floodplain for drainage purposes." Id,, at G-37. Based on this
anticipated increased storm water flow, the
Commission concluded that "the requirement
of dedication of the floodplain area on the
site is related to the applicant's plan to intensify development on the site." Ibid, The
Tigard City Council approved the Commission's final order, subject to one minor modification; the city council reassigned the responsibility for surveying and marking the
floodplain area from petitioner to the city's
engineering department. Id., at G-7.

ZSLb

substantial evidence. Dolan v. Tigard,
LUBA 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992), reprinted at
App. to Pet. for Cert. D-15, n. 9. Given the
undisputed fact that the proposed larger
building and paved parking area would increase the amount of impervious surfaces
and the runoff into Fanno Creek, LUBA
concluded that "there is a 'reasonable relationship' between the proposed development
and the requirement to dedicate land along
Fanno Creek for a greenway." Id., at D-16.
With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, LUBA noted the Commission's finding
that a signifjcantly383 larger retail sales building and parking lot would attract larger numbers of customers and employees and their
vehicles. It again found a "reasonable relationship" between alleviating the impacts of
increased traffic from the development and
facilitating the provision of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway as an alternative means of transportation. Ibid.

Petitioner appealed to the Land Use Board
of Appeals (LUBA) on the ground that the
city's dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore, those requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of her property under
the Fifth Amendment. In evaluating the
federal taking claim, LUBA assumed that
the city's findings about the impacts of the
proposed development were supported by

The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting petitioner's contention that in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987),
we had abandoned the "reasonable relationship" test in favor of a stricter "essential
nexus" test. 113 OreApp. 162, 832 P.2d 853
(1992). The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P.2d 437 (1993).
The court also disagreed with petitioner's
contention that the Nollan Court abandoned
the "reasonably related" test. 317 Ore., at
118, 854 P.2d, at 442. Instead, the court
read Nollan to mean that an "exaction is
reasonably related to an impact if the exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of
the permit would serve." 317 Ore., at 120,
854 P.2d, at 443. The court decided that
both the pedestrian/bicycle pathway condition and the storm drainage dedication had
an essential nexus to the development of the
proposed site. Id., at 121, 854 P.2d, at 443,
Therefore, the court found the conditions to
be reasonably related to the impact of the
expansion of petitioner's business. Ibid}

4. The Supreme Court of Oregon did not address
the consequences of petitioner's failure to provide alternative mitigation measures in her vari-

ance application and we take the case as it
comes to us. Accordingly, we do not pass on the
constitutionality of the city's variance provisions
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We granted certiorari, 510 U.S. 989, 114
S.Ct. 544, 126 L.Ed.2d 446 (1993), because of
an alleged conflict between the Oregon Supreme Courts decision and our decision in
Nollan, supra.

United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct.
383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979).

5. Justice STEVENS' dissent suggests that this
case is actually grounded in "substantive" due
process, rather than in the view that the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But there is no doubt that later cases
have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does
make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the States, see Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122, 98 S.Ct.
2646, 2658, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827,
107 S.Ct. 3141, 3143, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987).
Nor is there any doubt that these cases have
relied upon Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897),
to reach that result. See, e.g., Penn Central,
supra, 438 U.S., at 122, 98 S.Ct., at 2658 ("The
issu[e] presented . . . [is] whether the restrictions
imposed by New York City's law upon appel-

lants' exploitation of the Terminal site effect a
'taking' of appellants' property for a public use
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
which of course is made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239,
17 S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897)"). ' .i

[2] On the other side of the ledger, the
authority of state and local governments to
engage in land use planning has been sustained against constitutional challenge as
long ago as our decision in Village of Euclid
II
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct.
[1] The Takings Clause of the Fifth 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). "Government
Amendment of the United State^ Constitu- hardly could go on if to some extent values
tion, made applicable to the States^tljrough incident to property could not be diminished
the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, 5. & l385without paying for every such change in
Q.R. Co. v. Chfyago,m 166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897), provides: Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159,
"[N]or shall private property be taken for 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). A land use regulation
public use, without just compensation."5 does not effect a taking if it "substantially
One of the principal purposes of the Takings advance[s] legitimate state interests" and
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing does not "den[yl an owner economically viasome people alone to bear public burdens ble use of his land." Agins v. City of Tibuwhich, in all fairness and justice, should be ron, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141,
6
borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980).
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct.
[3] The sort of land use regulations dis1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Without
cussed in the cases just cited, however, differ
question, had the city simply required petiin two relevant particulars from the present
tioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno
case. First, they involved essentially legislaCreek for public use, rather than conditiontive determinations classifying entire areas of
ing the grant of her permit to redevelop her
. the city, whereas here the city made an
property on such a dedication, a taking would adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
have occurred. Nollan, supra, 483 U.S., at application for a building permit on an indi831, 107 S.Ct., at 3145. Such public access vidual parcel. Second, the conditions imwould deprive petitioner of the right to ex- posed were not simply a limitation on the use
clude others, "one of the most essential sticks petitioner might make of her own parcel, but
in the bundle of rights that are commonly a requirement that she deed portions of the
characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. property to the city. In Nollan, supra, we

"3 »

6. There can be no argument that the permit
conditions would deprive petitioner of "economically beneficial us[e]" of her property as^sh?
currently operates a retail store on the lot. Peti-^
tioner assuredly is able to derive some econprai^
use from her property. See, e.g., Lucas v., South?
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 101$
112 S.Ct. 2886, 2895, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (19%^
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175^
100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979); Pen%
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra! l43$>
U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct., at 2659.
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held that governmental authority to exact
such a condition was circumscribed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under
the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions," the government may not require
a person to give up a constitutional right—
here the right to receive just compensation
when property is taken for a public use—in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit
sought has little or no relationship to .the
property. See Perry v. Sindermann, 4t)8
U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570
(1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist 205, Will Cty., 391
U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731,1734, 20 L.Ed.2d
811 (1968).
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[5] We addressed the essential nexus
question in Nollan. The California Coastal
Commission demanded a lateral public easement across the Nollans' beachfront lot in
exchange for a permit to demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a threebedroom house. Id, at 828, 107 S.Ct., at
3144. The public easement was designed to
connect two public beaches that were separated by the Nollan's property. The^ Coastal
Commission had asserted that the public
easement condition was imposed to promote
the legitimate state interest of diminishing
the "blockage of the view of the ocean"
caused by construction of the larger house.

We agreed that the Coastal Commission's
concern with protecting visual access to the
ocean constituted a legitimate ^public interest. Id, at 835, 107 S.Ct., at 3148. We also
agreed that the permit condition would have
been constitutional "even if it consisted of the
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with
whose sighting of the ocean their new house
would interfere." Id, at 836, 107 S.Ct., at
3148. We resolved, however, that the Coastal Commission's regulatory authority was set
completely adrift from its constitutional
moorings when it claimed that a nexus existed between visual access to the ocean and a
permit condition requiring lateral public access along the Nollans' beachfront lot. Id.,
at 837, 107 S.Ct, at 3148. How enhancing
Ill
the public's ability to "traverse to and along
[4] In evaluating petitioner's claim, we the shorefront" served the same governmenmust first determine whether the "essential tal purpose of "visual access to the ocean"
nexus" exists between the "legitimate state from the roadway was beyond our ability to
interest" and the permit condition exacted by countenance. The absence of a nexus left
The city. Nollan, 483 U.S., at 837, 107 S.Ct., the Coastal Commission in the position of
jat 3148. If we find that a nexus exists, we simply trying to obtain an easement through
must then decide the required degree ' of gimmickry, which converted a valid regula"connection between the exactions and the tion of land use into " 'an out-and-out plan of
projected impact of the proposed develop- extortion.'" Ibid, quoting J E.D Associment. We were not required to reach this ates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432
"question in Nollan, because we concluded A.2d 12,14-15 (1981).
that the connection did not meet even the
No such gimmicks are associated with the
loosest standard. Id., at 838, 107 S.Ct., at
t "3149. Here, however, we must decide this permit conditions imposed by the city in this
"question.
case. Undoubtedly, the prevention of floodPetitioner contends that the city has forced
her to choose between the building permit
and her right under the FifthJ^sAmendment
to just compensation for the public easements. Petitioner does not quarrel with the
city's authority to exact some forms of dedication as a condition for the grant of a building permit, but challenges the showing made
by the city to justify these exactions. She
argues that the city has identified "no special
benefits" conferred on her, and has not identified any "special quantifiable burdens" created by her new store that would justify the
particular dedications required from her
which are not required from the public at
large.
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ing along Fanno Creek and the reduction of
traffic congestion in the Central Business
District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld. Agins, 447
U.S., at 260-262, 100 S.Ct., at 2141-2142. It.
seems equally obvious that a nexus exists
between preventing flooding along Tanno
Creek and limiting development within the
creek's 100-year floodplain. Petitioner proposes to double the size of her retail store
and to pave her now-gravel parkingMpt,
thereby expanding the impervious surface onN
the property and increasing the amount of
storm water runoff into Fanno Creek. •'
The same may be said for the city's attempt to reduce traffic congestion by providing for alternative means of transportation.
In theory, a pedestrian/bicycle pathway provides a useful alternative means of transportation for workers and shoppers: "Pedestrians and bicyclists occupying dedicated
I ^spaces for walking and/or bicycling . . .
remove potential vehicles from streets, resulting in an .overall improvement in total
transportation system flow." A. Nelson,
Public Provision of Pedestrian and Bicycle
Access Ways: Public Policy Rationale and
the Nature of Private Benefits 11, Center for
Planning Development, Georgia Institute of
Technology, Working Paper Series (Jan.
1994). See also Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102240, 105 Stat.1914 (recognizing pedestrian
and bicycle facilities as necessary components of any strategy to reduce traffic congestion).
B
The second part of our analysis requires
us to determine whether the degree of the
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed .development. Nollan, supra, 483 U.S., at 834,
107 S.Ct., at 3147, quoting Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
127, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 57 L.Ed.2d, 631
(1978) (" '[A] use restriction may constitute a
"taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial government purpose'"). Here the Oregon Supreme Court
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deferred to what it termed the "city's unchallenged factual findings" supporting the
dedication conditions and found them to be
reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of petitioner's business. 317 Ore., at
120-121, 854 P.2d, at 443.
The city required that petitioner dedicate
"to the City as Greenway all portions of the
site that fall within the existing 100-year
floodplain [of Fanno Creek] ... and all property 15 feet above [thefloodplain]boundary."
JcL, at 113, n. 3, 854 P.2d, at 439, n. 3. In
addition, the city demanded that the retail
store be designed so as not to intrude into
the greenway area. The city relies on the
Commission's rather tentative findings that
increased storm water flow from petitioner's
property "can only add to the public need to
manage the [floodplain] for drainage purposes" to support its conclusion that the "requirement of dedication of thefloodplainarea
onj389the site is related to the applicant's
plan to intensify development on the site."
City of Tigard Planning Commission Final
Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert.
G-37.
The city made the following specific findings relevant to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway:
"In addition, the proposed expanded use of
this site is anticipated to generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing
congestion on nearby collector and arterial
streets. Creation of a convenient, safe
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an
alternative means of transportation could
offset some of the traffic demand on these
nearby streets and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion." Id., at G-24.
The question for us is whether these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify
the conditions .imposed by the city on petitioner's building permit. Since state courts
have been dealing with this question a good
deal longer than we have, we turn to representative decisions made by them.
In some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. See, e.g.,
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964);
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Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966). We
think this standard is too lax to adequately
protect petitioner's right to just compensation if her property is taken for a^public
purpose.
Other state courts require a very exacting
correspondence, described as the "specific]
and uniquely attributable" test. The Supreme Court of Illinois first developed this
test in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v.
Mount Prospect, 22 I11.2d 375, 380, 176
N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961).7 Under this stand a r d j ^ i f the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need, the
exaction becomes "a veiled exercise of the
power of eminent domain and a confiscation
of private property .behind the defense of
police regulations." Id, at 381, 176 N.E.2d,
at 802. We do not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny, given
the nature of the interests involved.
A number of state courts have taken an
intermediate position, requiring 1 the municipality to show a "reasonable relationship"
between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed development. Typical
is the Supreme Court of Nebraska's opinion
in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240,
245, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980), where that
court stated:
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property for some future public use as a
condition of obtaining a building permit when
such future use is not "occasioned by the
construction sought to be permitted." Id, at
248, 292 N.W.2d, at 3v02.
Some form of the reasonable relationship
test has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls,
28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965); Collis
v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19
(1976) (requiring a showing of a reasonable
relationship between 1391 the planned subdivision and the municipality's need for land);
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680
S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex.1984); Call v. West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (affirming use of the reasonable relation test).
Despite any semantical differences, general
agreement exists among the courts "that the
dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the [development]." Ibid. See generally Note " 'Take'
My Beach Please!": Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus
Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U.L.Rev. 823 (1989); see also
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 651-653 (CA9
1983).

Thus, the court held that a city may not
require a property owner to dedicate private

[6] We think the "reasonable relationship" test adopted by a majority of the state
courts is closer to the federal constitutional
norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not adopt it as such,
partly because the term "reasonable relationship" seems confusingly similar to the term
"rational basis" which describes the minimal
level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
think a term such as "rough proportionality"
best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No
precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedi-

7. The "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test has now been adopted by a minority of other
courts. See, e.g., J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 585, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (1981);
Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of

Wayne, 66 N.J. 582, 600-601, 334 A 2d 30, 40
(1975); McKaxn v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26
Ohio App.2d 171, 176, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374
(1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R.I
63, 69, 264 A.2d 910, 913(1970)

"The distinction, therefore, which must
be made between an appropriate exercise
of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is whether the
requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the
property is being made or is merely being
used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the
landowner is asking the city for some license or permit."
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cation is related both in nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development.8
[7] |392Justice STEVENS7 dissent relies
upon a law review article for the proposition
that the city's conditional demands for part
of petitioner's property are "a species of
business regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of constitutional
validity." Post, at 2325. But simply denominating a governmental measure as a ^lousiness regulation" does not immunize it from
constitutional challenge on the ground that it
violates a provision of the Bill of Rights. In
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98
S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), we held
that a statute authorizing a warrantless
search of business premises in order- to detect OSHA violations violated the Fourth
Amendment. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd., of Colo. v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,
416 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607
(1974); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987). And
in Central Hudson Gas & Elec, * Corp.' v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447^U.S. 557,
100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), we
held that an order of the New York Public
Service Commission, designed to cut down
the use of electricity because of a fuel shortage, violated the First Amendment insofar as
it prohibited advertising by a utility .company
to promote the use of electricity. We see no
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable
circumstances. We turn now to analysis of
whether the findings relied upon by the city
8. Justice STEVENS' dissent takes us to task'for
placing the burden on the city to-justify the
required dedication. He is correct in .arguing
that in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly "rests on the
party challenging the regulation to prove that it
constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property
rights. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L:Ed.
303 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. In this situation, the burden properly
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here, first with respect to the floodplain easement, and second with respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path, satisfied these requirements.
[8] It is axiomatic that increasing the
amount of impervious surface will increase
the quantity and rate of storm water flow
from petitioner's property. Record, Doc. No.
F, ch. 4, |393p. 4-29. Therefore, keeping the
floodplain open and free from development
would likely confine the pressures on Fanno
Creek created by petitioner's development.
In fact, because petitioner's property lies
within the Central Business District, the
CDC already required that petitioner leave
15% of it as open space and the undeveloped
floodplain would have nearly satisfied that
requirement. App. to Pet. for Ceil. G-16 to
G-17. But the city demanded more—it not
only wanted petitioner not to build in the
floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's
property along Fanno Creek for its greenway system. The city has never said why a
public greenway, as opposed to a private one,
was required in the interest of flood control.
The difference to petitioner, of course, is
the loss of her ability .to exclude others. As
we have noted, this right to exclude others is
"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S., at
176, 100 S.Ct., at 391. It is difficult to see
why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner'sfloodplaineasement are sufficiently
related to the city's legitimate interest in
reducing flooding problems along Fanno
Creek, and the city has not attempted to
rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836,
107 S.Ct., at 3148. This conclusion is not, as he,
suggests, undermined by our decision in Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52
L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), in which we struck down a
housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single family as"
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance at issue in
Moore intruded on choices concerning family
living arrangements, an area in which the usual
deference to the legislature was found to be
inappropriate. Id., at 499, 97 S.Ct., at 1935.>
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make any individualized determination to
support this part of its request.

retail store. Her right to exclude would n<
be regulated, it would be eviscerated.

The city contends that the recreational
easement along the greenway is only ancillary to the city's chief purpose in controlling
flood hazards. It further asserts,that unlike
the residential property at issue in Nollan,
petitioner's property is commercial in character, and therefore, her right to exclude others is compromised. Brief for Respondent
41, quoting United States v. Orito, 413VU.S.
139, 142, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 2677, 37 L.Ed.2d 513
(1973) ("The Constitution extends special
safeguards to the privacy of the home'").
The city maintains that "[t]here is nothing to
suggest that preventing [petitioner] from
prohibiting [the easements] will unreasonably
impair the value of [her] property as a [retail
store]." PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2042,
64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980).

If petitionees proposed development ha
somehow encroached on existing greenwa;
space in the city, it would have been reason
able to require petitioner to provide som<
alternative greenway space for the public
either on her property or elsewhere. See
Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836, 107 S.Ct, at 314S
("Although such a requirement, constituting
a permanent grant of continuous access to
the property, would have to be considered a
taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the Commission's assumed
power to forbid construction of the house in
order to protect the public's view of the
beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by
the owner, even a concession of property
rights, that serves the same end"). But that
is not the case here. We conclude that the
findings upon which the city rejlies395 do not
show the required reasonable relationship
between the floodplain easement and the petitioner's proposed new building.

|394Admittedly, petitioner wants to build a
bigger store to attract members of the public
to her property. She also wants, however, to
be able to control the time and manner in
which they enter. The recreational easement on the greenway is different in character from the exercise of state-protected
rights of free expression and petition that we
permitted in PruneYard. In PruneYard, we
held that a major private shopping center
that attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons
had to provide access to persons exercising
'their state constitutional rights to distribute
'pamphlets and ask passers-by to sign their
petitions. IcL, at 85, 100 S.Ct., at'2042. We
'based our decision, in part, on the fact that
the shopping center "may restrict expressive
activity by adopting time, place, and manner
regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions/' Id, at
83, 100 S.Ct., at 2042. By contrast, the city
wants to impose a permanent recreational
easement upon petitioner's property that
borders Fanno Creek. Petitioner would lose
all rights to regulate the time in which the
public entered onto the greenway, regardless
of any interference it might pose with her
9. The city uses a weekday average trip rate of
53.21 trips per 1,000 square feet. Additional

[9,10] With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, we have no doubt that the city
was correct in finding that the larger retail
sales facility proposed by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of the Central
Business District. The city estimates that
the proposed development would generate
roughly 435 additional trips per day.9 Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions
to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use. But on the record before us, the city has not met'its burden of
demonstrating that the additional number of
vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development reasonably relate to the
city's requirement for a dedication of the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The
city simply found that the creation of the
pathway "could offset some of the traffic
Trips Generated = 53 21 X (17,600-9,720)
to Pet. for Cert. G-l 5.
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demand ... and lessen the increase in traffic
congestion." 10

cent to her hardware business. The mountain of briefs that the case has generated
nevertheless makes it obvious that the pecuAs Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court
niary value of her victory is far less imporof Oregon explained in his dissenting opinion,
tant than the rule of law that this case has
however, "[t]he findings of fact that the bicybeen used to establish. It is unquestionably
cle pathway system 'could offset some of the
an important case.
traffic demand' is a far cry from a finding
that the bicycle pathway system mil, or is
Certain propositions are not in dispute.
likely to, offset some of the traffic demand." The enlargement of the Tigard unit in Do317 Ore, at 127, 854 P.2d, at 447 (emphasis^ lan's chain of hardware stores will have an
in original). No precise mathematical calcu- adverse impact on the city's legitimate and
lation is required, but the city must make substantial interests in controlling drainage
some effort to quantify its findings in in Fanno Creek and minimizing traffic conl^support of the dedication for the pedestri- gestion in Tigard's business district. That
an/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory impact is sufficient to justify an outright
statement that it could offset some of the denial of her application for approval of the
traffic demand generated.
expansion. The city has ne\jertheless397
agreed to grant Dolan's application if she will
comply with two conditions, each of which
IV
admittedly will mitigate the adverse effects
Cities have long engaged in the commend- of her proposed development. The disputed
able task of land use planning, made neces- question is whether the city has violated the
sary by increasing urbanization, particularly Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Conin metropolitan areas such as Portland. The stitution by refusing to allow Dolan's planned
city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and construction to proceed unless those conditraffic congestion, and providing for public tions are met.
greenways, are laudable, but there are outer
limits to how this may be done. "A strong
The Court is correct in concluding that the
public desire to improve the public condition city may not attach arbitrary conditions to a
[will not] warrant achieving the desire by a building permit or to a variance even when it
shorter cut than the constitutional way of can rightfully deny the application outright.
paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coaly I also agree that state court decisions dealing
260 U.S., at 416, 43 S.Ct., at 160,
with ordinances that govern municipal development plans provide useful guidance in a
The judgment of the Supreme Court of case of this kind. Yet the Court's description
Oregon is reversed, and the case is remanded
of the doctrinal underpinnings of its decision,
for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the phrasing of its fledgling test of "rough
this opinion.
proportionality," and the application of that
test to this case run contrary to the traditionIt is so ordered.
al treatment of these cases and break considerable and unpropitious new ground.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice
BLACKMUN and Justice GINSBURG join,
dissenting.
I
The record does not tell us the dollar value
of petitioner Florence Dolan's interest in excluding the public from the greenway adja-

Candidly acknowledging the lack of federal
precedent for its exercise in rulemaking, the
Court purports to find guidance in 12 "repre-

10. In rejecting petitioner's request for a variance
from the pathway dedication condition, the city
stated that omitting the planned section of the
pathway across petitioner's property would conflict with its adopted policy of providing a contin-

uous pathway system But the Takings Clause
requires the city to implement its policy by condemnation unless the required relationship between petitioner's development and added traffic
is shown.
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sentative" state court decisions. To do so is
certainly appropriate.1 The state cases the
Court consults, however, either fail to support or decidedly undermine the Court's conclusions in key respects.
First, although discussion of the state
cases permeates the Court's analysis of the
appropriate test to apply in this case, the test
on which the Court settles is not^ naturally
derived from those courts' decisions^ The
Court recognizes as an initial matter that" the
city's conditions satisfy the "essential nexus"
requirement announced in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct.
3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), because they
serve the legitimate interests in minimizing
floods and traffic confeestions.398 Ante, at
2317-2318.2 The Court goes on, however, to
erect a new constitutional hurdle in the path
of these conditions. In addition to showing a
rational nexus to a public purpose that would
justify an outright denial of the permit, the
city must also demonstrate "rough' proportionality" between the harm caused by the
new land use and the benefit obtained by the
condition. Ante, at 2319. The Court also
decides for the first time that the city has the
burden of establishing the constitutionality of
its conditions by making an "individualized
determination" that the condition in question
satisfies the proportionality requirement.
See Ibid.
'• ''•'
Not one of the state cases cited by the
Court announces anything akin to a'"rough
proportionality" requirement. For the'.most
part, moreover, those cases that invalidated
municipal ordinances did so on state law or
unspecified grounds roughly equivalent to
1. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513521, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
2. In Nollan the Court recognized that a state
agency may condition the grant of a land use
permit on the dedication of a property interest, if
the dedication serves a legitimate police-power
purpose that would justify a refusal to issue the
permit. For the first time, however, it held that
such a condition is unconstitutional if tjie condition "utterly fails" to further a goal that would
justify the refusal. 483 U.S., at 837,107 SiCt., at
3148. In the Nollan Court's view, a condition

Nollan's ."essential nexus" requirement.
See, e.g., Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb.
240, 245-248, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301-302 (1980)
(ordinance lacking "reasonable relationship"
or "rational nexus" to property's use violated
Nebraska Constitution); J.E.D. Associates,
Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 583-585, 432
A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981) (state constitutional
grounds). One case pur|porting399 to apply
the strict "specifically and uniquely attributable" test established by Pioneer Trust &
Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 IU.2d
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), nevertheless
found that test was satisfied because the
legislature had decided that the subdivision
at issue created the need for a park or parks.
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P.2d 182,
187-188 (1964). In only one of the seven
cases upholding a land use regulation did the
losing property owner petition this Court for
certiorari. See Jordan v. Menomonee Falls,
28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal
dism'd, 385 U.S. 4, 87 S.Ct. 36, 17 L.Ed.2d 3
(1966) (want of substantial federal question).
Although 4 of the 12 opinions mention the
Federal Constitution—2 of those only in
passing—it is quite obvious that neither the
courts nor the litigants imagined they might
be participating in the development of a new
rule of federal law. Thus,, although these
state cases?: do lend support to the Court's
reaffirmance of Nollan's reasonable nexus
requirement, the role the Court accords them
in the announcement of its newly minted
second phase of the constitutional inquiry is
remarkably inventive.
would be constitutional even if it required the
Noilans to provide a viewing spot for passers-by
whose view of the ocean was obstructed by their
new house. Id., at 836, 107 S.Ct., at 3148.
"Although such a requirement, constituting a
permanent grant of continuous access to the
property, would have to be considered a taking if
it were not attached to a development permit, the
Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public's
view of the beach must surely include the power
to condition construction upon some concession
by the owner, even a concession of property
rights, that serves the same end." Ibid.
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In addition, the Court ignores the state
courts' willingness to consider what the property owner gains from the exchange in question. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for
example, found it significant that the village's
approval of a proposed subdivision plat "enables the subdivider to profit financially by
selling the subdivision lots as home-building
sites and thus realizing a greater price than
could have been obtained if he ha<^ sold his
property as unplatted lands." JordakvKMenomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d, at 6;9-620,V 1?7
N.W.2d, at 448. The required dedication as
a condition of that approval was permissible
"[i]n return for this benefit." Ibid. See also
Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn,,5, 1>1-13,
246 N.W.2d 19, 23-24 (1976) (citing Jordan);
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680
S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex.1984) (dedication requirement only triggered when developer
chooses |4ooto develop land). In this case,
moreover, Dolan's acceptance of the permit,
with its attached conditions, would provide
her with benefits that may well go beyond
any advantage she gets from expanding her
business. As the United States pointed out
at oral argument, the improvement that the
city's drainage plan contemplates would widen the channel and reinforce the slopes to
increase the carrying capacity during serious
floods, "conferring] considerable benefits'on
the property owners immediately adjacent to
the creek." Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42.'--**
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indication that the transfer of an interest in
realty was any more objectionable than a
cash payment. See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v.
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955,
218 N.E.2d 673 (1966); Jordan u Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5,
246 N.W.2d 19 (1976). None of the decisions
identified the surrender of the fee owner's
"power to exclude" as having any special
significance. Instead, the courts uniformly
examined the character of the entire economic transaction.

II
It is not merely state cases, but our own
cases as well, that require the analysis to
focus on the impact of the city's action on the
entire parcel of private property. In Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631
(1978), we stated that takings jurisprudence
"does not divide a single parcel Uoiinto discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated." Id, at 130-131, 98
S.Ct, at 2662. Instead, this Court focuses
"both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole." Ibid.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S.Ct. 318,
62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), reaffirmed the nondivisibility principle outlined in Penn Central,
stating that "[a]t least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one strand' of the bundle is
The state court decisions also. $ret enlightnot a taking, because the aggregate must be
ening in the extent to which they required viewed in its entirety." 444 U.S., at 65-66,
that the entire parcel be given controlling 100 S.Ct., at 327.3 As recently as last Term,
importance. All but one of the cases involve we approved the principle again. See Conchallenges to provisions in municipal ordi- crete Pipe & Products of CaL, Inc. v. Connances requiring developers to dedicate ei- struction Laborers Pension Trust for Southther a percentage of the entire parcel {usual- ern CaL, 508 U.S. 602, 644, 113 S.Ct. 2264,
ly 7 or 10 percent of the platted subdivision) 2290, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (explaining that
or an equivalent value in cash (usually a "a claimant's parcel of property [cannot] first
certain dollar amount per lot) to help finance be divided into what was taken and what was,
the construction of roads, utilities, schools, left" to demonstrate a compensable taking).*
parks, and playgrounds. In assessing j:he Although limitation of the right to exclude
legality of the conditions, the courts gave.no others undoubtedly constitutes a significant
3. Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v.
DeBenedwtis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-^99, 107 S.Ct.
1232, 1249, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987), we concluded that "[t]he 27 million tons of coal do not

constitute a separate segment of property for
takings law purposes" and that "[tjhere is no
basis for treating the less than 2% of petitioners'-'
coal as a separate parcel of property "
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infringement upon property ownership, Kai- compliance is sufficiently great to deter the
ser Aetna u United States, 444 U.S. 164, owner from proceeding with his planned de179-180, 100 S.Ct. 383, 393, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 velopment." Id., at 917. The city of Tigard
(1979), restrictions on that right do not alone has demonstrated that its plan is rational
constitute a taking, and do not do so in any *, and impartial and that the conditions at issue
event unless they "unreasonably impair the are "conducive to fulfillment of authorized
value or use" of the property. PruneYard planning objectives." Dolan, on the other
Shopping Center u Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82- hand, has offered no evidence that her bur84,100 S.Ct. 2035, 2041-2042, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 den of compliance has any impact at all on
(1980).
the value or profitability of her planned deThe Court's narrow focus on one strand i h \ velopment. Following the teaching of the
the property owner's bundle of rights is par- cases on which it purports to rely, the Court
ticularly misguided in a case involving the should not isolate the burden associated with
development of commercial property. As the loss of the power to exjclude^ from an
evaluation of the benefit to be derived from
Professor Johnston has noted:
the permit to enlarge the store and the park"The subdivider is a manufacturer, proing lot.
cesser, and marketer of a product; land is
but one of his raw materials. In subdiviThe Court's assurances that its "rough
sion control disputes, the developer is proportionality" test leaves ample room foi
|402not defending hearth and home against cities to pursue the "commendable task uf
the king's intrusion, but simply attempting
land use planning," ante, at 2322—even twice
to maximize his profits from the sale of a
avowing that "[n]o precise mathematical calfinished product. As applied to him, subculation is required," ante, at 2319, 2322—are
division control exactions are actually busiwanting given the result that test compels
ness regulations." Johnston, Constitutionhere. Under the Court's approach, a city
ality of Subdivision Control Exactions:
must not only "quantify its findings," ante, at
The Quest for A Rationale, 52 Cornell L.Q.
2322, and make "individualized determina871, 923 (1967).4
tion[s]" .with respect ^to the nature and the
The exactions associated with the' develop- extent of the relationship between the condiment of a retail business are likewise a spe- tions and the impact, ante, at 2319, 2320, but
cies of business regulation that heretofore also demonstrate "proportionality." The corwarranted a strong presumption of constitu- rect inquiry should instead concentrate on
tional validity.
whether the required nexus is present and
In Johnston's view, "if the municipality can venture beyond considerations .of a condidemonstrate that its assessment of financial tion's nature or germaneness only, if the deburdens against subdividers is rational, im- veloper establishes that a concededly gQipartial, and conducive to fulfillment of autho- mane condition is so grossly disproportionate
rized planning objectives, its action need be to the proposed development's adverse efinvalidated only in those extreme and pre- fects that it manifests motives .other than
sumably rare cases where the burden of land use regulation on the part of the city.5
deference" of Billings Properties, Inc v 'Yellow4. Johnston's article also sets forth a fair sumstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P 2d 182 (1964;
mary of the state cases fiom which the Court
52 Cornell L.Q., at 917.
purports to derive its "rough proportionality"
test. See 52 Cornell L.Q., at 917. Like the
r.Court, Johnston observed that cases requiring a 5. Dolan's attorney overstated the danger when
^"rational nexus" between exactions and public
he suggested at oral argument that without some
needs created by the new subdivision—especially
requirement for proportionality, "[t]he City could
'^Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137
have found that Mrs. Dolan's new store would
11
N.W.2d 442 (1965)—"steefr] a moderate course"
have increased traffic by one additional vehicle
between the "judicial obstructionism" of Pioneer
trip per day [and] could have required her to
dedicate 75, 95 percent of her land for a widenTrust & Savings Bank v, Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d
ing of Main Street." Tr. of Oral Arg 52-53
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), and the "excessive
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The heightened requirement the Court imposes on cities is even more unjustified when
all the tools needed to resolve the questions
presented by this case can be garnered from
our existing case law.

confining the city's condition in a manner this
Court would accept, her failure to seek that
narrower form of relief at any stage of the
state administrative and judicial proceedings
clearly should preclude that relief in this
Court now.

III
Applying its new standard, the Court finds
two defects in the city's case. First, while
the record would adequately support^ requirement that Dolan maintain the portion^of
the floodplain on her property as undeveloped open space, it • does not support the
additional requirement that the floodplain be
dedicated to the city. Ante, at 2320-2322.
Second, l^while the city adequately established the traffic increase that the proposed
development would generate, it failed to
quantify the offsetting decrease in automobile traffic that the bike path will produce.
Ante, at 2321-2322. Even under the Court's
new rule, both defects are, at most, nothing
more than harmless error.

The Court's rejection of the bike path condition amounts to nothing more than a play
on words. Everyone agrees that the bike
path "could" offset some of the increased
traffic flow that the larger store will generate, but the findings do not unequivocally
state that it mill do so, or tell us just how
many cyclists will replace motorists. Predictions on such matters are inherently nothing
more than estimates. Cerfcainly^s the assumption that there will be an offsetting
benefit here is entirely reasonable and should
suffice whether it amounts to 100 percent, 35
percent, or only 5 percent of the increase in
automobile traffic that would otherwise occur. If the Court proposes to have the federal judiciary micro-manage state decisions
of this kind, it is indeed extending its welcome mat to a significant new class of litigants. Although there is no reason to believe that state courts have failed to rise to
the task, property owners have surely found
a new friend today.

In her objections to the floodplain condition, Dolan made no effort to demonstrate
that the dedication of that portion of her
property would be any more onerous than a
simple prohibition against any develppment
on that portion of her property. ' Given the
commercial character of both tHe existing
and the proposed use of the property as a
retail store, it seems likely that potential
customers "trampling' along petitioner's
floodplain," ante, at 2320, are' more valuable
than a useless parcel of vacant land. Moreover, the duty to pay taxes and the responsibility for potential tort liability may well
make ownership of the fee interest in useless
land a liability rather than an asset. That
may explain why Dolan never conceded that
she could be prevented from building on the
floodplain. The city attorney. also pointed
out that absent a dedication, property owners
would be required to "build on their own
land" and "with their own money" a storage
facility for the water runoff. Tr. of Oral Arg.
30-31. Dolan apparently "did have that option," but chose not to seek it. Id, at 3i. If
Dolan might have been entitled to a variance
6. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 111 U.S. 726, 83

IV
The Court has made a serious eiror by
abandoning the traditional presumption of
constitutionality and imposing a novel burden
of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan. Even
more consequential than its incorrect disposition of this case, however, is the Court's
resurrection of a species of substantive due
process analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago.6
The Court begins its constitutional analysis
by citing Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed.
979 (1897), for the proposition that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is "applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963)
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Amendment." Ante, at 2316. That opinion,
however, contains no mention of either the
Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment;7 it
held that the protection afforded by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amende
ment extends to matters of substance as well
as procedure,8 and that the subjstance406 of
"the due process of law enjoined by the
Fourteenth Amendment requires compensation to be made or adequately secured-tp the
owner of private property taken for pubH<^
use under the authority of a State." 166
U.S., at 235, 236-241, 17 S.Ct, at 584, 584586. It applied the same kind of substantive
due process analysis more frequently identified with a better known case that accorded
similar substantive protection to a baker's
liberty interest in working 60 hours a week
and 10 hours a day. See Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937
(1905).y

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-433, 102 S.Ct. 3164,
3172-3175, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S., at 178-180,
100 S.Ct., at 392-393. Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when
he opined that a state law making it "commercially impracticable to mine certain coal"
had <4very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 414, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 67 L.Ed.
322 (1922). The so-called "regulatory
407takings" doctrine that the Holmes dictum10 kindled has an obvious kinship with
the line of substantive due process cases that
Lochner exemplified. Besides having similar
ancestry, both doctrines are potentially openended sources of judicial power to invalidate
state economic regulations that Members of
this Court view as unwise or unfair.

Later cases have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protection
against uncompensated deprivations of private property by the States as though it'
incorporated the text of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See, e.g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 481, n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1240, n.
10, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987). There was nothing problematic about that interpretation in
cases enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
against state action that involved the actual
physical invasion of private property. See

This case inaugurates an even more recent
judicial innovation than the regulatory takings doctrine: the application of the "unconstitutional conditions" label to a mutually
beneficial transaction between a property
owner and a city. The Court tells us that the
city's refusal to grant Dolan a discretionary
benefit infringes her right to receive just
compensation for the property interests that
she has refused to dedicate to the city
"where the property sought has little or no
relationship to the benefit." n Although it is

7. An earlier case deemed it "well settled" that
the Takings Clause "is a limitation on the power
of the Federal government, and not on the
States." Pumpelly v Green Bay Co., 13 Wall.
166, 177, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1872).
8. The Court held that a State "may not, by any of
its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities
may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing forms of procedure in the courts and give the
parties interested the fullest opportunity to be
heard, and yet it might be that its final action
would be inconsistent with that amendment. In
determining what is due process of law regard
must be had to substance, not to form." Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234235, 17 S.Ct. 581, 584, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897).

9. The Lochner Court refused to presume that
there was a reasonable connection between the
regulation and the state interest in protecting the
public health. 198 U.S , at 60-61, 25 S.Ct., at
544. A similar refusal to identify a sufficient
nexus between an enlarged building with a newly
paved parking lot and the state interests in minimizing the risks of flooding and traffic congestion proves fatal to the city's permit conditions in
this case under the Court's novel approach.
10. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S., at 484, 107 S.Ct., at 1241
(explaining why this portion of the opinion was
merely "advisory").
11. Ante, at 2317. The Court's entire explanation
reads: "Under the well-settled doctrine of 'un-
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well settled that a government cannot deny a
benefit on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests—"especially [one's]
interest in freedom of speech," Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694,
2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)—the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine provides,an inadequate framework in which to analyze this
case.12
I^Dolan has no right to be compensated
for a taking unless the city acquires the
property interests that she has refused to
surrender. Since no taking has yet occurred,
there has not been any infringement of her
constitutional right to compensation. See'
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17, llO'S.Ct:
914, 921-924, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 -<1990) (finding
takings claim premature because property
owner had not yet sought compensation under Tucker Act); Model v. Virginia Surface.
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 294-295, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370,', 69
L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (no taking where no one
"identified any property ... that has allegedly been taken").
Even if Dolan should accept the city's conditions in exchange for the benefit that she
seeks, it would not necessarily follow that she
had been denied "just compensation" since it
would be appropriate to consider the receipt
constitutional conditions/ the government' may
not require a person to give up a constitutional
right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a pubjic use—in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by
the government where the benefit sought has
little or no relationship to the property."
12. Although it has a long history, see Home Ins
Co v Morse, 20 Wall 445, 451, 22 L.Ed. 365
(1874), the "unconstitutional conditions" 'doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it has never been-an
overarching principle of constitutional law' that
operates with equal force regardless of. the nature of the rights and powers in question:.' • See,
e.g., Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B.U.L.Rev.
593, 620 (1990) (doctrine is "too crude and too
general to provide help in contested cases");
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102-Harv.
L.Rev. 1415, 1416 (1989) (doctrine is "riven with
inconsistencies"); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum.L.Rev.
321, 322 (1935) ("The Supreme Court has sustained many such exertions of power even after
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of that benefit in any calculation of "just
compensation." See Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160
(noting that an "average reciprocity of advanv
tage" was deemed to justify many laws);
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715, 107 S.Ct.
2076, 2082, 95 L.Ed.2d 668 (1987) (such
" 'reciprocity of advantage' " weighed in favor
of a statute's constitutionality).^ Particularly in the absence of any evidence on the
jpoint, we should not presume that the discretionary benefit the city has offered is less
valuable than the property interests that Dolan can retain or surrender at her option.
But even if that discretionary benefit were so
trifling that it could not be considered just
compensation when it has "little or no relationship" to the property, the Court fails to
explain why the same value would suffice
when the required nexus is present. In this
respect, the Court's reliance on the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine is assuredly
novel, and arguably incoherent. The city's
conditions are by no means immune from
constitutional scrutiny. The level of scrutiny, however, does not approximate the kind
of review that would apply if the city had
insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First
Amendment rights in exchange for a building
announcing the broad doctrine that would invalidate them"). As the majority's case citations
suggest, ante, at 2316, modern decisions invoking
the doctrine have most frequently involved First
Amendment liberties, see also, e g, Connick v
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-144, 103 S.Ct. 1684,
1688, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), Elrod v Burns,
All U.S. 347, 361-363, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684, 49
L E d . 2 d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion), Sherbert
v Verner, 374 U.S 398, 404, 83 S Ct 1790, 1794,
10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Speiser v Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518-519, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338, 2
L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). But see Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
328, 345-346, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 2979, 92 L.Ed.2c?
266 (1986) ("[T]ne greater power to completely
ban casino gambling necessarily includes the
lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling"). The necessary and traditional breadth
of municipalities' power to regulate property development, together with the absence here of
fragile and easily "chilled" constitutional rights
such as that of free speech, make it quite clear
that the Court is really writing on a clean slate
rather than merely applying "well-settled" doctrine. Ante, at 2316.
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permit. One can only hope that the Court's
reliance today on First Amendment cases,
see ante, at 2317 (citing Perry v. Svfidermann, supra, and Picketing v. Board of Ed.
of Toivnship High School Dist. 205, Will
Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 173;, 1734,
20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)), and its' candid disavowal of the term ."rational basis" -to describe
its new standard of review, see ante, at 2319,
do not signify a reassertion of the kin^ of
superlegislative power the Court exercised
during the Lochner era.
The Court has decided to apply its heightened scrutiny to a single strand—the'power
to exclude—in the bundle of rights that enables a commercial enterprise to flourish in
an urban environment. That intangible interest is undoubtedly worthy of constitutional
protection—much like the grandmother's interest in deciding which of her relatives njay
share her home in Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L,Ed.2d 531
(1977). Both interests are. protected:&9m
arbitrary state action by. the Due Pro<;es$
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment..nJt is,
however, a curious irony that Members of
the majority in this case would impose -an
almost insurmountable burden of proof on
the property owner in the Moore ..case
J4iowhile saddling the city with a heightened
burden in this case.13
In its application of what is essentially the
doctrine of substantive due process, the
Court confuses the past with the*' present.
On November 13, 1922, the village of Euclid,
Ohio, adopted a zoning ordinance that effectively confiscated 75 percent of the value of
property owned by the Ambler Realty' Com13. The author of today's opinion joined Justice
Stewart's dissent in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531' (1977)?
There the dissenters found it sufficient, in response to my argument that the zoning ordinance was an arbitrary regulation of property
rights, that "if the ordinance is a rational attempt
to promote 'the city's interest in preserving the
character of its neighborhoods,' Young v. American Mini Theatres (Inc J 427 U.S. 50, 71 [96
S.Ct. 2440, 2452, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976)] (opinion of STEVENS, J.), it is . . . a permissible
restriction on the use of private property under
Euclid v. Ambler Really Co., Ill U.S. 365 [47
.S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)], and Nectow v.

pany. Despite its recognition that such an
ordinance *!would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive" at an earlier date, the
Court (over the dissent of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler) upheld the
ordinance. Today's majority should heed the
words of Justice Sutherland:
"Such regulations are sustained, under the
complex conditions of our day, for reason*
analogous to those which justify traffic
regulations, which, before the advent of
automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the
meaning of constitutional guaranties never
varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract 141 ito meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation.
In a changing world, it is impossible that it
should be .otherwise." Village of Euclid v
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47
S.Ct U4,118, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
In pur changing world one thing is certain
uncertainty will characterize predictions
about the impact of new urban developments
on, the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic
congestion, or environmental harms. When
there is doubt concerning the magnitude oi
those impacts, the public interest in averting
them must outweigh the private interest of
the commercial entrepreneur. If the government can demonstrate that the conditions it
has imposed in a land use permit are rational, impartial and conducive to fulfilling the
aims of a valid land use plan, a strong preCambridge, 277 U.S. 183 [48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed
842 (1928)]." Id., 431 U.S., at 540, n. 10, 97
S.Ct,, at 1956, n. 10. The dissent went oa to
state that my calling the city to task for failing tu
explain the need for enacting the ordinance:
"placefd] the burden on the wrong pany " Ibid
(emphasis added). Recently, two other Member
of today's majority severely criticized the holding
in Moore. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U S
26, 40-42, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2027, 129 L Ed 2 J 22
(1994) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment; btc
also id., at 39, 114 S.Ct at 2020 (SCALIA, J
concurring in judgment) (calling the docttine oi
substantive due process "an oxymoron").
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sumption of validity should attach to those
conditions. The burden of demonstrating
that those conditions have unreasonably impaired the economic value of the proposed
improvement belongs squarely on the shoulders of the party challenging the state action's constitutionality. That allocation of
burdens has served us well in the past. The
Court has stumbled badly today by reversing
it.
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merely an application of Nollan's nexus
analysis. As the Court notes, "[i]f petitioner's proposed development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the
city, it would have been reasonable to require
petitioner to provide some alternative greenway space for the public." Ante, at 2321.
But that, of course, was not the fact, and the
city of Tigard never sought to justify the
public access portion of the dedication as
related to flood control. It merely argued
I respectfully dissent.
that whatever recreational uses were made of
the
bicycle path and the 1-foot edge on eiJustice SOUTER, dissenting.
ther side were incidental to the permit condiThis case, like Nollan v. California Coast- tion requiring dedication of the 15-foot easeal Comm% 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 ment for an 8-foot-wide bicycle path and for
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), invites the Court to ex- flood control, including open space requireamine the relationship between conditions ments and relocation of the bank of the river
imposed by development permits, requiring by some 5 feet. It seems to me such incidenlandowners to dedicate portions of their land tal recreational use can stand or fall with the
for use by the public, and governmental in- bicycle path, which the city justified by referterests in mitigating the adverse effects of ence to traffic congestion. As to the relasuch development. Nollan declared the need
tionship the Court examines, between the
for a nexus between the nature 'of an exacrecreational easement and a purpose never
tion of an interest in land (a beach* easement)
and the nature of governmental interests. put forth as a justification by the city, the
The Court treats this case as raising a fur- Court unsurprisingly finds a recreation area
ther question, not about the nature, but to be unrelated to flood control.
about the degree, of connection1 required between such an exaction and the |4i2adverse _|4i3Second, as to the bicycle path, the Court
effects of development. The Court's opinion again acknowledges the "theoretically]" reaannounces a test to address this question, but sonable relationship between "the city's atas I read the opinion, the Court does not tempt to reduce traffic congestion by providapply that test to these facts, which do not ing [a bicycle path] for alternative means of
transportation," ante, at 2318, and the "cor-J
raise the question the Court addresses.
rect" finding of the city that "the larger
First, as to the floodplain and greenway, retail sales facility proposed by petitioner,
the Court acknowledges that an easement of will increase traffic on the streets of the
this land for open space (and presumably
Central Business District," ante, at 2321,
including the five feet required for needed
The Court only faults the city for saying that
creek channel improvements) is reasonably
the bicycle path "could" rather than "would"
related to flood control, see ante, at 23172318, 2320, but argues that the "permanent offset the increased traffic from the store,
recreational easement" for the public on the ante, at 2322. That again, as far as I can
greenway is not so related, see ante, at 2320- tell, is an application of Nollan, for the Court
2321. If that is so, it is not because of any holds that the stated connection ("could offlack of proportionality between permit condi- set") between traffic congestion and bicycle
tion and adverse effect, but because of a lack paths is too tenuous; only if the bicycle path
of any rational connection at all between "would" offset the increased traffic by some
exaction of a public recreational area and the amount could the bicycle path be said to be
governmental interest in providing for the related to the city's legitimate interest in
effect of increased water runoff. That is reducing traffic congestion.
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I cannot agree that the application of Nol- PenneU v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20, 108 S.Ct.
lan is a sound one here, since it appears that 849, 862, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (SCALIA, J.,
the Court has placed the burden of producing concurring in part and dissenting in part).
evidence of relationship on the city, despite The bicycle path permit condition is fundathe usual rule in cases involving the police \ mentally no different from these.
power that the government is presumed to
In any event, on my reading, the Court's
have acted constitutionally.* Having, thus conclusions about the city's vulnerability carassigned the burden, the Court concludes ry the Court no further than Nollan has
that the city loses based on one word gone already, and I do not view this case as a
("could" instead of "would"), and despite the suitable vehicle for taking the law beyond
fact that this record shows the connection thex\ that point. The right case for the enunciCourt looks for. Dolan has put forward no ation of takings doctrine seems hard to spot.
evidence that Uuthe burden of granting a See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coundedication for the bicycle path is unrelated in cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2925,
kind to the anticipated increase in traffic 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (statement of SOUTcongestion, nor, if there exists a requirement ER, J.).
that the relationship be related in degree,
has Dolan shown that the exaction fails any
rw
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
such test. The city, by contrast, calculated
•++•*+*> S>
the increased traffic flow that would result
from Dolan's proposed development to be 435
trips per day, and its Comprehensive Plan,
applied here, relied on studies showing the
link between alternative modes of transporta512 ILS, 415, 129 L.Ed.2d 336
tion, including bicycle paths, and reduced
4_15HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD,
street traffic congestion. See, e.g., App. to
et al. Petitioners,
Brief for Respondent A-5, quoting City of
Tigard's Comprehensive Plan (" 'Bicycle and
pedestrian pathway systems will resultr in
Karl L. OBERG.
some reduction of automobile trips within the
No. 93-644.
community'"). Nollan, therefore, is satisArgued April 20, 1994.
fied, and on that assumption the city's conditions should not be held to fail {a further
Decided June 24, 1994..
rough proportionality test or any other that
might be devised to give meaning to the
constitutional limits. As Members of this
Products liability action was brought
Court have said before, "the common zoning against manufacturer of all-terrain vehicle
regulations requiting subdividers to . . . dedi- (ATV), to recover for injuries suffered in
cate certain areas to public streets, are in accident. The Oregon Circuit Court entered
accord with our constitutional traditions be- judgment on jury verdict awarding plaintiff
cause the proposed property use would oth- compensatory damages and $5 million in puerwise be the cause of excessive congestion." nitive damages, and manufacturer appealed.
* See, e.g, Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594-596, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990,, 8 L.Ed.2d 130
(1962); United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S.
52, 60, 110 S.Ct. 387, 393-394, 107 L.Ed.2d 290
(1989). The majority characterizes this case as
involving an "adjudicative decision" to impose
permit conditions, ante, at 2390, n. 8, but the
permit conditions were imposed pursuant to Tigard's Community Development Code. See, e.g.,
§ 18.84.040, App. to Brief for Respondent B-26.

The adjudication here was of Dolan's requested
variance from the permit conditions otherwise
required to be imposed by the Code This case
raises no question about discriminatory, or "reverse spot," zoning, which "singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment
than the neighboring ones." Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132,
98 S.Ct. 2646, 2663, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978).
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evidence, in my view, of market value in J., sustained validity of the park improvethis case. Even if it be conceded that the ment fee, and granted city's motion to displaintiff's out-of-court statement as to the miss as to it and held the advance collection
value of the well is sufficient to establish of water connection fee contrary to statutothe value of the well, the testimony falls far ry law and granted subdividers' motion for
short of providing a reasonable basis for summary judgment and both sides appealdetermining market value of the whole par- ed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that
cel without a working well. Surely in this advance collection of water connection fee
case such evidence would not have been from subdivider and a park improvement
hard to come by. The point cannot be fee designed to raise funds to enlarge and
avoided by the general principle that someN - improve sewer and water systems and recx
uncertainty in evidence of damage is to be
reational opportunities would be valid proexpected. That principle has especial applivided they were reasonable.
cation in cases dealing with lost profits
Reversed and remanded.
because of lost sales, see Winsness v. M. J.
Conoco Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d
Howe, J., filed separate opinion concur1303 (1979); loss of good will; losses occa- ring in part and dissenting in part in which
sioned by inability to reduce unit costs; etc.
Maughan, C. J., joined.
These types of losses inevitably are burdened with considerable uncertainty be- 1. Waters and Water Courses <3=*203(6)
cause of the nature of the factors which
Advance collection of water connection
must be considered. Market value, as a fee from subdivider and a park improvemeasure of damages, may give rise to con- ment fee designed to raise funds to enlarge
flicting testimony, but the basic factors to and improve sewer and water systems and
be considered are not so difficult to evalu- recreational opportunities would be valid
ate. In any event, there must be some provided they were reasonable.
evidence of market value, and there is none.
2. Municipal Corporations <&=»712
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opinWaters and Water Courses <^203(6)
ion of STEWART, J.
To comply with standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee related to services like
water and sewer must not require newly
developed properties to bear more than
BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, McKean Construction Compa- their equitable share of the capital costs in
ny, Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc., a relation to benefits conferred.
Utah corporation, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a municipal corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16872.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 3, 1981.
Subdividers brought suit against city to
challenge the validity of water connection
and park improvement fees imposed as a
condition to connection to the city water
main and as a condition to final approval of
the subdividers* plat. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder,

3. Municipal Corporations <s=»458
To determine equitable share of the
capital costs to be borne by newly developed properties, a municipality should determine the relative burdens previously
borne and yet to be borne by those properties in comparison with the other properties
in the municipality as a whole and important factors to consider include: (1) the cost
of existing capital facilities; (2) manner of
financing existing capital facilities; (3) relative extent to which newly developed
properties and other properties in municipality have already contributed to cost of
existing capital facilities; (4) relative extent to which newly developed properties

900

Utah

631 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

and other properties in municipality will
contribute to cost of existing capital facilities in the future; (5) extent to which municipality is requiring new developers or
owners to provide common facilities that
have been provided by municipality and financed through general taxation or other
means; (6) extraordinary costs in servicing
newly developed properties; and (7) timeprice differential inherent in fair comparisons of amounts paid at different times.
4. Municipal Corporations <3=>458
In determining reasonableness of a fee
for municipal services, courts must concede
municipalities the flexibility necessary to
deal realistically with questions not susceptible of exact measurement and precise
mathematical equality is neither feasible
nor constitutionally vital.
5. Municipal Corporations <3=*167
Municipal officials must have legal
power to deal creatively with extraordinary
or unforeseen circumstances in provision of
municipal services.
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 122(2)
A municipality's exercise of its legislative powers is entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality.
7. Water and Water Courses <s=>203(12)
Zoning and Planning <s=>685
As the information that must be used to
assure that sudivision fees are within the
standard of reasonableness is most accessible
to the municipality, that body should disclose
the basis of its calculations to whoever
challenges the reasonableness of its subdivision or water hookup fees.
8. Water and Water Courses <s=*203(12)
Zoning and Planning <s=»685
Once the municipality has disclosed the
basis of its calculations for its subdivision or
water hookup fees to those who challenge
the reasonableness of the fees, the burden of
showing failure to comply with constitutional standard of reasonableness is on the
challengers.
9. Municipal Corporations @=*458
Park improvement fees should be fixed
so as to be equitable in light of relative
benefits conferred on, as well as relative

burdens previously borne and yet to be
borne by, newly developed properties in
comparison with the other properties in municipality as a whole and fees should not
exceed^amount sufficient to equalize the
relevant benefits and burdens of newly developed and other properties.
Michael J. Mazuran, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
John H. McDonald, Craig S. Cook, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
OAKS, Justice:
This is a suit by three subdividers against
a city to challenge the validity of water
connection and park improvement fees imposed as a condition to connection to the
city water main and as a condition to final
approval of the subdividers' plat. At issue
in this appeal are the legality of any such
fees, and, if they are legal, the criteria for
judging their reasonableness.
The procedure for charging the park improvement fee does not appear in the record. City Ordinance 13-1-5, which the subdividers concede was lawfully enacted and
constitutional, requires a subdivider who
desires to connect to the city water system
to enter into an agreement "specifying the
terms and conditions under which the water
extensions and connection shall be made
and the payment that shall be required."
Paragraph 10 of the agreement form adopted by the city and required of all subdividers before plat approval obligates the subdividers to pay the entire cost of all water
lines required to service the subdivision,
including extensions from existing water
mains and all connecting lines within the
subdivision. It also provides that "the City
shall charge the Applicant a connection fee
in the amount of $
for each individual dwelling unit to be served within the
subdivision, which sum shall be payable in
full to the City before the subdivision system is connected to any existing City water
mains." The required connection fee was
$800 for a 3/i-inch line and $1,000 for a
1-inch line.
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Objecting that the collection of the water
connection fees in advance from the developer constituted an unlawful tax and an
unconstitutional taking of property without
due process, the subdividers sought injunctive relief. They challenged the city's park
improvement fee of $235 per lot on the
same basis. They also attacked both fees as
discriminatory.
On motions in advance of trial, the^district court (1) sustained the validity of the.
park improvement fee and granted the
city's motion to dismiss as to it, and (2) held
the advance collection of the water connection fee contrary to statutory law, granted
the subdividers' motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoined the city
from its enforcement. Both the city and
the subdividers have appealed.
I.
THE VALIDITY OF WATER
CONNECTION AND PARK
IMPROVEMENT FEES
[1] The district court ruled that the advance collection of the water connection fee
was rendered illegal by the combined effect
of U.C.A., 1953, § 10-8-38 and § 17-6-22.
Section 10-8-38 empowers the city, for the
purpose of defraying costs of construction
or operation of a sewer system, to require
mandatory hookup and payment of charges
when a sewer is available and within 300
feet of any property containing a building
used for human occupancy. Section 17-622 provides that a municipal corporation
which contracts with an improvement district for sewage services shall have authority to make service charges to parties who
connect to its sewer system. If the municipality also operates a waterworks system,
the section provides that these charges
"may be combined with the charge made
for water furnished by the water system
and may be collected and the collection
thereof secured in the same manner as that
specified in Section 10-8-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953."
Because § 10-8-38 does not authorize the
charging of a sewer connection fee in the
case of vacant lots, and because § 17-6-22
provides that the city may collect water

fees in the same manner as § 10-8-38 authorizes for the collection of sewer fees, the
combination of these two statutes is urged
to forbid cities from collecting water fees in
circumstances not authorized for sewer
fees. This does not follow. Section 17-622 is permissive, not mandatory. It poses
no statutory prohibition against the collection of a water connection fee from a subdivider for each lot in a subdivision at the
time the subdivision is hooked up to the city
. water system.
The validity of a sewer connection fee to
raise money to enlarge and improve a sewer
system was sustained by this Court in
Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah
2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972), discussed hereafter. In a decision issued after the trial
court acted in this case, we sustained a
municipality's power to withhold the privilege of city water service until a landowner
had paid a valid municipal sewer connection
fee. Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610
P.2d 338 (1980). In two other decisions
issued after the trial court acted in this
case, we sustained a municipality's requirement that subdividers dedicate a portion of
subdivision land for recreational purposes
(or pay cash in lieu) as a condition of final
approval of their plat. Call v. City of West
Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979). On
rehearing in this same case, we held that
the reasonableness of the dedication or cash
requirement in a particular case was a question of fact that must be resolved at trial.
Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d
1257 (1980).
These four decisions have resolved the
legality of water connection and park improvement fees designed to raise funds to
enlarge and improve sewer and water systems and recreational opportunities, as well
as the legality of conditioning water hookups or plat approval on their collection.
However, these decisions leave open the
question of the reasonableness of any individual fee charged or land dedication required. This question of reasonableness
must be resolved on the facts in each particular case. We therefore reverse both judgments and remand the entire case for trial
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on the reasonableness of the fees the city
has imposed in this case.
Because this case is being remanded for
trial, it is appropriate for this Court to
elaborate on the constitutional standards of
reasonableness that should govern the validity of subdivision charges such as these.
II.
THE REASONABLENESS OF SUBDIVISION FEES IN GENERAL
Like so many other municipalities in this
state, the City of South Jordan confronts
the problems of providing a fast-growing
city with adequate services for water, sewer, recreation, and other common needs. In
1978, the city had to deal with the development of about 600 lots (including the 400 in
subdividers' development), up from about
65 in prior years. Such growth puts a
severe strain on the financial and personnel
resources of a small municipality, and if not
properly managed could well overburden
common facilities like water and sewer to
the point where their service would deteriorate severely for the existing occupants and
be inadequate for the new ones. An appropriate way to provide adequately for such
services is by advance planning and financing.
The conventional means of financing municipal facilities are tax revenues, special
assessments, and bonding. In addition, in
recent years many local governmental units
in this country have employed subdivision
plat controls to require fees, such as the
water and park fees involved in this case,
that force developers to contribute to the
centralized capital costs of municipal services in addition to the concededly valid
localized costs applicable solely to their development. The courts of this state and
others have approved the legality of such
fees, but are still struggling to define the
limits of reasonableness that must be imposed upon their amount. 1 Without legal
limits—imposed by statute or constitution—
subdivision charges could easily be used to
avoid statutory requirements for bonding
1. J. Johnson, "Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale,"
52 Cornell L.Q. 871 (1967); Heyman & Gilhool,
"The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents

municipal improvements, statutory limits
on municipal taxation, and legal limits on
restrictive or exclusionary zoning.
The subdividers argue that the water and
park fees far exceed the city's costs in
respect to these matters and that the excess
would be used in the city's general operating fund. The city maintains in its brief in
this Court that the water connection fees
would be used to enlarge water lines and
storage and pumping facilities, and the
park improvement fees would be used to
enlarge and develop city parks. The parties
differ on whether such an intent was secured by enforceable restriction, such as
deposit to a separate fund. These contentions, all relevant to reasonableness, are
matters for consideration at trial.
The subdividers also argue that the water
connection fee cannot be imposed on the
developer, but must be deferred for imposition on the lot owner or homeowner at the
time of hookup. We find this argument
unpersuasive. .This is not a case where the
party burdened with the exaction will derive no benefit from it.2 When the subdivision is connected to the city's water and
sewer systems, the city must be prepared to
perform its services on demand, and from
that fact the subdividers .derive immediate
benefit. The provision of standby capacity
to a subdivision requires the commitment of
substantial capital. The city does not have
to wait until someone turns on a tap or
flushes a toilet before it requires participation in the cost of providing its services.
Subject to the requirements of reasonableness discussed below, a hookup fee that
requires a subdivider to make advance payment of some portion of the common capital
costs attributable to committing service to
the lots in the subdivision is valid. The
same is true of the park improvement fee.
The proceedings on remand in this case
will be governed by two leading decisions of
this Court, one dealing with a municipal
service that employs an expensive central
Through Subdivision Exactions," 73 Yale L.J.
1119 (1964).
2.

City and County of Denver v. Greenspoon,
140 Colo. 402, 344 P.2d 679 (1959).
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facility like water or sewer, and the other
with a municipal service that employs dispersed resources like recreational land.
Though the standards of reasonableness in
these two circumstances are essentially the
same, their application is somewhat different. The two different types of charges
will therefore be discussed separately.

The Home Builders case established the
principle upon which the reasonableness of
the water connection fee in this case should
be judged. The "fair contribution" of the
connecting party should not exceed "the
expense thereof met by others." Or, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court held in a subsequent case, the rules governing the allocation of improvement costs between city and
III.
developer
REASONABLENESS OF WATER
would ideally have been such as to insure,
CONNECTION FEE
to the greatest extent practicable^ that
[2] Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City,
the cost of extending a municipal water
28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972), susfacility would fall equitably upon those
tained the validity of a sewer connection
who are similarly situated and in a just
fee (in addition to the monthly sewer
proportion to benefits conferred. They
charge) for each living unit of newly conshould be sufficiently flexible to permit
structed buildings connected to an existing
consideration to be given to the facts and
sewer system. The fee was imposed in
circumstances of each particular case.
order to improve and enlarge the sewer Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E
system. It was not a revenue measure or Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505
an assessment, the court found, but "a rea- (1972). Therefore, where the fee charged a
sonable charge for the use thereof," as au- new subdivision or a new property hookup
thorized by U.C.A., 1953, § 10-8-38. Sig- exceeds the direct costs incident thereto (as
nificantly, the $100-per-lot charge was de- a means of sharing the costs of common
rived by dividing the total number of sewer facilities), the excess must survive measure
connections in the municipality into the net against the standard that the total costs
value of the sewer system, and the funds "fall equitably upon those who are similarly
obtained were to be restricted to the en- situated and in a just proportion to benefits
largement, improvement, and operation of conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply
the sewer system and to the retirement of with the standard of reasonableness, a muindebtedness incurred in its construction. nicipal fee related to services like water and
sewer must not require newly developed
In approving the sewer connection fee in
properties to bear more than their equitable
Home Builders, this Court relied on Airwick
share of the capital costs in relation to
Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Aubenefits conferred.
thority, 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18 (1970).
[3] To determine the equitable share of
That case approved a connection fee arthe
capital costs to be borne by newly derangement by which the capital and interveloped
properties, a municipality should
est costs of a new central sewage system,
although met initially by the actual users, determine the relative burdens previously
would ultimately be borne by all properties borne and yet to be borne by those properbenefited, including lands that were unim- ties in comparison with the other properties
proved when the central expenditures were in the municipality as a whole; the fee in
originally made. The municipality did this question should not exceed the amount sufby including as part of its connection fee ficient to equalize the relative burdens of
what our Court characterized as "a sum of newly developed and other properties.
money which would represent a fair contriAmong the most important factors the
bution by the connecting party toward the municipality should consider in determining
expense theretofore met by others." 3
the relative burden already borne and yet
3s Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah
2d at 405, 503 P.2d at 453.
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to be borne by newly developed properties reasonableness, the courts must concede
and other properties are the following, sug- municipalities the flexibility necessary to
gested by the well-reasoned authorities cit- deal realistically with questions not susceped below: (1) the cost of existing capital tible of exact measurement. Precise mathfacilities; (2) the manner of financing exist- ematical equality "is neither feasible nor
ing capital facilities (such as user charges, constitutionally vital." Airwick Industries,
special assessments, bonded indebtedness, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Authority, sugeneral taxes, or federal grants); (3) the pra, 270 A.2d at 26. Similarly, municipal
relative extent to which the newly devel- officials must also have the legal power to
oped properties and the other properties in .vdeal creatively with extraordinary or unthe municipality have already contributed foreseen circumstances in the provision of
to the cost of existing capital facilities (by municipal services. Rose v. Plymouth
such means as user charges, special assess- Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946).
ments, or payment from the proceeds of
We agree with and adopt the New Jersey
general taxes); (4) the relative extent to
court's ruling in Deerfield Estates, Inc. v.
which the newly developed properties and
Township of E. Brunswick, supra, 286 A.2d
the other properties in the municipality will
at 507-508:
contribute to the cost of existing capital
The rule we lay down must be given a
facilities in the future; (5) the extent to
pragmatic
application. Complete equaliwhich the newly developed properties are
ty
of
treatment
may sometimes be imposentitled to a credit because the municipality
sible, especially where a municipality has
is requiring their developers or owners (by
followed
no set pattern with respect to
contractual arrangement or otherwise) to
past
extensions.
Nor should a municipalprovide common facilities (inside or outside
ity be denied the right to modify an esthe proposed development) that have been
tablished pattern where altered circumprovided by the municipality and financed
stances
reasonably so dictate. Equality
through general taxation or other means
of treatment may upon occasion be forced
(apart from user charges) in other parts of
to give way before some supervening
the municipality; (6) extraordinary costs, if
any, in servicing the newly developed proppublic interest. But insofar as such
erties; and (7) the time-price differential
equality can reasonably be achieved this
inherent in fair comparisons of amounts
must be done.
paid at different times. Home Builders v.
[6-8] The required flexibility will be imProvo City, supra; Rose v. Plymouth Town,
plemented by the presumption of constitu110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946); Airwick
tionality incident to a municipality's exerIndustries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Aucise of its legislative powers. Call v. City of
thority, supra; Deerfield Estates, Inc. v.
West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258
Township of E. Brunswick, supra; West
(1980);
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners
Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48
f
N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966); Rutan Estates, Ass n, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., Utah, 545
Inc. v. Town of Belleville, 56 NJ.Super. 330, P.2d 1150 (1976); Dowse v. Salt Lake City
152 A.2d 853 (App.Div.1959); Zehman Con- Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953).
struction Co. v. City of Eastlake, 92 Ohio Since the information that must be used to
Law Abst. 364, 195 N.E.2d 361 (CtApp. assure that subdivision fees are within the
1962); Strahan v. City of Aurora, 38 Ohio standard of reasonableness is most accessiMisc. 37, 311 N.E.2d 876 (Ct.Com.Pleas, ble to the municipality, that body should
1973); R. Ellickson, "Suburban Growth disclose the basis of its calculations to whoControls: An Economic and Legal Analy- ever challenges the reasonableness of its
sis," 86 Yale L.J. 385, 467-89 (1977); F. subdivision or hookup fees. Once that is
Michelman & T. Sandalow, Government in done, the burden of showing failure to comUrban Areas, 533-36 (1970).
ply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness
in this matter is on the chal[4, 5] In adjudicating the validity of any
lengers.
Home
Builders Ass'n of Greater
individual application of this standard of
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Kansas City v. City of Kansas Cityt Mo., 555
S.W.2d 832 (1977).
IV.
REASONABLENESS OF PARK
IMPROVEMENT FEE
[9] In Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah,
606 P.2d 217 (1979), opinion on rehearing,
614 P.2d 1257 (1980), this Court upheld the
validity of a city ordinance that required
subdividers, as a condition of plat^tpproval,
to dedicate certain proposed subdivision
land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for
flood control and/or park and recreation
facilities. In remanding the case for trial
on the constitutionality of the ordinance as
applied (i. e., the requirement that seven
percent of the subdivision land be dedicated), this Court ruled that "the dedication
should have some reasonable relationship to
the need created by the subdivision." Id. at
1258. The Court quoted the following from
Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kansas
City v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 555 S.W.2d
832, 835 (1977):
[I]f the burden cast upon the subdivider
is reasonably attributable to his activity,
then the requirement [of dedication or
fees in lieu thereof] is permissible; if not,
it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention
of the constitutional prohibitions rather
than a reasonable regulation under the
police power.4
Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to a higher standard of rationality
than the requirement that its actions not be
arbitrary or capricious.
Under the reasonableness test in Call v.
City of West Jordan, supra, the benefits
derived from the exaction need not accrue
solely to the subdivision (614 P.2d at 1259);
flood control and recreation are needs that
cannot be treated in isolation from the rest
of the municipality. At the same time, the
benefits derived from the exaction must be
of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivision (Id. at 1259).
As with water connection fees, the
amount of such exactions or fees should be
such that the burden of providing these
4.

Call v City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d at 1259.

municipal services "falls equitably upon
those who are similarly situated and in a
just proportion to benefits conferred."
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E.
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505
(1971). The measurement of "benefits conferred" may have a more significant impact
on the reasonableness of park fees than on
water connection fees. The central facilities that support water and sewer service
would generally confer the same benefits in
every part of the municipality, but the benefits conferred by recreational, flood control, or other dispersed resources may be
measurably different in different parts of
the municipality. Park improvement fees
should therefore be fixed so as to be equitable in light of the relative benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens
previously borne and yet to be borne by the
newly developed properties in comparison
with the other properties in the municipality as a whole. The fees in question should
not exceed the amount sufficient to equalize the relative benefits and burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
The factors to be considered in the determination of relative burden are similar to
the factors discussed in Part III in connection with water connection fees. The flexibility to be tolerated within the presumption of regularity and the disclosure of the
basis of calculation specified in Part III is
also applicable to this type of subdivision
charge.
The judgments of the trial court are reversed in the appeal and the cross-appeal,
and the cause is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. No costs
awarded.
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur that the defendant city may
lawfully require water connection fees to be
paid at the time the main line running
through the subdivision is connected to the
city system and water is brought to the
edge of each lot. I arrive at this conclusion
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in view of the authority invested in cities
and towns to "construct, maintain and operate waterworks," § 10-8-14 U.C.A.1953; to
"fix the rates to be paid for the water use,"
§ 10-8-22; and to "enact ordinances, rules
and regulations for the management and
conduct of the waterworks system owned or
controlled by it," § 10-7-14. It is not unreasonable to require payment of the connection fee when the water is turned into
the main line coursing through the subdivision because at that time the defendant city
is obligated to furnish water to each and
every lot as requested. In order to prepare
to do this, the defendant city had to make
capital expenditures to enlarge its capacity
so that it could meet the new demands to be
imposed upon it. I concur that § 10-8-38 is
not a prohibition against advance collection.
I also concur with the criteria of reasonableness contained in Parts III and IV of the
majority opinion.
I dissent, however, from the holding in
the majority opinion that the city may lawfully impose park improvement fees. I concur with the reasoning of Justice Wilkins in
his dissenting opinion in Call v. City of
West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979).
The imposition of the park improvement
fees is even more offensive in this case
since the city conditioned the furnishing of
water service to the subdivision upon their
payment. To me the two subjects are entirely separate and I believe it to be an
abuse of the city's authority to own and
operate a waterworks system (a proprietary
operation) to use the furnishing of water as
leverage to collect fees for other unrelated
purposes. Section 10—8-38 authorizes cities
and towns to discontinue water service to
premises where the sewer service charges
have not been paid, but I find no authorization to also deny service until park improvement fees have been paid.
MAUGHAN, C. J., concurs in the opinion
of HOWE, J.
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I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

Betty Harper CULBERTSON, Executrix
of the Estate of Joyce K. Culbertson,
and as an individual, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, a Tennessee corporation, Chicago
Bridge and Iron Company Profit-Sharing Plan Trust, an Illinois Trust, Beth
Rowley Culbertson Conrad, an individual, Loretta Culbertson, an individual,
Richard Culbertson, an individual,
Chrystella Culbertson, an individual, and
Elizabeth Culbertson, an individual, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 17148.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 4, 1981.

Decedent's second wife brought action
as executrix to have proceeds of a profitsharing plan and certain insurance policies
awarded to decedent's estate rather than to
decedent's first wife as his designated beneficiary. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., awarded
plaintiff proceeds of profit-sharing plan and
defendant proceeds of insurance policies,
and defendant appealed and plaintiff cross
appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
C. J., held that; (1) defendant was entitled
as decedent's first wife to proceeds of profit-sharing plan, interest to which vested in
her on decedent's death, where decedent
neither changed designated beneficiary not
as moving party in divorce action sought
explicit relinquishment of defendant's expectancy, and there were no broad, comprehensive provisions in decree of divorce
which could reasonably be construed as a
relinquishment or waiver of any or all expectancies, and (2) where decree of divorce
between defendant and decedent as her
first husband did not by its terms expressly
terminate defendant's status as a benefi-

APPENDIX #5
SALT LAKE COUNTY "highway-abutting" Ordinance

15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required.
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Title 15 BUILDINGS AND CONSTRUCTION
Chapter 15.28 HIGHWAY DEDICATION

15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.020, no building or structure shall be erected,
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on
any lot or parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the map
entitled, "The County Transportation Improvement Plan," on file with the planning and
development services division and made part of this chapter by reference, or other public street
which does not conform to current county width standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel
within the right-of-way of the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been
dedicated to the county and improved. The dedication and improvements shall meet the
standards for such highway or street as provided in Section 15.28.060. (Ord. 1473 (part), 2001:
Ord. 961 § 1 (part), 1986: prior code § 2-6-1)

http://ordlink.com/codes/saltlkco/_DATA/TITLE 15/Chapter_l 5_28_HIGHWAY DEDI... 10/21 /2004

APPENDIX #6
Section 63-90a-l et seq, Utah Code

C H A P T E R 90a
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKING I S S U E S
Section
63-90a-l.
63-90a-2.
63*90a-3.
§3-90a-4.

Definitions.
Applicability of chapter.
Political subdivisions to adopt guidelines.
Appeals of decisions.

63-90a«l. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:

(1) "Constitutional taking issues" means actions involving the physical taking or exaction of private real
property by a political subdivision that might require
compensation to a private real property owner because of:
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States;
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution;
or
(c) any recent court rulings governing the physical
taking or exaction of private real property by a
government entity.
(2) "Political subdivision" means a county, municipality, special district, school district, or other local government entity.
1994
63-90a-2. A p p l i c a b i l i t y of c h a p t e r .
This chapter does not apply when a political subdivision
formally exercises its power of eminent domain.
1994

63-90a-3. Political subdivisions to adopt guidelines.
(1) Each political subdivision shall enact an ordinance
establishing guidelines to assist them in identifying actions
involving the physical taking or exaction of private real
property that may have constitutional taking issues.
(2) Each political subdivision shall consider the guidelines
required by this section when taking any action that might
result in the physical taking or exaction of private real
property.
(3) (a) The guidelines adopted under the authority of this
section are advisory.
(b) A court may not impose liability upon a political
subdivision for failure to comply with the guidelines
required by this section.
(c) The guidelines neither expand nor limit the scope of
any political subdivision's liability for a constitutional
taking.

1994

63-90a-4. Appeals of decisions.
(1) Each political subdivision shall enact an ordinance that:
(a) establishes a procedure for review of actions that
may have constitutional taking issues; and
(b) meets the requirements of this section.
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose interest in
the property is subject to a physical taking or exaction by a political subdivision may appeal the political
subdivision's decision within 30 days after the decision is made.
(ii) The legislative body of the political subdivision,
or an individual or body designated by them, shall
hear and approve or reject the appeal within 14 days
after it is submitted.
(iii) If the legislative body of the political subdivision fails to hear and decide the appeal within 14
days, the decision is presumed to be approved.
(b) The private property owner need not file the appeal
authorized by this section before bringing an action in any
court to adjudicate claims that are eligible for appeal.
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the action of a
political subdivision does not constitute, and may not be
interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies or as a bar to brineine- Wal

APPENDIX #7
"Westridge Meadows" subdivision area map
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APPENDIX #8
COUNTY "Individualized Determination" document
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
By: JOHN P. SOLTIS (#3040)
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-3000
Telephone: (801) 468-2661

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT,
Plaintiff,

PARTIAL ANSWER OF PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

-vsCivil No. 980908157CD
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Judge Hanson
Defendant,

The above-named Defendant, Salt Lake County, by and through Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney John P. Soltis, in partial answer to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and
Production of documents:

INTERROGATORY No. 1.

Identify and fully describe the need (or in your opinion th<

claimed need created by the development of subject subdivision) for roadway improvements to 3 501
South Street in excess of the 33 - foot "half-width".

INTERROGATORY No. 8.

Identify and fully describe the development, platting,

approval and recordation of the development and/or issuance of a development approval for the
Westridge Meadows subdivision development.
ANSWER:

This Interrogatory will be answered in the Supplemental Answers to

Interrogatories.
I

INTERROGATORY No. 9.

Identify and fully describe:

I

A. The COUNTY'S "individualized determination", if any, concerning the public roadway I

I needs created by development of the subject subdivision and/or evidencing or supporting the I
I conclusion there is a "rough proportionality" between the dedication from the Plaintiff and the I
I corresponding needs created by the development of the subject subdivision.
I

I

B. The calculations indicating that the COUNTY has made "some sort of individualized I

I determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the |
I proposed development."
I

C.

I

The calculations indicating that the County has made "some effort to quantify its I

I findings" in support of the required dedication and improvement of the widened 3500 South Street I
I public roadway "half-width".
I

ANSWER:

pMiiniii ii

" iii id

I
See Exhibit 11.

I

i mini i f f l i m v i m i i ^

INTERROGATORY No. 10.

Identify and fully describe thepreparation, promulgation, '

adoption and/or implementation of an "official map" or "major street plan", including but not limited
to the resolutions or other documentation of the governing body of the COUNTY confirming such
"adoption" of the "official map" or "major street plan".

5

RESPONSE:

This Production Request will be answered in the Supplemental

Answers to Interrogatories.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS No. 18.

Produce all documents

you intend to introduce as evidence in the trial of this case.
RESPONSE: Attached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS # 19.

Produce all documents

identified or referred to in your answers to PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
TO DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY.
RESPONSE:

Attached.

DATED this 29th day of January, 2001

HOTAKY

7,

'^iz.

UART1N S. KMAPHU8
2001 So. State 9L #K3800
SaitUkuCfty.urfrriW
My Commkttiofi Expira*
February a, 2804
tTATlEbrUTAM

M

LL

Andrea Pullos
Salt Lake County Transportation Engineer;

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 29lh day of January, 2001.

bfoTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake G6unty
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake District Attorney

^jpH^ip.^oi/fis
/ ^ " D e p u t y District Attorney
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